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Introduction
Gladys Lechini
This book is the result of a Workshop organized in Caracas in 
2006. it is one of the byproducts of the first phase of a three year 
academic south/south collaboration project carried out by CLACso, 
CoDEsRiA and APisA during the period 2005-2007, thanks to the 
generous support of the swedish international Development Agency. 
The project is many sided and quite comprehensive, and it was 
designed to set up and, in some cases restore, the culture of structured 
scholarly networking among regional and sub-regional social science 
research institutions in Latin America, Africa and Asia. 
The objective is to improve the reciprocal understanding of these 
regions and, at the same time, to contribute to the production and dis-
semination of relevant knowledge in the south, useful to understand 
and solve regional challenges and encourage the adoption of new poli- 
cy directions. Through the organization of workshops and summer 
institutes in the three continents the project fosters the circulation of 
ideas and research findings in the academic media as well as in the 
public space of the concerned regions. The project also tries to make an 
* PhD in sociology from sao Paulo University. Researcher at the CoNiCET. Regular 
Professor of internationalss Relations at the National University of Rosario, Argen-
tina. Academic Consultor of CLACso´s south-south Program.
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impact in the scholarly discussion going on in the North, usually very 
poorly informed about realities and theoretical and methodological ap-
proaches being used in the south. The outcome of these collaborative 
activities is published in the form of books and occasional papers. 
 
During the above-mentioned seminar in Caracas, scholars coming 
from different regions of the south shared ideas and experiences on 
common realities and problems, learning about similarities and differ-
ences, compatibilities and contradictions on issues concerning mainly 
with themes related to the international financial architecture and its 
influence on democratic stability and the prospects of development in 
the south.
As it was stated during the discussions, the policies of structural 
adjustment were introduced in the early 1980s as an all-embracing 
framework for “reform” (“market-friendly” reforms) within which 
the countries of the south would surely overcome their traditional 
problems of development. but, rather than helping to solve them the 
orthodox recipes of stabilization and structural adjustment became 
major factors in the dynamic of crises and decline experienced, with 
few exceptions, in most countries of the south, reinforcing existing 
difficulties and producing new ones of their own. 
in this adjustment process a key instrumental role was played 
by the international Financial institutions (iFis). in fact, agencies 
like the international Monetary Fund (iMF), the World bank (Wb), 
and the World Trade organization (WTo) and, in our regions, the 
inter-American Development bank, the Asian Development bank and 
the African Development bank all played a dual role of paramount 
influence in domestic political processes. on the one hand, an 
economic role, forcefully promoting and implementing –sometimes 
even contributing with their own staff to the state bureaucracies 
in charge– the neoliberal policies in a whole range of markets and 
economic institutions; and on the other hand, a political role, helping 
to “discipline and align” resistant national governments within the 
narrow limits established by the Washington Consensus. 
Within this context, these financial institutions became critical 
avenues for the advancement of an international hegemonic structure 
–led by global dominant economic and political forces– into the 
policy-making and the domestic agenda of supposedly sovereign 
states, determining new forms of subordination and control. This 
asymmetrical network of social, political and cultural relations has 
prevented the countries of the periphery from implementing sovereign 
decisions in crucial areas of governance, with the consequent erosion of 
their democratic legitimacy. one of the most important consequences 
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of the policies of the Washington Consensus has been the undermining 
of the state, an institution that was relentlessly demonized and 
attacked, and multiple efforts were made to de-legitimise it as a 
player in the development process. but perhaps even more disturbing 
were the systematic erosion of effective policy making and policy 
capacities and the relocation of key macro-economic decision-
making levers in the markets and in the hands of foreign international 
financial institutions, jeopardizing both democratic consolidation and 
development in the south. 
in this regard, a relevant research question from the point 
of view of our countries relates to the conditions under which the 
long expected democratization could produce a fairer distribution 
of resources and promote the dissolution of entrenched dependency 
structures. Another pertinent issue confronted by the countries of the 
south and very hard to deal with is the challenge posed by the need 
to guarantee the state-building process against the background of a 
generalized, although highly unequal, erosion of sovereignty. A clear 
understanding of this complex background is absolutely essential to 
realize the enormous difficulties facing democratic policy making in 
Third World countries. 
That is the reason why the good performance and legitimacy of 
democratic governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America requires a 
new thinking and a new theoretical framework. Consequently, if coun-
tries are cannot be sovereign in international affairs, they can hardly 
honor popular sovereignty at home, which is just another name for 
democracy. on the other hand, the conditionalities of the internation-
al financial institutions have led to increasing levels of poverty and 
exclusion, provoking not only a negative performance in economic 
terms but also negatively affecting chances of good governance and 
democratic stability and legitimacy. The quest of overcoming ortho-
dox policies is a relevant matter for the future of democracy and de-
velopment in the south.
With these challenging topics in mind, scholars belonging to the 
three regions of the south have discussed in Caracas general issues 
concerning with the global processes and the role of international fi-
nancial institutions in shaping the new international structure. They 
also examined more specific problems related (a) to the impact of the 
structural adjustment policies on poverty and social exclusion; (b) to 
the difficult task of bringing about the reconciliation of democracy 
and development in Africa, Asia and Latin America; and (c), the con-
crete examples of Mexico, Ethiopia, Mozambique, india, Philippines, 
China and Taiwan. in the next pages a succinct summary of the diffe- 
rent presentations will be given.
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in his paper on “Global processes and its effects on Latin America. 
Polycentric versus Perturbed Worlds”, Marco Gandásegui (jr) refers to 
the ever expanding capitalist system and its ties with the Nation-state 
and the possibilities for political organizations in the countries of the 
south to act independently, with reasonable margins of autonomy. 
Within this context Gandásegui proposes to delink from capitalist re-
lations and start building alternative strategies for development. For 
him, delinking implies a political option taken by a leading social class 
or class alliance to unshackle the economic and ideological bonds im-
posed by the core capitalist powers and to seek new avenues towards 
the creation of self-centered national projects. Yet, he wonders wheth-
er delinking could be a step towards deepening capitalist relations or 
the first step in the road towards socialism.
Gandásegui resorts to samir Amin theories, for whom the only 
alternative open to countries at the periphery is to delink from a 
world-system that presents no future to them. if new alternatives 
appear on the horizon, several centers could then compete with their 
own dynamic, creating a polycentric world. Amin also considers the 
possibility of an intermediate road, one that would lead to a new phase 
of world capitalist expansion based on accelerated accumulation of an 
integrated periphery. samir Amin’s theoretical proposals are precisely 
what worry Us strategists the most, as they expect that Us could 
continue controlling events in Latin America as it has done since 
annexing half of Mexico in 1846. Despite the fact that the Us is planning 
to “redraw” the political boundaries with its southern neighbors (via 
extension of its immigration and commercial prerogatives, and so 
on) it is up to the Latin Americans to build their own alternatives. 
Gandásegui concludes that this challenge will therefore only be 
taken up by the Latin American peoples when the necessary popular 
alliances enable them to delink their development from the demands 
of transnationalization.
in her presentation on “international Monetary Fund: from stabil-
ity to instability. The Washington Consensus and structural reforms in 
Latin America” Alicia Girón’s main assumption is that the Washington 
Consensus and its consequent reforms have jointly contributed to ag-
gravate the instability in Latin America within a democratic context. 
For Girón, the development of capitalism and the economic re-
forms of the Washington Consensus have deepened the transforma-
tion of the economic structures of governments, which have passed 
from authoritarian and regulated regimes to deregulated, democratic 
and market-driven systems. however, democracy and its significance 
in the path of economic, political and social reorganization has not 
provided opportunities to the majority of the population, which has 
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not seen the benefits from the reorganization of relations between 
countries in the process of globalization. This is why it is relevant to 
highlight the constant dispute between a financial system that seeks 
equilibrium in its macroeconomic variables and the persistent finan-
cial instability of capitalist development. 
in her analysis, Girón describes the international monetary sys-
tem from its creation until the post-bretton Woods era; the global 
financial markets and the implications of financial globalization for 
emerging countries; the Washington Consensus and the transforma-
tion from regulated economies to deregulated market systems within 
democratic regimes, to conclude with some reflections on democracy 
and the results of the structural reforms. 
The problem is that after the “lost decade” of the 1980s these re-
forms were applied without bearing in mind each country’s specific 
conditions. Thus, they have weakened public institutions and have 
failed to strengthen national businesses in the face of the foreign 
competition that invaded the industrial and financial sector of the pe-
ripheral countries. Large international corporations have become the 
main actors in the post-bretton Woods era through the acquisition 
of recently privatized companies. As far as the financial environment 
is concerned, development policies, reforms and the liberalization of 
financial systems have initiated the internationalization of financial 
services, contrary to the interests of any project of national develop-
ment. The result has been growing inequality in income distribution, 
unemployment and a decrease in consumption, reaching unprece-
dented peaks in Latin American history.
Arturo Anguiano in his paper on “Mexico: the contradictions and un-
certainties of a truncated democratic process” voices his disillusion 
for the failure of the government of Vicente Fox Quesada, from the 
National Action Party (PAN), to eradicate during his presidency (2000-
2006) the evils caused by seventy two years of hegemony of the PRi 
(Partido Revolucionario institucional).
The author explains how, in a very short time, this supposedly in-
novative government turned into a grotesque caricature of the strongly 
criticized former PRi’s administrations, by resorting to the same tra-
ditional methods and practices of political manipulation and control, 
and provoking disenchantment, anger and even polarization and de-
spair in all sectors of the Mexican society. Nevertheless, he admits 
some advances to improved degrees of transparency, like the fact that 
the institutional elections of 2006 were carried out under the organi-
zation and supervision of electoral bodies (the Federal Electoral in-
stitute and its equivalents in each of the Mexican states) more or less 
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autonomous from the authorities. This could be considered a first step 
towards the effective emergence of a sovereign citizenry in Mexico, 
whose rights have always been usurped by the state and its politico-
corporate instruments. Nevertheless, this step fell short of what was 
expected because enjoyment of freedom continues to be segmented, 
differentiated, unrestricted at the top while restricted, conditioned and 
even regimented for those who survive at the bottom layers of society. 
The democracy that is supposed to have arrived in Mexico under 
the modernizing auspices of neoliberal globalization is one in which 
political parties have become electoral machines without a political 
soul, stripped of their ideology and programmes. supported by pub-
lic funding and mechanisms that guarantee them the monopoly over 
political participation, the parties appear to be booming, rich thanks 
to the public money, promoted by the modern media, participants in 
an increasingly exclusive political society. but on the other hand, this 
society is disintegrating and becoming segmented under the influence 
of regressive economic policies that result in a massive loss of jobs 
and condemn ever broader and more diverse strata of the population 
to impoverishment, emigration and uncertainty.
similarly to the case of Latin America is the situation experienced 
in Africa and the Arab World, as analyzed by the Egyptian scholar hel-
mi sharawy, when, in “The American led Globalization as the Main 
obstacle to the Development of Democracy in the Arab World and 
Africa”, he analyzes the negative consequences of the Us hegemonic 
project for the countries of the region. 
sharawy argues that Us shapes its policies in the Arab/African 
Region in the context of its global plans, the result of which impacts 
negatively on the democratic developments in the area. on the other 
hand, scholars and the civil society of the region, despite being aware 
of this situation, have so far been unable to organize and produce an 
appropriate local response. This is the reason why, to cope with Us 
overall unilateral strategy, it is of the utmost importance to resort to 
south-south cooperation.
sharawy underlines that by the end of the XXth century, the in-
ternational Financial institutions have coerced all Third World coun-
tries into adopting structural adjustment policies along with suppos-
edly democratic changes. but in order to safeguard the interests of the 
Us and its imperialist allies and in order to secure the flow of oil from 
the Gulf, full support was given to the dictatorial regimes in the Mid-
dle East. Furthermore, a year after september 11, “The national se-
curity strategy of the United states” was made known to the general 
public and in this very important document the aims of the American 
global domination were disguised in moral terms, glorifying the “de-
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mocracy” of the Free Market, the American internationalism and the 
American way of life. 
some people have argued that the logic of the market economy 
enhances the chances of liberal democracy in the case of liberal capi-
talist development. but in a region like the Middle East, where such 
development is absent because of the supremacy of a rent “tributary” 
economy (oil rent in many countries) and a long history of despotic 
rule much nearer to the Asiatic mode of production than to capital-
ism, such market economy leads to despotism rather than to democ-
racy. in the case of the African Continent, the regimes have tried to 
justify their despotism by appealing to a discourse on ethnic strife, 
the burden of foreign debt and the injustice of world trade. in both 
regions however, the aim is to support regimes loyal to the Us and 
block any attempt for a south/south dialogue.
At the beginning of the XXist century, under the guise of the world 
war on terrorism, various forms of regional collectives were promoted 
by Us. After President bush announced his “strategic Vision of the 
Us” (september 2002), his secretary of state, Colin Powell, coined 
his initiative for “Partnership Us / Middle East, for hope building” in 
December 2002, through which the Us, irrespective of any discourse 
about democracy and human rights, imposed its arbitrary right to de-
stroy any regime threatening its hegemony. Two years later, the ini-
tiative was renamed the “broader Middle East”. in this context “The 
Alexandria Declaration” was adopted in september 2004, with a neo 
liberal agenda of market economy. 
According to the author, the progress of this Middle East initiative 
must be linked to the “American internationalism”, announced several 
years before. This “internationalism” held its preparatory meetings in 
Warsaw and afterwards created the “World Forum for Democracy” in 
Chile. For sharawy, this private international organization, more en-
compassing in its scope than the Davos Forum, or the G-8, is directed 
against popular activities and the World social Forum. As it includes 
many Third World countries, like india, south Africa and Mexico, 
which have special preponderance among countries in the south, it 
presents a real obstacle to any south/south dialogue. For all the rea-
sons presented above he proposes to reactivate the three continent’s 
movement started in 1955, reinvigorating the south-south commu-
nity of nations and promoting an alternative democratic globaliza-
tion to replace the current, American-led globalization that caused so 
many problems all around the world. 
in his “The Looting of Africa” Patrick bond contends that the con-
tinent is getting progressively poorer, and that its integration into the 
world economy has generated not wealth but has rather improved the 
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mechanisms through which the outflow of wealth is secured. Africa re-
mains disempowered on fronts ranging from trade to direct investment. 
Not just poverty, but also inequality are Africa’s main features, as it hosts 
some of the world’s worst cases. Yet, the looting of Africa is not new 
and dates back many centuries, to the point at which value transfers 
began via appropriation of slave labour and the slave trade. Then, pre-
cious metals and raw materials were also extracted by forceful colonial-
ist methods. in recent decades, wealth extraction through imperialist 
relations has intensified, and some of the same kinds of primitive looting 
tactics are now once again in place throughout the entire continent. 
in his paper bond analyzes the processes of Africa’s underdevelop-
ment via trade and extractive-oriented investment, largely through the 
depletion of natural resources, thus showing the close correlation be-
tween trade openness and liberalization, poverty and the worsening of 
social conditions in general. The ‘Marginalization’ of Africa occurred, 
hence, not because of insufficient integration into the world markets, 
but because other areas of the world –especially East Asia– moved 
to the exportation of manufactured goods, while Africa’s industrial 
potential declined thanks to excessive deregulation associated with 
structural adjustment. 
Another related problem is the Northern agricultural subsidy 
system, though this is merely one aspect of the growing rural world 
inequality. Farm subsidies today mainly reflect agro-corporate campaign 
contributions and the importance of rural voting blocs in advanced 
capitalist countries. The crucial strategic question is whether self-reliant 
development strategies –which were the necessary (if insufficient) 
condition for most industrialization in the past– can be applied if low-
income exporting countries remain mired in the commodity-export 
trap. The same points must be raised with respect to Africa’s mineral 
exports, where depletion of nonrenewable resources drains the wealth of 
future generations. in the most brazen case, the oil sector demonstrates 
how profit and dividend outflows, often lubricated by corruption, have 
had extremely negative consequences. in all these respects, diverse 
forces in society have moved away from considering oil merely as a 
matter of private property, to be negotiated between corporations and 
governments, and have begun to treat oil as part of a general ‘commons’ 
of a national society’s natural capital. Ecological debt that the North 
owes the south, especially in Africa, is also vast. but only some of these 
factors are incorporated in the alternative accounting systems of the 
World bank and other ecological and social indicators such as those 
proposed by the san Francisco-based Redefining Progress. A final way 
in which Africa’s wealth is depleted is via skilled labour migration as 
mounting flows of people are producing a veritable brain drain. 
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For bond, the challenge will be to establish a different approach 
to public policy and politics. The solution to the looting of Africa is to 
be found in the self-activity of progressive Africans themselves, in their 
campaigns and declarations, their struggles –sometimes victorious 
but still mainly frustrated– and their expectations for an Africa which 
can finally throw off the chains of an exploitative world economy and 
a global power elite who treat the continent with total disrespect.
in his paper on “The impact of the Washington Consensus on Demo-
cratic stability: the case of Ethiopia”, Mammo Muchie analyzes the 
implementation of poverty reduction objectives in African states in 
this period of structural adjustment programs. For the Ethiopean, the 
main weakness of the structural adjustment approach sponsored by 
the Washington-based financial institutions is the rupture of the econ-
omy from politics and the disembeddedment of the economy from 
society. in this process, autonomy and accountability, growth and re-
distribution, and consensus and inclusiveness, moved in opposite or 
bifurcated directions.
This dilemma can be well illustrated by taking the issue of govern-
ance. only democratic governance and not what is often sold as ‘good 
governance’ provides the necessary conditions for tackling poverty at the 
root. For Muchie, the difference between democratic governance and 
good governance is significant. The donors invented what they call ‘good 
governance’ and meant by it anything but democratic participation and 
empowerment of citizens. by good governance they very often stress au-
thoritarian, pro-market, managerial ability. in the case of Africa, the so-
called ‘new generation leaders’ have been selected in accordance to how 
‘good’ and receptive they are to the donors, and not on how democratic 
they are to their people. on the contrary, in democratic governance, le-
gitimacy comes from the people and the society and not from external 
donors. Democracy is based on people’s choice, empowering the citizen 
and the society by making the state’s authorities accountable. 
in the case of Ethiopia the World bank officials claim that the 
present regime is committed to poverty reduction and is meeting the 
Millenium Development Goals while the country is a food dependent 
economy and there is not any commitment to democracy from the 
part of the government. For Muchie, profound democracy is the nec-
essary foundation for the eradication of poverty in Ethiopia, by creat-
ing the legitimacy to undertake the much overdue green (agricultural 
food production), blue (water production) and white (milk produc-
tion) revolutions. The donors should not disassociate democracy from 
poverty reduction if they wish to be politically, morally and intellectu-
ally sensitive and consistent. 
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beluce bellucci in “All and Nothing: Capital’s Wager in Mozambique” 
analyses the possibilities and limitations of two economic bets pro-
posed to reduce misery in Mozambique, showing the complete schizo-
phrenia between them: capital on one side and labor on the other, with 
capital being the beneficiary, as always. For the author, the present 
social and institutional violence is the fruit of the normal process of 
capital accumulation between the haves and have-nots, with police 
and private militias imposing order.
The modernization of Mozambique, including the establishment 
of a national state and the implementation of socialism, occurred be-
latedly in the world context, in the mid 1970s, just when nation-states 
began to lose weight in international relations and found their margin 
for maneuver and sovereignty constrained. With independence, social-
ist modernization was imposed, conceived of as a system to produce 
manufactured goods supported by a strong state, formally different 
from capitalist models. but in 1992, a capitalist, democratic and lib-
eral system was instituted. The legal system was adjusted accordingly, 
readying the country for its new international insertion, to the liking 
of big investors. however, never before did the country face such mis-
ery with so little autonomy. 
Foreign direct investment (FDi) as one of the pillars of econom-
ic policy is proposed in the case of Mozambique, through the Mozal 
Project, which started to operate in 2000, and is considered relevant 
by the government because, being export oriented, will bring benefits 
by linking Mozambique to the international economy. Mozal, together 
with other mega-projects which are still on the drawing board, will 
have a large impact on the country’s GDP and trade balance, but not 
on the national income, the balance of payments and the creation of 
local jobs. 
Another alternative for a “pro-poor” development strategy to the 
above-mentioned mega projects has been to attract investments through 
labor-intensive manufactured exports (LiME) industries, which will 
create more jobs than the mega projects. but according to bellucci, 
this process based on individual and family labor, implies acute and 
intensified exploitation, and experience teaches that this model is also 
responsible for the exclusion of various countries and regions. From 
a novel perspective, the mega-projects act in the old Mozambican pic-
ture with “much dead labor and nearly no live labor, while the LiME 
initiatives act with much live labor and nearly no dead labor”.
Mozambique’s exclusion is social, political and economic. 
Mozambique has unconditionally adhered to all the letters of 
intention to the iMF and has obeyed the impositions established by 
international lenders. it established the peace process with Renamo, 
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democratized the country with direct elections, freedom of political 
parties, the press and circulation of capital, and above all, it brought 
good governance, permitting high profits and their repatriation. The 
proposal of the iMF, World bank and big international investors, 
endorsed by the government, to attract mega-projects and LiME –in 
a country with 70% of the population living in abject misery– puts a 
new face on exploitation, but according with the author, everything 
is in line with the same colonial political objectives of despoiling the 
Mozambican people. This is the essence of the current economic 
policy, which takes advantage of the reigning misery to increase the 
gains of big capital, borne on the bandwagon of democracy, peace, 
security and good governance.
in “The Global Crisis of Legitimacy of Liberal Democracy” Walden 
bello deals with the present crisis of Lockean democracy, the model of 
democratic rule that the Us has promoted as the system of self-rule, 
both in the North and in the south. This model is now in crisis in the 
United states, as well as in the countries of the south, as the author 
shows through various examples, mainly in the Philippines.
Although two decades ago “People power” used to be synonymous 
with the Philippines, recent developments have shown that everyone 
is becoming increasingly disillusioned with the political system estab-
lished in the Philippines since 1986. This system has increasingly en-
couraged maximum factional competition within the elite, while allow-
ing them to close ranks against any proposal of change in the social and 
economic structure. Elections have made voters active participants in 
legitimizing the social and economic status quo, creating the great Phil-
ippine paradox: an extremely lively play of electoral politics unfolding 
above a class structure that is one of the most immobile in Asia. 
Despite some institutional and cultural variations, one can say 
that the dynamics of democratic politics in countries such as bra-
zil, Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, and Thailand are similar to those in 
the Philippines. in all these cases, dictatorships lost credibility in the 
1980s, for they could neither implement nor support the “structural 
adjustment” programs which external actors demanded. but the new 
democratic governments soon confronted their own dilemma as mul-
tilateral agencies wanted them to use their democratic legitimacy to 
impose the economic reforms the military failed to carry out. Thus, 
electoral democracy became the prime mechanism for the imposi-
tion of stabilization or structural adjustment programs in Jamaica, 
haiti, the Philippines, Peru, and Pakistan, among others. From the 
mid eighties to the 2002, a series of governments eroded the credibil-
ity of democracy by undertaking unsuccessful efforts to impose the 
economic stabilization desired by Washington and the iMF.
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bello’s main point is that democracy is nowadays suffering a 
process of erosion due to many threats, both in the North and in the 
south. To respond to these threats he finds it necessary to enter into 
a process of reconceptualization or fundamental revision of what 
democracy is at various levels, as for too long democracy has been 
identified with elections, irrespective of either Rousseau’s or Michels’ 
warnings. This is why it is necessary to move to more direct and par-
ticipatory methods of democratic governance, taking into account the 
anti-globalization movement with its emphasis on direct democratic 
methods of decision-making. Equality must be restored, as one of the 
key dimensions of democracy, achieving a more equitable distribu-
tion of assets and income.
but, above all, we must face the fact that capitalism and demo-
cratic deepening are no longer compatible, and that the challenge lies in 
the nature and degree of the restraints that we put on the market while 
we restructure the system of production and consumption around the 
satisfaction of the needs of people and the community rather than 
around the profitability of the firms. This is a very complex task, which 
needs a multidimensional approach to tackle the various dimensions of 
the problem with ideas and institutional solutions appropriate for the 
present times, so that democracy will not become a thing of the past. 
in line with the above contribution, Virginia Miralao in “Globali-
zation, Democracy and Development: some Asian Patterns and the 
Philippines’ Experience”, describes the impact of the globalization 
over democracy and development in Asia, with especial attention to 
the case of Philippines.
in the first place, Miralao highlights some relevant patterns of glo-
balization, democracy and development in Asia. she briefly analyzes 
the cases of india, the Philippines, singapore, Malaysia, south korea, 
Taiwan, China and Vietnam to show the difference between the con-
cepts of democracy and development in the countries of the region, 
and hence, the way they are related to the notions of development and 
economic growth. in general, country experiences in the region lend 
support to the proposition that the opening up of national economies 
to global market forces puts pressure on societies to also liberalize their 
political systems. but in the case of the AsEAN members, the alliance 
has not been successful in enjoining fellow-members, like Myanmar, to 
democratize and allow its citizens greater political freedoms.
Then, she focuses on the Philippines current development situa-
tion. since the mid-1990s, the Philippines has been trying to open up 
its economy and pursue various “free market” reforms as well as so-
ciopolitical ones, to make the country so-called “globally competitive”. 
she has particularly analyzed the consequences of globalization on 
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the educational levels and profiles and on the employment structure. 
And she finds reasons to expect that ongoing globalization may be 
further worsening the state of the Philippine socioeconomic inequali-
ties. Finally she concludes that despite the fact that there are emerging 
trends that seem to be uplifting the national economy, this appears 
to be taking place in ways that do not adequately address issues like 
poverty and inequalities
in her paper “Theorizing poverty and food security in the era of 
economic reforms”, Utsa Patnaik analyzes the impact of the neoliberal 
economic policies on issues related to food security and poverty in 
india during the last fifteen years, criticizing the prevalent analysis 
and prescriptions.
The author remarks that the very serious and widespread agrar-
ian crisis that currently affects india was generated by deflationary 
public policies and trade liberalization, in a moment when the inter-
national prices of primary goods were declining. This is reflected in 
falling foodgrains absorption and falling energy intake in the indian 
population. she criticizes, then, the estimation procedure to calculate 
poverty used by the government and a great number of academics 
when they arrive at the conclusion that poverty in india is declining, 
without understanding that the adverse unemployment effects of de-
flation can swamp out any benefit from falling food prices. 
For Patnaik the data shows that the depth of poverty has increased 
considerably during the fifteen years of neoliberal reforms, with more 
people being pushed down into a poorer nutritional status than before 
in most indian states. Thus, there is not over supply of food grains, 
but a decline in food grain supply and an even more drastic decline of 
effective demand for food grains especially in rural india, owing to an 
abnormally fast loss of purchasing power of the lower strata during 
the last years.
 her proposal offers an alternative to cutting back food grain out-
put. For her, the correct policy is to raise purchasing power of the 
popular sectors and restore effective demand and access to affordable 
food grains through a combination of a universal, and non targeted, 
employment guarantee scheme. 
Patnaik evaluates the relevance of a proper analysis of this situa-
tion as the incorrect theorizing in academic and government circles is 
leading to policy formulations and measures which will only worsen 
mass welfare and plunge even larger sections of the rural population 
in particular into higher unemployment and food deprivation. The 
official calculation uses a particular indirect method of estimation, 
which completely de-links poverty from nutrition norms by ignoring 
current data which shows the rising nutritional deprivation and in-
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creasing depth of poverty. it refuses to recognize that, while in devel-
oped societies consumers can be separated from a minority who are 
agricultural producers, in a poor country like india the majority of 
consumers are themselves rural and directly involved in production 
as cultivators and labourers, so deflationary policies hit them hard in 
both these roles of producers and consumers. Price deflation does not 
benefit even landless labourers since it is part of a process of income 
deflation which raises unemployment faster than prices fall. The econ-
omists’ estimation of poverty by the indirect method are still caught 
in the old conceptual trap of equating relative food price decline with 
declining poverty, without understanding that the adverse unemploy-
ment effects of deflation can swamp out any benefit of food price fall.
With current rural poverty as high as nearly four-fifths of the 
population, and poverty depth increasing with a higher proportion of 
people being pushed down into lower nutritional levels, Utsa Patnaik 
concludes by arguing that there is no economic rationale for continu-
ing with a targeted public distribution system. 
Romer Cornejo demonstrates that there is not an inevitable relation-
ship between economic liberalism and democracy. in his paper “Po-
litical Participation and Challenges of New Democracies: Remarks 
on China and Taiwan”, he exposes how in China the endogenous 
factors along with the prevalence of the authoritarian state outweigh 
the internationalization of the economy; in Taiwan, on the other 
hand, the democratic process can be linked to the search for inter-
national legitimacy. 
The changes in the Chinese political system during the reforms 
can be summarized as the transition from a totalitarian regime to a 
single party authoritarianism. This last form has required the decen-
tralization of decisions and the introduction of innovative ways of po-
litical participation, while continually preserving the hegemonic posi-
tion of the Communist Party, which is endorsed by the Constitution 
and other related laws. Therefore, the changes in the political system 
(and the local direct elections as the main example) cannot be consid-
ered as mechanisms traditionally linked to a democratic system but 
rather as instruments to help the survival of an authoritarian regime. 
The local elections have been utilized by the new leadership to face the 
threats to governability and the generalized discontent of the popula-
tion caused by the corruption of local officials.
According to Cornejo, thanks to its political system, Taiwan has 
been recognised worldwide as one of the most liberal and democratic 
countries. The transition from a single party dictatorship to an elec-
toral democracy began in the 1980’s, together with a Taiwanisation 
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process of the government. since 1991 the Constitution has been 
amended several times with the purpose of changing some founda-
tions of the government structure and the electoral mechanisms. All 
these reforms have implied a redefinition of the relations with China, 
as the new ascending Taiwanese elite wanted to move away from the 
reunification project and begin constructing an all-Taiwanese political 
structure and a new form of nationalism. The current opening process 
was not only a product of the island’s domestic social forces but, also, 
of the relationship within the international context and with China. 
At the moment, the intensification of the economic relationship has 
made the island highly dependent on its commerce with the continent. 
beijing, for its part, has played its cards to influence Taiwan’s elections 
through different means. Another relevant aspect pointed out by Cor-
nejo is the existence of a society with dynamic class mobility resulting 
from accelerated development, economic opportunities, and effective 
state policies (efficient land reform, strong investment on education, 
industrial development and infrastructure construction). 
having analyzed the current political system and the local elec-
tions, Cornejo states that nowadays one of the problems in Taiwan is 
the increasing lack of trust in political parties among voters, because 
of the growing corruption and the “new pop electoral culture”. he 
concludes that democracy is more than copying procedures and insti-
tutions; political culture is particularly important and new democra-
cies still need to go through political education in order to create real 
citizenships.
Marco A. Gandásegui (Jr.)*
Global Processes and its Effects
on Latin America
Polycentric vs Perturbed Worlds
The capacity of capitalism to abstractly ‘solve the 
problem of African development’ could be dis-
cussed ad infinitum. Concrete capitalism, such 
as actually exists, that is, globalized, not only has 
failed to ‘solve’ this problem (which it created) 
over the last 150 years (or even over the last 400 
years since the slave trade), but envisages nothing 
for the next 50 years. The challenge will therefore 
only be taken up by the African peoples, the day 
that the necessary popular alliances enable them to 
delink (déconnexion) their development from the 
demands of transnationalization. 
samir Amin (1987)
ThE sPANish-sPEAkiNG WoRLD is celebrating the 400th An-
niversary of Quixote, published in 1605. The book marks Europe’s 
transformation from the old feudal order to a new financially driven 
system of accumulation. Cervantes’ vision of the new times was ex-
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tremely sharp. Let me share with you a dialogue between Don Quix-
ote and sancho his squire.
Fortune is arranging matters for us better than we could have shaped 
our desires ourselves, for look there, friend sancho Panza, where 30 
or more monstrous giants present themselves, all of whom i mean to 
engage in battle and slay, and with whose spoils we shall begin to make 
our fortunes; for this is righteous warfare, and it is God’s good service to 
sweep so evil a breed from the face of the earth.
–What giants? –Panza responds. 
–Those thou seest there –answers his master– with the long arms, and 
some have them nearly two leagues long.
Look, your worship –says Panza– what we see there are not giants but 
windmills, and what seem to be their arms are the sails that turned by 
the wind make the millstone go.
Undeterred, Don Quixote spurs his trusty Rocinante to a shambling 
gallop, only to come to grief as the windmill turns, breaking his spear 
and tossing rider and mount to the ground.
Quixote’s words sound so familiar 400 years later when world leaders 
speak of “righteous wars” and the need to “sweep so evil breed from 
the face of the earth”. (China Daily News, 2005).
so-called globalization is not so new. We can track it down to at 
least since Quixote’s first edition. however, the late 20th Century 
corporate world globalization has spurred a set of new questions. 
According to Wood (2003) the world state system –within which 
globalization keeps growing– is very much a necessity, with its com-
plex institutional apparatuses and its apparent sovereignty. This is 
the context in which “New imperialism” faces all its contradictions 
and defies conflicting interests. on the other hand, for authors like 
hardt and Negri (2001), the Nation-state is obsolete, belonging to 
the past.
At this juncture we will present the ever expanding capitalist 
system and its close ties to the existence of the Nation-state. After 
exploring the notions associated with the Nation-state we will exam-
ine their impact on the XXi Century. We are interested in the pos-
sibilities for autonomous political organizations to flourish among 
peoples of over one half of humanity. What obstacles can be foreseen, 
and what challenges confront the alternatives. Do the alternatives 
push us in the direction of delinking? Does delinking have a special 
relationship with revolution? What are the historical delinking expe-
riences? We will analyze some of the more recent thesis developed in 
the Us to confront these alternatives, specifically to contain future 
delinking processes. We will close with some concluding remarks on 
Latin America.
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The Nation State System
According to Wood, (2000) the capitalist world system in the early XXi 
Century has to confront the growing disparity between the rich and poor 
regions. To conserve the present world order, a result of over 100 years 
of on-going conflicts and struggles, more violence and force will top the 
agenda. Arrighi (2003) believes that we are in a period of transition, a pe-
riod of turbulence1. however, hardt and Negri foresee a new world order 
based on Empire, a state capable of concentrating military and ideologi-
cal (hegemony) power over other lesser states and political entities. 
in the upper-most echelons of Us foreign policy, world order and 
containment has been its priority for decades. however, as we shall 
examine, emphasis and direction change according to new world de-
mands. These challenges to the present world order require solutions. 
For some Us analysts world order has to be “perturbed” on a perma-
nent basis. The proposal entails a hierarchic world with a solid center 
and its periphery. The new world order also must have a “semi-periph-
ery” committed to the global rules.
The proposal underscores the need to “perturb” those countries 
or regions on the periphery that have any delinking tendencies. Quot-
ing Quixote, “this is righteous warfare, and it is God’s good service to 
sweep so evil a breed from the face of the earth”.
how and when will this period of “turbulence” come to an end? 
Will the outcome be a perturbed self-centered Empire ruling over 
many immature Nation-states? or will a “new imperialism” emerge 
with some new and some old “global players” fighting over control 
of the resources within the boundaries of Nation-states? or can a 
polycentric world with multiple regional economic and cultural au-
tonomous expressions at the Nation-state level replace what has been 
centuries of confrontation?
Delinking and Revolution
The appearance of the Nation-state is a product of capitalist 
development. The Capitalist unequal rhythm of expansion create a 
Nation-state system full of contradictions. These conflicts have been 
closely examined on two distinct levels. Firstly, conflicting interests 
between more and less developed countries (that are identified as 
Nation-states). These contradictions lead to the subordination 
of the weaker countries. Wallerstein and Arrighi (1989) set these 
relations in a world system context divided between center and 
periphery.
1 “if the system eventually breaks down, it will be primarily because of the Us re-
sistance to adjustment and accommodation” (Arrighi, 2003). 
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At a second level, conflicts arise among the core states whose 
capitalist expansion tends to clash over control of cheap labor and 
natural resources. Modern capitalist imperialism is a consequence of 
uneven growth and expresses itself through financial competition and 
military confrontation.
Marxists up until early 20th Century saw capitalist relations 
spreading evenly worldwide. however, bolsheviks criticized this view 
saying that imperialism would not allow less developed countries to 
reach full capitalist development. The only alternative open to these 
countries was to delink from capitalist relations and start building 
alternative strategies for development.
The Marxist view of social revolution, a product of internal capi-
talist contradictions, was enriched and, in fact, transformed by what 
was called “Leninism”. Revolution was not only the result of reaching 
a ripe-old capitalist state ready to fall, it could also be understood 
as breaking away from dominant capitalist relations. The delinking 
process was a necessity precisely due to the absence of any feasible 
mature capitalist development.
A long debate ensued within the Marxist ranks pitting the “one coun-
try” thesis against a “world revolution” outlook. The valuable lessons de-
riving from these ideological confrontations can be summarized in a bet-
ter understanding of capitalist underpinnings. Gramsci’s critique of lineal 
development, French structuralism, World systems, and Latin American 
Dependency theory, among others, broke new grounds in this context.
World systems theory centers on these processes that open paths 
for countries to transit from center to periphery, and vice versa. it de-
velops the new notion of semi-periphery to acknowledge the existence 
of an intermediate space. in a way it leans towards criticism of Marx’s 
original views on capitalist development. 
Marx’s theory on a capitalist crisis based on a tendency towards 
falling profit rates, feeding territorial expansion and regional domi-
nation, is overcome through political manipulation and the extrac-
tion of surpluses from non value (productive) sources. These alter-
natives are shrinking in the wake of a diminishing work force and 
the destruction of the environment. Capitalism has shown resilience 
through inclusive political regimes (social democrats and /or Wel-
fare states), as well as exclusive policies both at the Center and the 
Periphery through military takeovers of cheap labor reserves and 
natural resources.
Among the early writings on imperialism –centered on the dan-
gers of war, financial concentration, and its periodization– little atten-
tion was dedicated to the growing polarization of the international 
community. After the 1917 Russian Revolution and the failure of the 
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Western European working class to follow suit, Lenin put forth his 
thesis on building socialism from below. in order to be successful a 
new strategy was necessary: Delinking. only through a state centered 
policy, controlled by a high command, could a relatively backward 
country catch up with the more developed capitalist countries.
The notion startled and confused many of the revolutionaries 
around the world. Lenin’s idea was to build socialism in the middle 
of a capitalist crisis, hoping time would be on the worker’s side. Len-
in’s foresight was amazing taking into account his experience during 
World War i and what was yet to come: The 1929 financial “crash” and 
World War ii. he did not count on capitalisms ability to fight back and 
find new energies where apparently none existed.
The UssR after its foundation in 1923 chose delinking as the best 
option to defend its revolution and to accumulate internally. before 
passing away Lenin stood by the peasant-workers alliance that would 
enable the new state to survive. by the period 1928-1929, however, the 
class alliance was not solving the crucial growth problems faced by 
the UssR. Rapid industrialization could only be achieved by transfer-
ring profits from the rich peasantry to the new economic strategy. The 
economy based on “socialist primitive accumulation” became the new 
battle cry2.
Historical delinking experiences
Russia’s delinking strategy was mainly imposed on her by the central 
powers and ensuing imperialist policies (internal contradictions). 
To survive the blockade and military campaigns, the UssR first 
established an alliance with the small and medium landowners in 
order to create surplus. Later on it subjected the land-workers to 
stringent accumulation policies. Throughout its 70 year history, the 
UssR was forced to compete on uneven grounds with the richer 
capitalist countries. The arms race finally pulled the rug from under 
the soviet regime. The UssR was never able to escape the laws of 
capitalist accumulation.
The autarchic thesis of socialism in one country was trans- 
formed after World War ii into an alternative model of growth for all 
underdeveloped countries. The earlier delinking strategy was aban-
doned and in its place a new socialist world bloc was proposed to 
compete with capitalism.
2 According to bettelheim, Charles (1978) a new economics based on the idea of 
a “socialist primitive accumulation”, put forth by Preobrazhensky, Evgeni (1971) 
would call for “the peasantry (to) pay relatively high prices for industrial products 
and be more or less underpaid for their own produce”.
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The Chinese Revolution right after World War ii seemed to con-
firm the delinking thesis. China’s new leaders rapidly embraced Mos-
cow. however, disputes over peasant worker alliances and agrarian 
surpluses provoked a split by the end of the 50s. in Latin America, the 
Cuban Revolution success reinforced the delinking thesis. in order to 
survive the overwhelming Us offensive the Cuban leadership struck 
an alliance with Moscow. Cuba was able to receive enough petrol and 
cheap food products (for 30 years) to consolidate its new society.
Using the same containment tactics applied to the UssR and 
China, the Us set up an aggressive isolationist policy towards the Car-
ibbean island. The Us developed a dual strategy aimed at destroying 
all national liberation movements as well as to contain all delinking 
processes. Firstly, containment was predicated on an anti-communist 
crusade. secondly, an inclusive policy was hatched based on develop-
ment and economic growth recipes. Today’s classic example is still 
W.W. Rostow’s book on how to confront communism through capital-
ist development (Rostow, 1974).
The Dependency theorists in the 60s put forth an alternative that 
rebukes Rostow’s thesis. its focus centers on capitalist contradictions 
and limitations. Two lines within the Theory of Dependency are rec-
ognized and debated. The first states that countries on the periphery 
will never be successful if the central powers do not make structural 
changes. These changes would clear the way for the less developed 
countries to catch up (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969). 
Prebisch understood the relations as uneasy, begging for more 
autonomy.
by dependence i mean relations between centers and the periphery 
whereby a country is subjected to decisions taken in the centers, not 
only in economic matters, but also in matters of politics and strategy 
for domestic and foreign policies. The consequence is that due to exte-
rior pressure the country cannot decide autonomously what it should 
do or cease doing. The structural changes bring about an awareness 
of this phenomena, and this awareness, this desire for autonomy, is 
one of the integral elements in a critical understanding of the system3 
(Chilcote, 1984).
Chilcote also quotes osvaldo sunkel, a renowned critique of develop-
ment theory, who says that Latin America’s
aim is greater autonomy, in order to achieve development without “de-
pendency” and without marginalization. To achieve this goal, the asym-
3 Chilcote’s quote is from Prebisch, Raul (1980). 
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metrical nature of the present system of international economic rela-
tions must first undergo a thorough reform (sunkel, 1972:517-531).
The second line did not see any possibilities for structural changes 
and proposed a delinking strategy designed to build new alliances and 
create conditions for self-centered surplus accumulation4 (Marini, 
1973; Dos santos, 1977).
We attempt to demonstrate that the dependence of Latin American coun-
tries on other countries cannot be overcome without a qualitative change 
in their internal structures and external relations (Dos santos, 1970).
in a political perspective, Dos santos would add that 
everything now indicates that what can be expected is a long process of 
sharp political and military confrontations and a profound social radi-
calization that will lead these countries to a dilemma: government of 
force, which opens the way to fascism, or popular revolutionary govern-
ments, which open the way to socialism. intermediate solutions have 
proved to be, in such a contradictory reality, empty and utopian (Dos 
santos, 1970).
There is no doubt that the most successful delinking experiment of 
the XXth Century was the creation of the socialist bloc under soviet 
leadership. Although the process was wracked with contradictions, 
Moscow rarely denied entrance to any Nation-state. Another experi-
ence set in motion in a similar direction –with different ideological 
contents and with less success– was the non-aligned movement.
According to samir Amin (2000) these experiments were mainly 
grounded on material objectives, losing perspective of the ideologi-
cal underpinnings. Material aspects were over dimensioned and super 
structural elements were not sufficiently stressed.
The strategic objectives of these revolutions involve a disconnection 
in relation to the logic of the capitalist global expansion. The deploy-
ment of these objectives supposes a power based on a social hegemony 
“national popular” and not a “dictatorship of the proletariat”, as it had 
been conceived in the Marxist tradition, which recognizes the need to 
combine, even conflictively, aspirations of capitalists and other social-
ists character. Progress in achieving these objectives implies, in turn, 
the gradual and steady progress in the democratization of society both 
in the practice of management power and in the economy.
4 For an update on the Dependency debate, osorio, J. (2005).
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An important case that must be studied further is China’s post 1949 
revolutionary experience. Delinking was an immediate response to 
Us military threats. China’s alliance with the UssR enabled Mao 
followers to defend themselves militarily and to reorganize the 
economy. by 1972 China was able to establish new relations with 
the Us and other central powers. by the turn of the XXi Century 
China is considered a rising star capable of becoming the future 
economic world super power on which capital accumulation can 
grow unfettered.
 
China’s re-linking has just begun. With strong similarities to the Us 
experience in early XiX Century or German development in the mid 
19th Century, China seems ready to smash all material and ideologi-
cal obstacles on its way towards becoming a central player in capital-
ist accumulation. China seems to be prepared to take the giant step 
thanks to its work force as well as to its political organization. (Ecolo-
gists have their doubts that the Earth can support a new world player 
–capitalist predator– next to Europe and the Us)5.
The Periphery’s Delinking
Delinking implies a political option taken by a leading social class or 
class alliance to unshackle the economic and ideological bonds im-
posed by the core capitalist powers and to seek new avenues towards 
the creation of self-centered national projects. Are these projects asso-
ciated with any particular economic system or ideological premise? in 
other words, is delinking a step towards joining ranks with capitalism 
or is it supposed to show the road towards socialism?
The present day states successful in their delinking processes are 
at the center of the capitalist accumulation process. Those who failed 
are somewhere between the periphery and the semi-periphery. Where 
will China place itself in the short or medium term? Can Cuba be ana-
lyzed in this context?
Capitalism’s “periphery” is split into two segments. There is the 
proper periphery and there is also a semi-periphery. These are difficult 
categories because they are diffused, expected to describe the move-
ments of Nation-states. The members of the semi-periphery tend to 
move towards the center, with some self-centered accumulation el-
5 others are much more optimist for very different reasons. in a recent newspaper 
article published in beijing an observer had this to say: “Perhaps the strongest reason 
for optimism (over the region) is that it is no longer true that rising powers must inevi-
tably confront existing powers in either an acrimonious rivalry or in overtly belligerent 
competition, said Michael Rich, executive vice-president of Rand Corp, a Us-based 
think tank.”
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ements. The proper periphery has no accumulation properties with 
exporting or enclave economies. 
The Nation-state system offers a stabilizing effect both on politi-
cal relations as well as to the accumulation process. The territorial and 
world market distribution that took place in the XiX Century and the 
containment policies of the XX Century gave capitalism the needed 
stability for accumulation. The European Wars during the XiX Cen-
tury and the XX Century World Wars were necessary in order to make 
the adjustments between old and new power centers.
The XXi Century will face new and more dangerous con-
frontations between incumbent central powers and new candi-
dates. Unlike past centuries, the contenders are not concentrated 
in Europe. Europe along with Russia can become contenders in 
the next battle confronting Us and the Far East (China and Ja-
pan). An armed conflict or an ideological struggle of this kind 
can create conditions for delinking processes at regional levels 
or on a country basis. samir Amin asks himself if delinking is vi-
able or adequate at a regional level. Can delinking be the result of 
one or more leading countries at the periphery? Amin also pro-
poses the possibility of an intermediate road that would lead to 
a new stage of world capitalist expansion based on the accelera- 
ted accumulation of an integrated periphery. (samir Amin, 1997).
Theotonio Dos santos (2005) just recently put brazil’s foreign policy 
in the spot-light presenting the south American country as a new 
“global player”. 
brazil’s new international role implies a world trade strategy with 
new partners. At present brazil has balanced its foreign trade flow 
equally among the Us, Japan and the rest of Latin America. brazil’s 
growing trade with China and Asia, as well as its strategic move to-
wards the Arab countries, and its future association with Russia is 
part of the over-all picture it is sending to the world as a new “Global 
Player”.
Theotonio Dos santos’ approach has very little to do with autarchic 
strategies. in this sense he shares samir Amin’s (2000) view on the 
question that relates to delinking and autarchy. 
We shall not expand here on the theory of delinking but, to avoid 
any misunderstanding, say merely that delinking is not synonymous 
with autarchy but only the subjection of external relations to the 
logic of internal development (whereas adjustment means binding 
internal development to the possibilities afforded by the world sys-
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tem). in more precise terms, delinking is the refusal to submit to the 
demands of the worldwide law of value, or the supposed ‘rationality’ 
of the system of world prices that embody the demands of reproduc-
tion of worldwide capital. it, therefore, presupposes society’s capac-
ity to define for itself an alternative range of criteria of rationality 
of internal economic options, in short a “law of value of national 
application”.
The US and Delinking
in recent years new world-views have made their way to the top of 
the best seller lists in the Us. Although not truly original, what makes 
them special is their focus on the future of capitalism, uneven devel-
opment, and delinking processes. Author samuel huntington discov-
ers Gramsci´s notion of hegemony to base his theories on the inevita-
ble clash of civilizations and the survival of capitalism. More recently, 
Thomas barnett (2004) Professor at the Naval War College (Rhode 
island), has sparked controversy by stressing the need to introduce 
discipline on a world scale in order to subdue conflicts in an expand-
ing capitalist system6.
The nature of the system’s contradiction require correctives that 
can deal with threats of dismemberments, to avoid disconnections be-
tween its parts that can put the whole in danger. According to barnett, 
globalization is not a lineal process and much less an opportunity for 
less developed countries to catch-up with the richer nations7. barnett 
agrees with other authors reviewed here that the capitalist system has 
a center and a periphery8. in his particular view, the Us stands alone 
as the center´s nucleus. The rest of the developed world is grouped 
together in a “semi-periphery” status. The periphery is made up of all 
other Nation-states characterized by their instability, ruled by politi-
cal dictators and often with enormous natural resources. Under nor-
mal conditions, the system has no major problems it cannot solve. 
however, the center-periphery relationship generates what barnett 
calls “collateral damages”. These are mainly maverick Nation-states 
that delink from the capitalist system.
6 For a further analysis of barnett’s proposals see Ana Esther Ceceña, (2004).
7 see Garcia Arias, (2004) an analyst at ECLA, for a deeper analysis of neo-liberal 
policies.
8 barnett rejects Wallerstein’s formulation of the concept. in an interview with 
Martinovich (2004) the political scientist says “As for Wallerstein’s brand of watered-
down Marxism, let’s remember that he posited that the Core needed to keep the Pe-
riphery down in order to stay rich. i’m making exactly the opposite argument. if 
anyone wants to link me to Wallerstein, they better note i turn that now outdated (it 
worked for a while in the 1970s) argument on its head.”
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According to Peet (2005)
barnett describes a binary opposition: on one side there is a function-
ing core, a wonderful world, where the good stuff is found and the good 
life lived, with sacred America acting as the beacon of liberty; while on 
the other side there is the “disconnected gap”, where the bad stuff usu-
ally happens, off-grid locations where security problems and instability 
congregate, dangerous places that constitute a demand pattern for U.s. 
security exports. This cartography of American enlightenment guides a 
new attitude toward the world, intensifying the existing sense of global 
supremacy by expressing it always in optimistic terms, in contrast to 
terms of eternal lack in the places waiting for freedom to be imposed.
With the collapse of the socialist bloc and with China’s relinking, the 
Us has identified a new enemy for the XXi Century. barnett discards 
the cultural threats to world order (religions, islam, and others) and 
identifies as dangerous all those countries that have delinked as well 
as those with possibilities of doing so. Peet singles out another glimpse 
of barnett´s theory: 
The enemy is neither religion (islam), nor place, but the condition of 
disconnectedness. To be disconnected in this world is to be isolated, 
deprived, repressed, and uneducated. For barnett, these symptoms of 
disconnectedness define danger. simply put, if a country was losing 
out to globalization, or rejecting much of its cultural content flows, 
chances are that the United states would end up sending troops there. 
so barnett thinks that the 1990s revealed neither chaos nor uncer-
tainty, but the defining conflict of our age, a historical struggle that 
screams out for a new U.s. vision of a future world worth creating. 
strategic vision in the United states needs to focus on “growing the 
number of states that recognize a stable set of rules regarding war and 
peace” –that is, the conditions under which it is reasonable to wage 
war against identifiable enemies of “our collective order”.
barnett divides the system’s center into two parts. Firstly, a country or a 
region is functional to capitalism if it can manage the flows that integrate 
national and world economies (ideas, services, money, and media). At 
a second level, the system is made up of a group of countries or regions 
that do their best to harmonize their internal laws with dominant global 
rules of democracy, rule of law and the free market. Countries that are 
well behaved are those whose requests to join the WTo are accepted.
Peet comes to the conclusion that according to barnett “a country is 
‘disconnected’ (delinked) when it fails to gain the confidence of multi-
national corporations, which limits foreign investment”. barnett adds 
that this may be the case,
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because the country is a theocracy, is spatially isolated, connected to 
the world via corrupt state-run telecommunications media, pursues 
illicit gain, treats its women as birth machines and therefore limits 
its labor force and export potential, or because it is “blessed” with too 
many raw materials that constitute its main exports.
barnett also says “connectedness is kept from appearing in the ‘gap’ 
(peripheral countries) by wars, leaders who stay too long, and so on”.
barnett’s book puts forth two interesting proposals to maintain an 
Pax Americana in the XXi Century and neutralize contending alterna-
tives (delinking). To start off with, barnett suggests that the Us should 
create a systems Administration Force. This would entail dividing 
the Pentagon (Defense Department) into two divisions. one division 
would take care of traditional armed forces and their deployment on a 
world scale. The other division would take charge of the new systems 
Administrative Force with the task of reshaping and guiding all de-
linked countries9. Chet Richards (2005) comments that barnett’s goal 
to “perturb” countries that are delinked would be impossible if such a 
scheme were not in place. 
Without such a force, we might –through massive military effort– per-
turb a Gap country’s system, but we will have no mechanism to steer it 
into the Core. We are seeing this in iraq today where the initial surgery 
on the country was successful, but both the patient and the surgeon 
may succumb to the post-operative infection.
barnett’s idea of “perturbing” countries that are delinked (or in the 
“gap”) is not quite the same as destroying nations or peoples. it is 
more a question of creating instability and redefining the existing 
set of rules between Nation-states. barnett believes that in order to 
reach full-fledged globalization a third of today’s world population 
(2 billion persons) would have to perturbed. in order to reach such 
a goal the proposed systems Administrative Force would have to 
recruit some 20 million persons to work on a global scale on an in-
definite basis.
it is worthwhile noting that barnett predicts the political annexa-
tion of the whole Caribbean basin to the Us in the next 50 years. This 
9 The Us created an office of Reconstruction and stabilization at the state 
Department, with many of barnett’s proposals, in August 2004. President George 
bush gave a major speech explaining the office’s mission last May. see George 
W. bush, 2005, supporting Emerging Democracies, Remarks at the international 
Republican institute Dinner, Renaissance hotel, Washington, DC, 17 May, Us state 
Department Web Page.
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includes Mexico, Central America, and the northern portion of south 
America (a population close to 225 million inhabitants). he also fore-
sees a Mexican-born President at the White house by the middle of 
the XXi Century.
A Polycentric World vs a Perturbed World
barnett’s world-view does not deviate much from past capitalist ex-
periences. According to the Professor at the Us Naval War College, in 
order to avoid delinking from the system on behalf of Nation-states 
or whole regions, a strategy must be set up to defeat any new alter-
natives. barnett is very explicit in detailing the consequences these 
movements could have for the present world order.
samir Amin’s theoretical proposals are precisely what worry Us 
strategists the most. According to Amin, the only alternative open to 
countries at the periphery is to delink from a system that presents no fu-
ture to them. if new alternatives appear on the horizon several centers 
could compete with their own dynamic, creating a polycentric world.
barnett’s proposal contemplates precisely such a scenario. A 
polycentric world, apparently, would not be tolerated in barnett’s 
scheme. in order to dampen delinking tendencies, barnett foresees 
two forms of perturbations. Those created by central forces in order 
to destabilize delinked Nation-states or countries that have plans to 
disconnect from the system. barnett also mentions the possibility 
that the center itself can be perturbed by events such as the New 
York City Twin Towers attacks (Arrighi, 2005)10. 
A weakness in barnett’s proposal lies in his center-periphery no-
tion placing the former and the semi-periphery in an ironclad alliance. 
in other words, the center’s nucleus and the semi-periphery would 
be capable of absorbing any autonomous challenge coming from al-
ternative projects. barnett shares hardt and Negri’s view of a future 
dominated by a central state capable of maintaining the rule of law 
on a global scale.
Wood however does not agree with this view of Empire. she con-
siders the arrangements evolving around the “New imperialism”, as a 
system of Nation-states linked by a global economy but managed by 
local states, vulnerable to popular and democratic struggles. in a situ-
ation of this kind, there is more and more room for opposition move-
ments to expand and exploit the contradictions created by the core’s 
growing demands and its local political allies.
10 Arrighi in his article remarks that “scaring hell out of the American people’ was 
highly successful in helping establish Us hegemony in the wake of the second World 
War, but is now, in all likelihood, helping to bring that hegemony to an end.” 
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Jameson (2000) asks if whole regions or continents can delink 
from the logic of capitalist accumulation. Apparently, Jameson says, 
globalization seems irreversible albeit the fact that only a few decades 
ago a large segment of the world’s population belonging to the social-
ist bloc was delinked. Jameson believes that the collapse of the UssR 
was not due to the failure of socialism but to the fact that the socialist 
bloc abandoned its project of disconnection11. 
samir Amin’s polycentric world with its multicultural shapes and 
forms (¨national popular social hegemony¨) can emerge from capital-
ism’s contradictions and face-off with barnett’s permanent perturbed 
world foreseen by those defenders of a renewed Empire, based on 
a free market rational. The contradictions that characterize the ap-
pearance of new economic and cultural powers, with world hegem-
onic ideas (imperialism), will also provoke new grass-root movements 
as well as Nation-state delinking processes. These movements will 
search for original channels of cooperation capable of setting up new 
grounds for the building of viable alternatives. 
Latin America
For 200 years Latin America has been formulating projects that have 
universal underpinnings. The revolutionary wars fought for independ-
ence between 1808 and 1824 put forth a new Nation-state ideology 
expressed in the writings of bolivar and others. At the end of that cen-
tury, Jose Marti put forth a new set of ideas addressing social issues. 
in the mid XX Century the “Latino-americanists” strived with no avail 
towards industrial development trying to gear the continent’s future 
towards economic growth through import-substitution polices.
The new national markets created by industrialization gave rise, 
however, to a belligerent working class as well as to new aspirations 
on behalf of a local class of entrepreneurs. This “populist” alliance 
gave hope to a national project based on productivity and equality.
Cuba’s 1959 populist revolution was forced by a failed Us-led mil-
itary invasion and a blockade (now in its 44th year) to jump over this 
11 Jameson’s quote is the following: “Might regions, even whole continents, 
exclude the forces of globalization, secede, or ‘delink’ from it?… The aura of doom 
that seems to hang over globalization’s putative irreversibility confronts us with 
our own inability to imagine any alter-native, or to conceive how ‘delinking’ from 
the world economy could possibly be a feasible political and economic project in 
the first place –and this despite the fact that quite seriously ‘delinked’ forms of 
national existence flourished only a few decades ago, most notably in the form 
of the socialist bloc. i have taken the unpopular position that the ‘collapse’ of the 
soviet Union was due, not to the failure of socialism, but to the abandonment of 
delinking by the socialist bloc.”
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“phase” of creating the “national market” going straight to a radical-
ized political process. in the southern Cone countries of Latin Ameri-
ca, populism also led to an inevitable show-down with the Us. on the 
one hand, with regard to Cuba a weaker middle-class existed and, on 
the other, a very powerful military was organized under Us guidance 
to contain changes and unleash one of the bloodiest political reactions 
in history. The 1964-1989 military dictatorship’s era first objective was 
to smash the “populist” alliance and follow up with the destruction of 
the working class.
The first objective was swiftly accomplished due mainly to the lack of 
a political commitment on behalf of the middle classes that were not 
able to coalesce behind the “national project”. The second goal was 
more difficult due to the essence of capitalist development based on 
the accumulation of surplus labor. A new strategy was needed to con-
trol the worker’s protests and especially their class organizations. 
Neo-liberalism was unfolded to enhance capitalist accumula-
tion but more specifically to control workers and their organizations. 
Deregulation, flexibilization and privatization were the three mira-
cle words in the neo-liberal vocabulary. Globalization entailed a new 
ideological strategy to weaken the workers and block any class alli-
ances. After the neo-fascist onslaught came to an end, the neo-liberal 
objective was altered in the 80s: The goal was no longer to submit 
the working class and destroy its organizations. The new tactic was 
even more radical: wipe the working class out and make it disappear 
through globalization. shrink it in size and make it competitive as 
well. Presidents like Collor (brazil), Menem (Argentina), and dictator 
Pinochet (Chile) were given the task. All three failed miserably and left 
their countries in shambles. 
since the 90’s a new tactic has been developed. Globalization still 
means shrinking the size of the working class and making it competi-
tive (squeezing any class solidarity out of it) but a new very important 
component has been added: bring the working class into the politi-
cal equation inviting its political parties to lead the way into globali-
zation. These are apparently the new roles of former working class 
revolutionary parties such as brazil’s PT, Chile’s PS, Argentina’s Justi-
cialistas, Uruguay’s Frente Amplio. Mexico will probably follow shortly 
(2006) with PRD. Where there are no alternative working class po-
litical parties available, a Chavez (Venezuela) will appear and an Evo 
Morales (bolivia) will surely be present.
There is an optimistic reading of current events in Latin America. 
What seems to be a triumph of globalization over local or regional alter-
natives can give shape, paradoxically, to a new –polycentric– scenario in 
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the near future. As seen before, brazil has its own strategy and has been 
able to block Us plans to “perturb” its political ambitions. Argentina 
has all the promise (a “first world” country in the late 19th Century) and 
will probably have to back brazil as the “world player” in the region.
Mexico will probably support with enthusiasm the new regional 
project once the PRD government takes over in 2006. Chile has always 
been a wild card but will probably follow brazil’s leadership in the 
short run12. 
Can the Us continue controlling events in Latin America as it 
has done since annexing half of Mexico in 1846? The pessimistic 
scenario is put forth by Us Naval War College Professor Thomas 
barnett. (2003) The Us is planning on setting new political bounda-
ries with its southern neighbors. The new boundary set by barnett’s 
perturbed world by 2050 would be the great Amazon basin in the 
heart of south America. 
No more speculations. Latin America is on the road to new un-
foreseeable political and social arrangements in the near future. At 
present they cannot be predicted. however, the world system’s center 
and/or imperialism’s conflicting interests still foresee a subjugated 
Latin America. it is up to the Latin Americans to build their own alter-
natives. To paraphrase samir Amin (1987): 
The challenge will therefore only be taken up by the Latin American 
peoples, the day that the necessary popular alliances enable them to 
delink their development from the demands of transnationalization.
Can we conclude asking ourselves, along with all human-kind with 
whom we share this planet, who are –today– those monsters the Quix-
ote identified 400 years ago as his enemies that must be wiped from 
the face of the earth? 
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International Monetary Fund:
From Stability to Instability
The Washington Consensus and 
structural reforms in Latin America
Introduction
The international Monetary Fund (iMF) was created to set a stand-
ard for development and to facilitate the exchange transactions of 
the international Financial system (iFs) in the framework of the 
established international economic order. During the last three dec-
ades, the iMF has transformed itself into an international financial 
organization whose main objective has been to act as a “lender of 
last resort” in the face of the instability generated by financial cri-
ses during this period. The Washington Consensus and the struc-
tural Reforms in Latin America have jointly contributed to increase 
the instability in the region in a democratic context. it is therefore 
important to establish the reasons for the creation of a post war 
international monetary system and for the ongoing changes in the 
relationship between international financial institutions and the eco-
nomic and political international order. 
in addition, financial globalization and financial markets have 
fulfilled a strategic role in the performance of emerging economies, re-
sulting from changes in the global financial system. Also, the develop-
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of Mexico. PhD in Latin Americans studies from the Faculty of Politic Cience of the 
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ment of capitalism and the economic reforms of the Washington Con-
sensus have deepened the transformation of the economic structures 
of governments, which have passed from authoritarian and regulated 
regimes to deregulated, democratic and market-driven systems. how-
ever, democracy and its significance on the path of economic, political 
and social reorganization, has not given opportunities to the majority 
of the population, which has not seen the benefits from the reorgani-
zation of relations between countries in the process of globalization.
Decades ago, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1946), 
schumpeter emphasized several problems of democracy, saying that 
We have every reason to be on our guard against the pitfalls that lie on 
the path of those defenders of democracy who while accepting, under 
pressure of accumulating evidence, more and more of the facts of the 
democratic process, yet try to anoint the results that process turns out 
with oil taken from eighteenth-century jars (schumpeter, 1946: 324).
That is, “we still remain under the practical necessity of attributing to the 
will of individual independence and a rational quality that are altogether 
unrealistic” (schumpeter, 1946: 325). The significance of this quotation is 
that schumpeter recognizes that defenders of democracy and of freedom 
of choice do not necessarily seek the benefits of economic welfare and the 
opportunities that society can offer all of its members. Very often democra-
cy centralizes political and economic power in the hands of a small group. 
indeed, when one studies democracy inside the voting system of 
the iMF or voter equality in democratic regimes of the countries of 
the south, it would be difficult to speak of the benefits of democracy. 
Thus, Amartya sen furthers the concept of democracy, relating it not 
only to the possibility of election by the majority, but also to the op-
portunities of satisfying human beings’ needs and desires. Democracy 
is much more complex, as it not only relates to the majority vote but 
also to the respect for freedom and the right to choose within the so-
cial environment. Democracy is a system of demands on the part of 
social actors. Thus, democracy is related to economic development 
and to the economic needs of the population. These needs are also re-
lated to citizens’ values and universal values, such as the right to work, 
to nourishment, health, housing and education. 
Democracy and economic development constitute the path to-
wards liberty; this relationship is understood as
a process of expanding real freedoms [...] that [...] focuses attention 
on results for which development becomes important, and not only on 
the means that, amongst other things, have an outstanding role in the 
process (schumpeter, 2000: 19).
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This author mentions five different types of freedom,
[...] from an instrumental perspective: 1) political freedoms, 2) eco-
nomic facilities, 3) social opportunities, 4) transparency guarantees 
and 5) protective security. Each of these, distinct types of rights and 
opportunities, help to advance the general capability of a person 
(schumpeter, 2000: 27). 
Following these considerations, the main idea of this paper is to high-
light the constant dispute between a financial system that seeks equilib-
rium in its macroeconomic variables and the persistent financial insta-
bility of capitalist development. The essay is divided into the following 
sections: i) the international monetary system from its creation until the 
post-bretton Woods era; ii) the global financial markets and the impli-
cations of financial globalization for emerging countries; iii) the Wash-
ington Consensus and the transformation from regulated economies to 
deregulated market systems within democratic regimes; and lastly, iV) 
reflections on democracy and the results of the structural reforms. 
The international financial system in the
post-Bretton Woods era and the reform of the IMF
in general, the international Financial system is identified at present with 
the international Monetary Fund and to a lesser extent with the World 
bank (Wb), international institutions that for more than six decades have 
carried out financial norms established towards the end of the second 
World War. This section is divided into three parts: a) the international 
financial system and its relationship with the iMF; b) the characteristics 
of the post-bretton Woods era, and c) the reform of the iMF.
International Financial System and
its relationship with the IMF
The foundations of the iFs were established in July, 1944, to allow the 
economic renewal of the world’s main economic actors. The objec-
tives were
[...] the creation and control of international liquidity and the main-
tenance of a stable but adjustable exchange rate system, which helps 
countries with transitory difficulties in their balance of payments to 
hold stability in the exchange rate, as a contributing factor to the de-
velopment of the international economy (Chapoy, 2001: 22).
As such, a system with fixed exchange rates arose, with gold as the 
common denominator of monetary parities, expressed at the same 
time in Us dollars. The possession of foreign exchanges in the finan-
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cial reserves of countries was fully allowed. Therefore, the rate of ex-
change, disequilibrium in the balance of payments, and the reserves 
(once in gold, now in dollars) have constituted the key considerations 
of a hegemonic monetary system. 
With regard to exchange rates regimes, the iMF’s Constitutive 
Agreement establishes in  Article iV (section i), corresponding to gen-
eral obligations of members, that
[...] the essential purpose of the international monetary system is to 
provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, servic-
es, and capital among countries, and that sustains sound economic 
growth, and that a principal objective is the continuing development 
of the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for financial 
and economic stability, each member undertakes to collaborate with 
the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements 
and to promote a stable system of exchange rates.
More precisely, the iMF was created to facilitate the exchange or-
der altered by the second World War. According to authors such as 
Chapoy (1983), Correa, Girón and Martínez (1999), this has propiti-
ated the expansion of corporations in Europe, as well as in Asia and 
Latin America. 
This is due in large part to the fact that international financial or-
ganizations established the order and the management conditions of 
the exchange rates to facilitate the penetration and expansion of direct 
and indirect investments. As such, until 1971 corporate capital had a 
course of development beginning with its banks and companies. it is ex-
actly in this year that the foundations of the Agreements began to crack 
and what would later be called the post-bretton Woods era began. 
These agreements broke down in several ways. in 1944, “[...] 
when the iMF was established in bretton Woods, a fixed exchange 
rate system emerged around the dollar, convertible into gold at a cer-
tain standard rate” (Chapoy, 1983:7). between 1971 and 1973, dollar 
devaluation took place, followed by an increase in the price of gold 
and the flotation of exchange rates. This situation caused not only cur-
rency instability, but it also displayed the need to deregulate financial 
systems. As for financial stability, Article iV of the iMF’s Constitutive 
Agreement points out that each member shall
[...] i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the 
objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price 
stability; [...] ii)[...] that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions; 
iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary 
system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or 
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to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members; and iv) 
follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this 
section (iMF, 2006).
in section 3 on surveillance of exchange arrangements, the Fund es-
tablishes the supervision of the international monetary system and 
the compliance of each member to its obligations.
Due to the priority given to monetary stability through exchange 
rates and the balance of payments, the iMF has operated through sta-
bilization programs. but as the iMF does not take into account that 
economies have periods of growth and contraction, it has imposed eco-
nomic stabilization measures with orthodox leanings, and consequently 
pro cyclical monetary, fiscal and financial policies have been applied. 
The post-Bretton Woods era
The results of changes in Article iV and the devaluation of the dollar 
in relation to gold in 1971 and 1973, have signified not only the break-
ing of agreements but also the beginning of the post-bretton Woods 
era, characterized by 1) an international monetary system detached 
from a stock of external assets; 2) the creation of financial resources 
in excess of the rate of growth of international trade; 3) displacement 
of capital flows towards emerging markets; 4) chronic financial crises; 
5) drastic changes in national financial systems and 6) accumulation 
of reserves in emerging economies (Mántey, 1988).
IMF Reform
Recently, at the Aspen institute in Rome, italy, Rodrigo de Rato, man-
aging director of the iMF, said that
[...] The world is changing and the iMF needs to change with it. Twen-
ty-first-century globalization, with massive movements of capital and 
abrupt shifts in comparative advantage, is presenting all countries 
and the global community with new challenges. The Fund must help 
our members meet these challenges, and it will need to adapt to do so 
(iMF, 2006: 100).
on this subject, Edwin M. Truman mentions in A Strategy for IMF 
Reform (2006ª) several issues worthy of discussion, such as the voting 
and veto power of the members of the iMF. Countries that constitute 
the Group of 5 gather almost 40 percent of total votes: the United 
states has a share of 17.08%; Japan 6.13%; Germany 5.99%; both 
France and the United kingdom 4.95%. European countries, includ-
ing those recently incorporated into the European Union and those 
from Eastern Europe, constitute about 33.72% of votes. China rep-
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resents 2.94%, Russia and saudi Arabia 2.74 and 3.22, respectively. 
Africa has a 4.41% share, Latin America 12.43% and Asia 7.93%. This 
synthesis of voting percentages is of great importance, as developed 
countries, in no need of financing, have the larger number of votes. As 
it stands, at least a 10% of the voting power must be transferred from 
industrial countries to emerging economies. 
A recent publication of the institute for international Economics 
mentions that the iMF faces an identity crisis. it should guarantee 
its member countries the health and stability of the global economy 
and the financial system. Countless proposals are aimed at reform-
ing the institution, not only its provisional committee but also the 
availability of larger amounts of resources to finance development 
(Truman, 2006:119). 
Article iV emphasizes the stability of exchange rates, seeks co-
herence between countries’ external and internal balances, and un-
derlines that the Fund shall offer policies containing real guidelines 
for a country to develop its economy. This has determined the main-
tenance of a primary fiscal surplus in many countries, with the cases 
of Argentina, brazil, and Mexico being of particular relevance. in 
Mexico, the lack of an employment policy as part of the main objec-
tives of economic policy has contributed to the expulsion of jobs 
towards the United states. As such, remittances to the country have 
increased remarkably.
Financial globalization and the financial markets
of emerging countries
The iMF, in abdicating its role at the center of the iFs and regulator of 
inter-bank loans, left the field open for financial intermediaries to di-
rect the international financial market. in this new dynamic, the iMF 
is merely an observer of markets, an international lender of last resort, 
and an adviser of governments in order to restrict monetary, fiscal and 
financial policy in accordance with the new international order.
With the fall of the bretton Woods agreements, financial instabil-
ity has deepened and sharpened. in the past decades, financial crises 
have become part of Latin American, Asian and African daily life. The 
iMF itself points out that “[...] between 1975 and 1997, 158 episodes in 
which countries experienced substantial exchange market pressures 
and 54 banking crisis were identified” (iMF, 1998:86). A number of 
broad types of crises can be distinguished: currency crisis (devalua-
tion or sharp depreciation), stock market crisis, banking crisis, bal-
ance of payments crisis, etc. hence, it is correct to say that the decade 
of the nineties has not been the “decade of hope” or the “lost decade”, 
but the “decade of the financial crisis” on a global scale.
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Although stability has characterized the first decade of the XXi 
century, it has not been accompanied by economic growth. The world 
has gone through a decade of financial deepening that can be illustrat-
ed with the following figures from the bank for international settle-
ments. interbank transactions reached $23.1 trillion as of the second 
quarter of 2005. This unusual growth had not been seen since the 
first quarter of 1988. The main activities were carried out basically by 
banks in the United states, the United kingdom and offshore Centers 
(bank for international settlements, 2005:15). According to Mántey,
[...] global financial deregulation and the detachment of the interna-
tional monetary system from a reserve of external assets, has resulted 
in the expansion of international financial markets at rates far superior 
to those of world revenues and international trade (Mántey, 1998:9).
For example, the World Trade organization (WTo) indicates that ex-
ports exceeded $10 trillion in 2004. in spite of the fact that there was a 
slowing of world trade in 2005, exports of commercial services still rose 
by 11% at current prices (as opposed to a growth of 29% in 2004).
Meanwhile, financial activities have maintained a sustained 
growth, as evidenced by capital flows. Total external credits equaled 
$7.7 trillion dollars in 2005. Capital flows towards developing countries 
have had a sustained annual average of $179 billion dollars between 
2002 and the present. Nevertheless, Asia has received greater amounts 
of these private capitals than other regions, attracting $60.9 billion 
dollars during the period, while the Middle East and East Europe have 
received $77.4 billion dollars. on the other hand, Latin America’s an-
nual average of capital inflows has decreased by $54.8 billion dollars 
from 1996 to 2001. From 2002 until today, inflows to the region have 
averaged $17.9 billion dollars annually. 
At the same time, the deepening of external indebtedness is note-
worthy in the region, and Latin America continues to be far more 
indebted than other regions of the developing world. since 2000, the 
region’s annual average of external indebtedness has been $760 billion 
dollars, as opposed to south-East Asia and the Pacific’s $512 billion 
dollars, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia’s almost $600 billion 
dollars. Expressed in other terms, Latin America represents almost a 
third of all developing countries’ external indebtedness and more than 
the third of developing countries’ external debt service, representing 
as an annual average almost $133 billion dollars since 2000. 
The players of financial globalization represent interests of con-
siderable scope. only the first ten commercial banks worldwide con-
trolled 12.6 trillion dollars in 2005 (The banker, 2005), when fifteen 
years before, the respective number was only around 3 million dollars. 
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The major non financial corporations represented 2.88 trillion dollars 
in 2005. They increased three times more than fourteen years before, 
when the total amount was $870 billion dollars (Fortune, 2005). A sig-
nificant outcome of the Financial Reforms in Latin America is that the 
total amount of assets, at least in Argentina, brazil and Mexico, has 
reached over $660 billion dollars and net profits $8.7 billion dollars, 
more than a 10% of total assets. in addition, it is worth mentioning 
specific features of these countries. in Argentina, the country’s largest 
bank, banco de la Nación Argentina, controls over $14 billion dol-
lars while the banco de la Provincia de buenos Aires controls over 
$7 billion. in total, both state owned banks control over $21 billion 
dollars, more than the third of total assets. Even though Argentina 
was a symbol of the wave of privatizations in the nineties and of the 
financial and economic crises that the region has witnessed since its 
independence from spain, circumstances have been different in other 
countries, such as Mexico. This country’s main commercial banks are 
in private hands. The first two institutions belong to spain’s principle 
transnational megaconglomerates, bbVA and banco santander Cen-
tral hispano, which together hold a total of $65 billion dollars in as-
sets. in addition, Citigroup-banamex manages $42 billion dollars of 
assets in the country, and hsbC $18 billion.
The internationalization of the Mexican financial system has been 
very deep in comparison with Argentina and brazil. While brazil´s 
banks hold assets of over $422 billion dollars, and the first and third 
largest banks in this measure are state owned, banco do brasil holds 
$90 billion dollars, and Caixa over $55 billion. santander brasil, a 
spanish bank, occupies the sixth place with approximately $26 bil-
lion dollars. Comparing the amount of brazil’s total bank assets to 
the amount in hands of foreign agents, it is evident that foreign banks 
have a limited penetration and do not significantly influence the credit 
decisions of the brazilian client.
While financial reforms in Latin America were successful in some 
countries, in others they signified a loss of credit sovereignty. Though 
reforms have focused mainly on financial balances, in spite of the fact 
that such balances have generated stability, but not greater employ-
ment and growth, governments that have criticized the structural 
changes and so-called “neoliberalism”, have not worked towards at-
taining sustained growth for their countries. The economic reports of 
the ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean), of the iADb (inter-American Development bank), and even the 
annual statements of the central banks of the region, show this point 
clearly. There is still continual support to prioritize the neutrality of 
monetary policy and inflation. 
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The Washington Consensus and democracy 
From an academic perspective, relating the Washington Consensus 
to democracy poses a challenge. schumpeter himself warned that it 
was necessary to worry about the “defenders of democracy”. First, the 
main objective of the Washington Consensus project is the deregula-
tion of financial, productive and labor markets. secondly, emphasis is 
given to the respect of private property and processes of privatization 
which mean a diminished role of the state so that companies, together 
with a free workforce, can take charge of national and international 
economic projects. Moreover, the restructuring of the productive bas-
es of the economic order established since the end of the second world 
war, when public institutions and unions fulfilled a role in favoring a 
welfare state and when private and public investment coexisted in a 
coordinated way, has been explicitly exposed. in the eighties, deregu-
lation and liberalization were presented as an alternative to the exist-
ing economic policy and the problems that it faced, such as the United 
states’ economic situation and the serious difficulties of foreign debt 
in the Latin American countries. The deregulation and opening of 
markets took place gradually by way of the stabilization plans that 
the iMF imposed on countries after crises that led to the devaluation 
of their respective currencies. Therefore, movements towards more 
democratic markets have been based on a market in which the chief 
actors are the large financial and industrial conglomerates.
The Washington Consensus 
The recent essay “obstáculos al Desarrollo: el paradigma del financiami-
ento en América Latina” (Correa and Girón, 2006) mentions that in or-
der to understand the financial reforms in Latin America, it is necessary 
to at least be familiar with the works produced by the inter-American 
Development bank (iADb), the Center for Latin American Monetary 
studies (CLAMs), the institute for international Economics and the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
(hausmann, 1997). in such institutions, the ten points of the Washing-
ton Consensus and how they have been applied have been studied.
The result of the reforms
There are three fundamental books to understand the Washington 
Consensus and its results. The first is Correa and Girón’s Reforma 
1 on the part of CLAMs, it published stallings, b. (2001). it is proper to mention 
three other books that pose the “urgency” of the reforms: balassa, b. (1986), William-
son, J. (1990), which coins the concept of Washington Consensus, and kuczynsky, P. 
and Williamson, J. (2003).
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Financiera en América Latina (Correa and Girón, 2006), which ex-
plains the process of financial deregulation and the development 
paradigm up until the loss of national financial systems. secondly, 
in the foreword of After the Washington Consensus (kuczynski and 
Williamson, 2003), Fred bergsten mentions that it is time for the 
world to overcome the tendentious and ideological debates that have 
caricatured the Washington Consensus as a neoliberal manifesto 
and to engage in a serious discussion about the reforms that the 
region needs in order to restore growth and equity. Finally, Ffrench 
Davis (2005) discusses the successes and failures of the reforms and 
the imminent and pressing need for “reforming the reforms” in Latin 
America. These books synthesize at least three decades of the finan-
cial-structural change that has isolated Latin American from the 
benefits of development.
Although the macroeconomic view of the financial reforms is 
important, the close relationship between those changes and their 
consequences for families is determinant in the consideration of in-
equalities between them. in his work, Measuring International and 
Global Inequality (2005), branko Milanovic analyzes income distri-
bution worldwide, relating household activities to traditional indica-
tors of the per capita GDP. he comes to the conclusion that there has 
been a substantial increase in inequality on the international level, 
owing mainly to the economic reforms advocated in the Washington 
Consensus. 
When making reference to the Washington Consensus and de-
mocracy, it is also necessary to evaluate not only the partisan vote in a 
society and public participation of men and women in parliaments or 
congresses, but the levels of satisfaction in regard to basic needs and 
in regard to increasing the opportunities that the economic system 
offers. Moreover, the access to human rights –health, education, hous-
ing, and employment– to which people have the right to in a society, 
must also be considered. inequality, represented by the human Devel-
opment index (hDi), expresses the lack of opportunities for the great 
majority of worldwide population. The human Development Report 
(hDR, 2005) shows that the process of reform throughout the world 
has led to inequality, in spite of economic growth. Thus, the heteroge-
neity of international relations has deepened the dramatic inequality 
in income distribution in many countries. The aforementioned Report 
points out that 20% of the world’s population holds 75% of global in-
come, the poorest 40% has 5% and the poorest 20% only 1.5%.
To this same effect, Milanovic (2005) draws attention to the fact 
that until the breakdown of the bretton Woods agreements, there 
was generally only one supplier of resources per household. on 
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the other hand, in the last three decades the number of homes in 
which incomes stem from more than one purveyor has grown in an 
accentuated way. Not only has the wife become incorporated into the 
workforce, but within marginal families, even children bring money 
to the household. 
on this point, Ffrench-Davis mentions that
[...] one and a half decade of intensive and profound reforms has left 
a mix of successes and failures [...] striking mistakes in the design of 
reforms have been committed, plus a weak capability to recognize fail-
ures and correct them at the right moment [...] the proposal is reform-
ing the reforms (Ffrench-Davis, 2005:14).
Actually, the reforms that were a hope for governments, at least in 
Latin America, were applied without bearing in mind each country’s 
specific conditions after the “lost decade”. Not only did they not fa-
vor the strengthening of national business in the face of the foreign 
competition that invaded the industrial and financial sector, but even 
public institutions were debilitated. For instance, the importance of 
the development banking in strategic sectors of development in infra-
structure was diminished in countries as Mexico. in contrast to what 
occurred in Argentina, as it was not possible to sell the public banks 
before the debacle, they were restructured, now have a high profitabil-
ity and are helping towards an economic and social national project.
With regard to productive investments and the role of foreign di-
rect investment, Latin America was not favored in the conformation 
of the new economic order, as were China and india. The character-
istics of financing economic development in Latin America have been 
contrary to the interests of national projects. This confirms that in 
Latin America financial liberalization did not attain the expected re-
sults. both Asia and Latin America experienced financial crises in the 
nineties, but development policies, reforms and the liberalization of 
financial systems were different in these regions (kaminsky and Re-
inhart, 1998). The fact is that while in Asia financial systems emerged 
strengthened from the crisis; in some Latin America countries crises 
initiated the internationalization of financial services, a phenomenon 
that has gained strength in many cases. 
Stability and instability in markets with democracy
The great transformation of the iMF and democracy have posed a 
challenge for countries that make up the south-south-south cir-
cle. This challenge results from the fact that the path of develop-
ment has followed the guidelines of the Washington Consensus in 
the wake of the rupture of the international monetary system. The 
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end of regulated markets accompanying the collapse of the bretton 
Woods Agreements gave way to the dominance of the free market in 
the framework of deregulation and liberalization of productive and 
monetary circuits. 
Large international corporations have been the main players in 
the post-bretton Woods era and during the last two decades have 
quickly restructured through mergers and mega mergers, acquir-
ing recently privatized companies, as has been the case in much of 
Latin America. important transformations in the financial market 
have also taken place. innovations have allowed a common space 
to further financial profits, thus deepening financial instability. it 
should not be omitted, however, that the monetary, fiscal and finan-
cial policy of United states has aimed to maintain the stability of 
macroeconomic indicators. 
The result has been inequality in income distribution, unemploy-
ment and a decrease in consumption. how can one respond to these 
structural changes from the viewpoint of the south? The human Devel-
opment Report does not offer answers. The statistics indicate inequal-
ity; while developing countries have an hDi of 0,694; countries with 
high human development have one of 0,895. The GDP per capita indica-
tor registers $4,359 for developing countries, and $25,665 for countries 
with high human development. The per capita GDP and the hDi indi-
cators therefore represent an asymmetric relation between developing 
countries and those with high development. Therefore, the results of 
the Washington Consensus reforms in the countries of the south have 
not been optimal when taken into consideration the asymmetry in the 
opportunities of developing and developed countries. These include not 
only levels of income, education, life expectancy, literacy, sustainable 
access to water sources, health and nutrition, but also the lack of em-
ployment opportunities and a more equitable development financing in 
place of excessive external debt services or the interests paid to financial 
markets. in a democratic society, basic issues concerning the globaliza-
tion processes and the ongoing reforms must be discussed again.
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Arturo Anguiano
Mexico: The Contradictions And 
Uncertainties Of A Truncated
Democratic Process
JUsT A FEW YEARs since the historic election in 2000 in which Vi-
cente Fox Quesada, the candidate of the National Action Party (PAN) 
was elected as president of the Republic, it has become evident that 
it has failed the famous democratic transition that supposedly would 
end  with political alternation in the government and with the rule 
of the transfigured regime of the Mexican Revolution. The votes that 
piled in then, with the sole aim of putting an end to the domination 
symbolized by the institutional Revolutionary Party (PRi), were soon 
proved useless and a bad bet when an openly corporate government 
was formed, as this government repeatead the same neoliberal poli-
cies, impregnated with a religious fundamentalism that has only re-
inforced the conservative line. The consensus that was built then has 
crumbled and the disenchantment, anger and even polarization and 
despair in society is manifest in all sectors (from the businessmen to 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy, with all types of political parties and civil 
organizations in between). The economy, which the first president 
of the post-PRi era had promised to expand, has barely managed to 
keep afloat, constantly thrashed and battered by the fluctuations in 
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the Us economy, on which it has become more dependant than ever 
since the North American Free Trade Agreement came into effect. 
With Carlos salinas de Gortari’s government, Mexico had already 
tagged on to the first world through NAFTA, which basically meant 
the Mexican economy’s total subjection to the rhythm, demands and 
weaknesses of its Us counterpart. The so-called government of change 
headed by Fox –a former Coca Cola employee– continued with the 
same actions, encouraged and reinforced the same economic, social 
and political trends, and as a result, sooner rather than later it began 
to lose the credibility that it had won thanks to the votes and, in par-
ticular, to the defeat of the PRi’s candidate, which at that moment was 
seen as a historic turning point. 
The first profound change: credible elections 
The mere respect for the votes for the election to the different offices, 
principally that of president of the Republic, even though it represents a 
significant novelty that marks the beginning of the twenty first century 
in Mexico, has in no way opened up channels for an in-depth change in 
the political regime and its workings. The fall of the PRi has loosened 
some of the corporate and patrimonial ties that for decades had de-
prived society of political space, ways to participate and democratic life. 
but all over the nation the patronage and hierarchical relationships, 
oppression and subjugation, injustice, lack of freedom and the perse-
cution of those who are different or dissatisfied have been repeated, 
even increased, as have all the authoritarian reflections of an exclusive 
regime that never tolerated diversity, equalitarianism or democracy.
in a very short time the government of change turned into a gro-
tesque caricature of the PRi government, ultimately showing the deep-
roots and power of the methods, practices and conditions that the 
former regime had turned into a political culture that not only hasn’t 
disappeared but has defined and impregnated the PAN government and 
all of the institutional political players. Furthermore, Vicente Fox will 
end his term with a terrible year in which, with ostentation, he has 
managed to reproduce the worst traits of the PRi regime: attacking the 
fragile autonomy of unions with the vertical imposition of leaders in the 
unions, repressive violence against social movements such as that of the 
miners in Lazaro Cárdenas, Las Truchas, Michoacan and the general-
ized violations of human rights with the excessive use of force used to 
punish the rebellious inhabitants of san salvador Atenco in the state of 
Mexico. Even more, the last presidential elections on July 2nd, 2006, are 
reminiscent of the state elections run by the PRi, with the illegal use of 
vast state resources, the overwhelming presence of the media, elections 
that, as in the past, appear to be marked by fraud.
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in fact, everything that existed before still exists but –as tends to 
happen in historic processes of change– it is degraded, decaying, obvi-
ously with new elements (democratic, federative, still weak), which 
even so fail to crystallize, despite the fact that (however much) they 
are presented as the democracy so much desired by everybody. Al-
though weakened and with little negotiating capacity, the corporate 
machine keeps on rolling and its aging operators swing between past 
and present loyalties, but basically they remain subordinate to the 
presidency of the Republic. The so-called state party regime tumbled 
as soon as the president ceased to personify the undifferentiated amal-
gam of state control and the mechanism for the control and repro-
duction of the political class and consensus by means of a fictitious 
electoral processes. 
however, the end of the state party regime that represented the 
PRi-government has not put an end to the partisan state, that is, the 
Party-state that is being reinvented by the PAN at the federal level and 
by the governing party itself and the other parties in the states. All over 
the country, the amalgamation of the state machinery and the party is 
being repeated, even if it is a different party. The illusion of a diverse, 
plural state community consolidated in its contradictions by the state 
and the intended universal representation this expresses with regard to 
the set of social relationships, are completely destroyed. on the contrary 
a thriving specific ratio of powers can be found that is biased towards 
the actions of the state machinery as a whole and redefines power in a 
mafia way. Rather than representing the society as a whole, the state 
subjugates and disintegrates the subordinate social nuclei and promotes 
the interests of globalized financial capital more than ever before. 
Corporatism and presidentialism continue to move the Mexican 
political regime with its wealth of patronage and hierarchical relation-
ships, permitted and repeated thanks to the corruption of all kinds, 
which is now more diversified and generalized than ever. Perhaps 
what is new is the fact that presidentialism has not been able to re-
inforce the characteristics that made it omniscient and all-powerful, 
and, on the contrary, it is incurably losing the almost mystic aura that 
characterized it. its authority and capacity for action, mediation and 
negotiation, are gradually crumbling. For this reason, power seems 
to be fragmenting, regionally and locally, where, however, the presi-
dentialist, corporate and patronage mechanisms and relationships 
are still being repeated. institutional centralism is still in operation, 
although weakened, while the nation, as at the beginning of the last 
century, is fragmenting into regional and even autonomous powers. 
Although the “PRi-government” formula no longer exists centrally, all 
over the country –and regardless of which party it is– truncated mo-
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dalities are being repeated, which are a new, updated version of the 
partisan, exclusive, abusive management of power.
in reality, the different parts of the perverse institutionality that 
articulated this kind of state-party, which took away the Mexicans’ 
democratic liberties, such as the intended three autonomous powers 
(Executive, legislative and judicial), the federation and the municipal-
ity, have been continuously revamped, but they still reaffirm the pre-
dominance of a presidentialism that has apparently seen better times. 
Even so, it is present as a concept that governs and impregnates all 
relationships and articulations. 
The presidentialism in which Vicente Fox Quesada’s government 
takes refuge is a presidentialism without authority, like that of Ernest 
Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994-2000), sifted with the frivolity of the fig-
ure of the presidential couple and the president’s rural ignorance. it 
does not seem to be directed towards a political restructuring that 
would mean a real change of regime (the much-discussed reform of 
the state), or, even less, to be leading to a democratic regime, as yes-
terday’s and today’s apologists tirelessly claim. 
Rather, we seem to be witnessing the limited expansion of the same 
authoritarian regime, with a presidentialism that upholds the major-
ity of its functions and prerogatives but has touches of the president’s 
inconsistent, unpredictable personality, from now on supported by 
a kind of political party system that guarantees the reproduction of 
a new political class in charge of managing the state machinery and 
occupying and giving meaning to the political area. The regime is get-
ting broader, certain channels are becoming more flexible, functions 
are blended, institutional and other hierarchies are restructured, the 
power and the booty are divided up, certain relationships are re-
built and a new political society is founded with restricted admis-
sion. This is the real “possible” state reform from above, the outcome 
of the PRi regime, closed, exclusive and historically removed from 
any kind of democracy: its self-reform, supported by the neoliberal 
transfiguration of the state and the dogged fundamentalism of the 
market that conditions, infuses and at the same time determines all 
the policies, actions and relationships, irrespective of the differences 
of tone or texture. 
The degradation of the institutions and political life
but beyond the institutional political scenarios and, even within them, 
the intended government of change represented by Vicente Fox has 
not only failed to transform or rebuild another democratic regime on 
the ashes of the antiquated, decadent regime of the Mexican Revolu-
tion, but it is advancing in disarray towards its early decay and de-
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cline. Firstly, all of the parts of the institutional regime that are still in 
effect (the so-called three powers, the corporate, presidentialism, and 
the incipient party system) are speeding down the path to delegitima-
tion, inoperability and crisis.
 The state, the executive power, embodied as they are in the per-
son of the president, seems to be drifting in no clear direction, no 
matter how much it navigates within the parameters of the neoliberal 
policies. however, President Fox’s ignorance and lack of ability do not 
hide his religious fundamentalism with which he imbues his actions 
or, less still, his subordination to the interests and imperial policies of 
the United states, in spite of the disloyalties of his friend, President 
George bush. beyond the much talked of conflict with Cuba, his ac-
tions that stand out most are those directed at denationalizing the 
energy sector, privatizing water, overprotecting financial capital, espe-
cially foreign banks, and leaving the farmers hit by the TLC without 
protection, as well as the wage-earner and excluded sectors.
The Congress of the Union is permanently tangled up in the prag-
matic agreements, blackmails and negotiations that paralyze it for 
most of the time, but it almost invariably ends up endorsing the fed-
eral government’s initiatives. The pretense of indigenous reform that 
goes against the current of the san Andrés Agreements signed by the 
government of Ernesto Zedillo and the Zapatista National Liberation 
Army (EZLN), was easily the most despicable case of conspiracy of 
interests against the excluded social sectors. The congresses –both fed-
eral and local– pay more obedience to the factious interests of the gov-
ernment and the parties which their members come from than to the 
worries and interests of the people they supposedly represent. The pro-
vocative use of the Chamber of Deputies to arbitrarily strip the head of 
the Federal District’s Government, Andrés Manuel López obrador, of 
his privileges and immunity and his office was indisputable evidence 
of the crisis in institutional representation. As the hard nucleus of the 
new political class, its dominant concern is to find the mechanisms 
for its perpetuation within the institutional political spaces (reelection, 
extension of terms of office, salaries, prerogatives, etc).
The so-called judicial power is the one that has been renewed 
least, without reforms that would enable it to transform the integration 
mechanisms, its composition and its functions. The president still car-
ries decisive weight in the designation of its members and the judges. 
The administration of justice lacks autonomy and is subordinated po-
litically and organically to the heads of the executive powers (national 
and state). The members of the judicial power –including the ministers 
of the supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (sCJN)– have always 
and still do appear to be a closed, privileged, antidemocratic oligarchy, 
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without legitimacy, in a legalistic country riddled with laws, but without 
clear, unquestionable legality. it is the most antiquated part of the politi-
cal class and its performance confirms the weakness of a state of law 
that doesn’t govern but is interpreted at the convenience of the powers. 
The political parties, and the party system in general, which are 
professed to be the most patent expression of the democratic change 
in the country, are going through an early crisis of credibility and 
identity. The beneficiaries of a system they have created themselves, 
have taken over the increasingly narrow political space in an exclusive 
manner. The absence of democracy in the country formed and con-
ditioned them until the same authoritarian, patronage and obviously 
corrupt habits and inertias that characterized and still characterize 
the political regime, were reproduced in its structures and rules of op-
eration. The active members were replaced by civil servants who were 
paid enormous sums of money, thanks to the public funds that the 
parties generously allotted to each other in compliance with the legal 
requirements they had agreed on themselves. The electoral franchise 
system excluded society at the same time as it permitted the expan-
sion of the professional political class that operates politics as if it 
were a job for specialists. With no other bonds to society than those of 
patronage, without any pragmatic references or readings of the real-
ity to identify them, the parties have mimicked each other, becoming 
indistinguishable, governed by the same political culture of patron-
age that characterized the PRi. Their internal struggles for power and 
money and the repeated scandals are no more than a part of the politi-
cal show presented to society, to the audience that comprises the vast 
majority of its members. 
The fact that institutional elections are finally being carried out 
under the organization and supervision of electoral bodies (the Feder-
al Electoral institute and its equivalents in the states) that are more or 
less autonomous from the authorities and that, for the same reason, 
the votes are counted and recorded with a certain degree of transpar-
ency, is definitely an advance since this was the central demand of the 
democratic movement. it represented a first step towards the effective 
emergence of the citizenry, whose rights have always been usurped by 
the state and its politico-corporate instruments. but this fundamental 
step is emptied of content so long as the climate of freedom contin-
ues to be segmented, differentiated, unrestricted at the top, restricted, 
conditioned and even regimented at the bottom. The political and so-
cial rights of the different components of Mexican society continue to 
be precarious, conditioned by the needs to repeat the consensus and 
the intended legitimacy of the regime that has not yet finished break-
ing with the structures or the corporate bonds that supported it. They 
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are basically regimented in such a way that they prevent escape from 
society and the advance of self-organization and autonomy measures 
that would unhinge or upset the political scene articulated by the cen-
trality of the electoral process. society continues to have a truncated 
citizenry that is under surveillance and under suspicion. No policy is 
accepted other than the institutional, state policy that gives the parties 
registered exclusivity of representation and of electoral and govern-
ment action, this is institutional. The elections are still not really cred-
ible and the action of the arbiter –the Federal Electoral institute– has 
resulted perverse, biased, leaning crudely towards the government 
and the right-wing party.
The community, the village, the neighborhood, the organization, 
the company, as public spaces where society can discuss and jointly 
decide on the issues that concern them and vitally involve them, that 
is, where the underdogs engage in politics, they are all subjected to a 
beating that disintegrates and paralyzes them, seeking to steer them 
towards the protected institutional channels, that is, towards the par-
ties and their patronage methods of representation and management. 
Everywhere the patronage relationships are reproduced and conse-
quently reinforce the corruption, subordination, and multiform re-
pression against those who overstep the restricted forms of political 
participation that characterize the “new” institutionality set up under 
the sign of “change”. As always, the government fears the mobilization 
of society and, above all, the autonomization of its suppressed mem-
bers who could rebel or resist. 
The democracy that is supposed to have arrived in Mexico under 
the modernizing auspices of neoliberal globalization is consolidated 
in this way in electoral participation, around which witty scenes and 
shows are mounted, regulated by the ups and downs of the polls. The 
citizen, finally existing for the first time in Mexico, turns out to be more 
of a spectator who is watching a movie or television programs per-
formed by professional actors who can create the illusion of getting 
through to him, filling him with expectations and dreams. but in prac-
tice he finds them foreign, volatile, as things that are imposed on him, 
that manipulate him and even end up confirming his abandonment 
and exclusion. of course, as a part of the change, also advertised as the 
modernization of politics, in the country itself, they promote the full 
individualization of society, from now on composed of citizens in pos-
session of individual rights that are consolidated in the recurring vote. 
That is, like a sort of citizens who are conceived as being part-time. 
Everything collective, pertaining to the community or the neigh-
borhood or society, is presented as disposable waste from the past and, 
therefore, social and collective rights are also undermined. Neither in 
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the unions, nor in the peasants’ organizations, nor in the villages, nor 
even in the parties, has it been possible to pave the way for authentic 
democracy with no obstacles. individual passivity, not collective ac-
tion, is what is sought to support the new Mexican democracy. 
An exclusive, oligarchic political regime
Consequently, the centrality of the electoral process has been imposed 
on all the political processes, which overdetermines and resizes all of 
the organizations, relationships and political practices in the country. 
in this way, the parties are the inevitable and almost exclusive players 
in the political plot; they are projected as state organizations respon-
sible for intervening in the interminable campaigns for the election of 
the institutional representatives to the different bodies (governments, 
congresses) and ensuring their performance. so then, they become 
the only way that is tolerated, officially recorded and legal, to enter 
an area of politics that has been degraded to the merely governmental 
and institutional. All of the others –organizations, communities, peo-
ples and individuals– are excluded, condemned to their political mar-
ginalization, no longer just to socio-economic and cultural exclusion. 
Their voices are distorted or silenced, they are supplanted.
supported by public funding and mechanisms that guarantee 
them the monopoly over political participation, the parties become 
electoral mechanisms without a political soul, stripped of their ide-
ology and deprogrammed. Attended to and occupied only by profes-
sionals, (paid civil servants and state employees, people elected from 
different positions), the ideological and political profiles of the differ-
ent parties become blurred due to the demands of the marketing and 
opinion polls that govern not only their political and governmental 
practices but also their internal processes, which become warped and 
break down. The parties’ social bonds weaken and fade, just taking on 
the form of commercial relationships and the restricted exchange of 
favors and loyalties, generally circumstantial. in fact, all of the parties 
discard their distinguishing features and mimic each other, readopt-
ing and expanding the PRi culture –which obviously thrived as a per-
fect national political culture that was undemocratic, inequitable and 
generated inequality. The struggles and demands of the different sec-
tors of society and the nation’s economic, social, political and cultural 
needs, appear like a discordant echo from surveys and opinion polls, 
all from private agencies. For this reason the parties swing between 
frivolity and social autism, trapped in a show without worrying too 
much about the possible audience and their demands.
in the new political society that characterizes twentieth century 
Mexico, the parties and the different social sectors follow diverging 
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paths and it seems unlikely they will manage to cross. The parties ap-
pear to be booming, full of possibilities, rich from the public wealth, 
promoted by the modern media, participants in an increasingly exclu-
sive political society with rules and enciphered codes, cohesive due 
to the indiscriminate exercise of power and where entry is only by 
means of an intricate initiation process supervised by the iFE. on the 
other hand, society is disintegrating and segmenting under the influ-
ence of the regressive economic policies that result in a massive loss of 
jobs and condemn ever broader and more diverse strata of the popu-
lation to impoverishment, emigration and uncertainty. Although the 
corporatized social organizations as a whole are becoming thinner 
and losing any ability to negotiate (subordinated as never before) the 
autonomous social and civil institutions are the ones that suffer most 
from harassment by a “plural” (multiparty) government that seeks to 
displace them, paralyze them, corner them or co-opt them. 
Disintegrated, persecuted, cornered, the subordinated social sec-
tors are expelled from the political sphere, their human rights (politi-
cal and social) are undermined and the only thing they are offered as 
a feasible alternative is the saving bond (commercial, patronage) with 
the parties and their government administrations or the parliamentary 
efforts that should favor them. The institutional channels appear to be 
the way to safeguard certain minimum means of existence through the 
generalized assistentialism in the form of social policy par excellence 
(once again multiparty), the complicated procedures in the different 
public institutions and the promise of informal jobs in exchange for 
the precarious jobs they have just lost. Although the countryside can’t 
put up with any more, they maintain the supposedly free-market neo-
liberal policies –negatively affected by the provisions of NAFTA– and 
on the other hand, the solutions to the peasant’s urgent demands are 
not to be seen anywhere. scourged villages, disintegrating communi-
ties, desolate cities are depopulated; they emigrate in the search of 
dreams and hopes to the empire of no hope in the North. 
The junk market promoted by the political parties and the “gov-
ernments of change” –and not only by Fox’s government– puts a dis-
trustful society on the defensive, even though it appears to lack any 
real alternatives. The recurring electoral processes are the opportu-
nity for a profusion of propaganda by all of the parties and the gov-
ernments, who are bent on selling their candidates using marketing 
methods that barely distinguish one from the other, except perhaps by 
the colors that also seem to become blurred and merge into an enor-
mous undifferentiated shapeless splotch. but the noise in the media, 
although deafening, contrasts visibly with the apathy shown by the 
people towards the never-ending election campaigns that are unlikely 
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to attract anybody to the polling stations except for the voters who are 
committed to one of the parties or party-governments.
The reformed political regime and its parties are living the fan-
tasy of mere state politics, members of an exclusive political soci-
ety with limited responsibility, without attending to or noticing the 
changing moods of the excluded society that has just been called to 
cast a vote without any options or prospects. Nobody wants to see 
that the ship is running adrift, with a captain who is unskilled and 
doesn’t know where he’s going, caught up in his childishness, disor-
der and confusion. 
The very long, scandalous electoral campaign based on an exces-
sively dirty war and uncontrolled spending, with the repetition of the 
worst patronage practices of the PRi, which fabricated totally one-
sided state elections, has confirmed how far we are from landing in 
a truly democratic regime, whatever the adjective used to describe it. 
The scandals surrounding the corruption in the presidential family 
uncovered a very advanced process of rot that expresses a prolonged 
political culture based on a corruption that nobody has bothered to 
eradicate and really change. in the parties, this stems from the break-
ing of the social bonds that ought to characterize the parties. 
The offensive of the impeachment that was maintained for nearly 
a year by president Fox and his allies (the main parties, the business-
men and the media) to disqualify Andres Manuel Lopez obrador (of 
the Democratic Revolution Party) as the main contender for the already 
well-advanced presidential succession, rarified and polarized the na-
tional political atmosphere in 2005, preparing the institutional political 
crisis scenario we are experiencing now after the unclear and not very 
credible election results on July 2nd, 2006, which gave a very narrow 
victory to the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderon. Deprived of its social 
element, politics assumes the logic of the market, of crude competition, 
the logic of profit that imposes itself with neither scruples nor princi-
ples, nor programs, nor rules nor ethical considerations of any worth, 
in the search for competitivity and political success, which is nothing 
more than the accumulation of material assets, public offices and the 
opportunity to be heard. Marketing replaces political strategies, private 
consultancy firms replace programs and advertising, mostly in the me-
dia, replaces mobilizations, the political practice of the social sectors. 
The opacity of the political parties permits all kinds of alliances 
aimed at achieving a particular policy or, particularly, entered into 
in order to obtain different kinds of elective offices. but the political 
show, that of crude power, bores and cloys. it is found clearly alien 
and imposed, and a means of achieving personal ambitions; the play-
ers demonstrate their blunders, their lack of ability and capacity, their 
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utter lack of sensitivity and their imperviousness towards their envi-
ronment. Now when they are only just starting out, the parties are in 
crisis, socially isolated, caught up in egocentric soliloquies, dazzled by 
power and money and their driving ambition that keeps them united 
in spite of their internal squabbles, which paralyze them. 
Alternatives in the face of the disorder
of those at the top
in general, the government of change represented by Vicente Fox and 
the PAN, like the other parties’ local governments of change, was in a 
permanent state of disorder, putting into practice erratic policies that 
reproduced inequality, the weakening of the economy, the tearing of 
the social fabric and the loss of the nation’s viability, not just because 
of the porosity of the borders caused by neoliberal globalization, but 
also due to the economic, social and political subordination to the 
empire of the North. From Miguel de la Madrid (1982 to1988) to Fox, 
the Mexican nation has been disarticulated, torn apart, stripped of its 
national resources and of policies that would reaffirm its consistency, 
its viability as a nation that is independent, even though it is autono-
mously incorporated in a planet without opportunities but plagued 
with contradictions and imperial restructurings. 
The nation’s loss of identity and viability is due to the fact that the 
whole country, its economy, its institutions, its society, have been trans-
figured under the onslaught of neoliberal globalization and the material 
and cultural transformations that superimpose and aim at a “westerni-
zation” (Americanization) that sweeps away and dismantles traditions, 
histories and the country’s own native, local and national cultures. in 
this way, not only do the economy and political forms dance to the tune 
of neoliberal hegemony, which is more fragile today in spite of every-
thing, but there is also an attempt to overthrow and wash out history, the 
life of peoples and societies that are much richer and diverse than those 
imposed by technological development and the power of the media. 
Vicente Fox’s government, the different institutional actors in the 
form of parties, and his followers are leading the country adrift, in 
no direction, battered violently by the hurricane winds of the war of 
expansion, the oligopolic, oligophrenic world economy charged with 
crises and the instability of political institutions emptied of social con-
tent and delegitimized in the eyes of societies that resist exclusion 
and being reduced to the status of a mere audience to the perverse, 
degrading spectacles of the others, of the government or the perverted 
powers who have come down in the world. however, we shouldn’t 
fool ourselves and just see the disorder or lack of skill of a frivolous, 
ignorant pilot or the ambition and corrupt unprogrammed ineptness 
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of the whole political class. in any case, they act within the unchal-
lengeable parameters of neoliberalism, which they consider to be an 
unavoidable misfortune, and as a result the first things to suffer are 
the living, working, material and cultural conditions of the workers, of 
the subordinated social strata. 
That has transformed institutional politics, merely state politics and 
the politics of the government. The wager is to prevent the formation and 
above all organization of autonomous alternatives that would act under 
different rules and logics than those of the market and, on the contrary, 
would give priority to the community. This means that they would reject 
the exclusive, oppressive situation reproduced by neoliberalism in the 
form of a devastating, fatal capitalist order, and, conversely, from now on 
seek to construct a web of relationships, organizations and policies that 
would undermine the rule of money and perverse individuality and aim 
towards an equalitarian, just, free, libertarian future. 
All the institutional actors are acting against the latter –from the 
PAN to the PRD including the PRi and the governments and institu-
tional representatives in every corner of the country. The whole po-
litical regime, its rules for funding, organization, management and 
representation have been created to prevent the hostilities of the other 
actors who are excluded, despised and feared indiscriminately and 
without any opportunity.
The sordid political atmosphere, heavily polluted by market-
ing and the degradation of institutional politics rely on disorder and 
chaos as a way to increase and spread mistrust, discouragement and 
apathy in society everywhere. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
election campaign of 2006 to choose a new president of the Repub-
lic was characterized by the imposition of a politics of fear that led 
to the extreme polarization of society. A society that was paralyzed 
would provide room to maneuver for the mounting and policies of the 
show, however depressing and terrible it might be. A society that was 
mobilized and critical would not cease to resist the stupidity and the 
economic and political aggression repeated by neoliberalism. For this 
reason, the paths of the parties and other institutional players cross, 
without stumbling on the paths that are being opened up by society, 
its communities, peoples and collective components. 
The political crisis that obviously characterizes the Mexican situa-
tion is really their problem, that of the political class, the power of the 
privileged blinded by their long and apparently undisputed power. The 
restricted democracy that they foster cannot be resolved by a complete 
reorganization of social life since it has become an exclusive option, 
for just a few, elitist, only for the so-called political class. The others, 
the excluded, the underdogs, the society that resists, maintains its criti-
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cal edge and even irony as conditions for its existence, are only just 
beginning to renew bonds, put two and two together and recover their 
organizational, political and cultural traditions decimated by those at 
the top. it is not going through any crisis, except, perhaps, birth pangs. 
it is preparing to act, to resist, shaking off the imposed inertias and 
alienations and seeking to reverse an unfavorable ratio of power. it is 
barely beginning to get going, stealthily, determinedly, like in the early 
morning of New Year’s Day 1994. in the face of the crisis in state politics 
and the reduction of society’s public spaces, the EZLN began the Other 
Campaign as a way to start repairing the social fabric and the possibili-
ties of another politics based on society’s self-organization. 
in the struggles, in the attempts at restructuring the organizations, 
in the defense of autonomies, self-government and self-organization, 
even in mere irritation and protest, it is carving out –on the fringe of 
state politics and the political institutional society– another way to do 
politics, the politics of the oppressed, politics understood as the vital 
resistance of workers, indigenous people, peasants, women, young peo-
ple, intellectuals, etc. The politics that will not allow itself to become 
trapped in the present, but rather lives in it looking towards the future. 
it would appear that the state politics and the politics from below 
cannot cross, they follow different paths and their actors and destina-
tions will no doubt be different. in view of the scandalous struggle for 
power without alternatives, faced by all the parties in the permanent 
election campaign that characterizes the reupdated regime, society 
needs to advance with its reorganization from below, experimenting 
with new, democratic methods of reorganization and participation, 
working hard to outline political alternatives that will fight for justice, 
equality and the freedom to do a different politics under the influence 
of the regressive economic policies that result in a massive loss of jobs 
and condemn ever broader and more diverse strata of the population 
to impoverishment, emigration and uncertainty. 
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Helmy Sharawy*
The American led Globalization
as the Main Obstacle to the
Development of Democracy
in the Arab World and Africa
iT is WELL kNoWN how American imperialist capitalism adopted 
the neo-liberal trend of thought publicized by the extremely reaction-
ary schools of ideology during the second half of the 20th century, and 
put in practice by the multinational companies, most of which are 
owned by American capital. Needless to reiterate the globalized neo-
liberal practices in the sphere of military domination and territorial 
occupation on one hand, and the subjugation of the international le-
gal instances as embodied in the United Nations and its various insti-
tutions to American imperialism, on the other hand. indeed, we en-
counter numerous aspects of American arrogance and coercion, both 
in relation to the other capitalist powers in Europe and Asia, and to 
the dominated states in the Third World. such arrogance is clearly 
manifested in the political and economic choices forced upon these 
states, or as concerns the right of these peoples to determine their own 
destinies, and safeguard their territorial integrity.
We shall study here, three aspects of the problem:
The Political Framework of the Arab/African Region and how it 
is being readjusted to suit the American plans for globalization. 
-
* Professor of Polítical sociology and afro-arab studies. Director of the El Cairo Arab 
& African Research Center.
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how the various imperialist Projects proposed for the Region 
distort its Democratic Development.
The existing forms of Resistance in the Region, and the pos-
sibility of developing the framework of the Movement of the 
Countries of the south.
The Political Framework
The Region’s contacts with the modern global system is not a recent 
occurrence, as the nationalist regimes in the Arab World (Moham-
mad Aly in Egypt, and kheir Ed-Dine Pasha in Tunisia, etc.) tried to 
modernize their countries relying on the global movement of mod-
ernization. hence, the first infiltration by Europeans into Egypt and 
the Levant, followed by European colonization in these Countries and 
the rest of Africa. however, soon the emerging Nationalist Movements 
and the Pan Arab and Pan African Movements, began their active op-
position to this European led form of globalization, in particular with 
the onslaught of the world wars, and the emergence of the United 
states as the strongest economy after the second world war.
Thus, the Us moved into the Middle East, taking advantage of 
the past projects of the European Powers in the region, in particular 
britain. hence the Us went to the Gulf Area for its oil production 
in iraq and iran, then in saudi Arabia, and also took advantage of 
the british projects of establishing new states on a religious basis in 
Pakistan, israel and the Arab Peninsula. As a result, the Us was able 
to establish its military presence in order to safeguard its interests, 
menaced by the communist “threat” and the rise of the Nationalist 
Movements in the region. 
All through the 1950’s and 1960’s we find a proliferation of Us led 
projects under the umbrella of the policy of containment to preserve 
the region under its hegemony, starting from the Truman Doctrine 
(1949), the quadri partite (Military) Command (1951), the bagdad 
Pact (1955) and the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) and afterwards to fill 
the void left by the retreat of britain and France after their aggression 
on Egypt in 1956. All these projects were designed to give full sup-
port to the dictatorships, and reactionary regimes in iran, Pakistan, 
the Gulf states and North Africa. This went hand in hand with the 
encouragement of the massive establishment of formal independent 
regimes in Africa, which were soon followed by military dictatorships, 
with “Coups” in key African Countries (Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali) 
having full American support.
it is to be noted that for almost half a century, the Us strived to 
push the Arab Countries into a series of wider pacts in order to resist 
nationalist trends, and the aspiration of the Arab peoples to establish 
-
-
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their national unity, and resist the Zionist israeli state, the mainstay 
of all the imperialist projects in the region. it is also to be noted that 
the Us did not mind whether the states it backed up were or were not 
democratic, as it had to face strong pan movements supported by Na-
tionalist states (the Arab League and organization of African Unity). 
The resistance of these Nationalist states was further strengthened 
by the participation in the Movement of Non Aligned states, to be fol-
lowed by the movement of the group of 77 (G 77), and the full support 
of the soviet Union and People’s Republic of China. such resistance 
had the support of the popular masses that refused the American he-
gemony, and looked forward to more democratic social and political 
development as a corollary to the social concessions granted.
The renaissance and modernization projects in the Nationalist 
states, in the second half of the 20th century, were oriented towards 
the West, in an attempt to catch up with the progress made during the 
two previous centuries. This meant that the resistance of these states 
towards imperialist hegemony could not be radical. in the meantime, 
the imperialist development in alien regimes such as that of israel, 
or the south African apartheid, or in fully reactionary regimes such 
as those of iran and Pakistan, opened wide vistas for the imperialist 
projects in the region. The incessant strife between these regimes and 
the National Liberation states helped obstruct the normal evolution 
of these latter states into full democratic experiences. hence, the ex-
planation of the collapse of the National Liberation states is twofold, 
the shortcomings of the bourgeois leaderships, was coupled with for-
eign intervention, or covert intrigue. This remains true in the Arab 
World and Africa today.
With the onslaught of the hegemony of American capital, and the 
multi-nationals on the world economy, in particular from the 1970’s 
on, such hegemony projects put an end to any national progress or 
independent development in the Third World Countries including the 
Arab World. Very little resistance now faces the reactionary or com-
pradore regimes in the Arab World, while some cases of armed strug-
gle are still discerned in various parts of Africa. 
The widespread acceptance by the new classes in control of the 
region of the structural adjustment policies imposed by the interna-
tional financial institutions (the iMF, the World bank, etc.), has led to 
rampant pauperization and increased social injustice, paralyzing all 
nationalist, social or political action. The Gulf petrodollars and the ac-
companying consumerist models, were partly responsible for much of 
the social disorders. They also promoted waves of salafi Fundamen-
talist islam, which pervaded the Arab World, and opposed the Nasser-
ist and socialist trends and their social and political concepts. 
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Most of the Arab modernization process was also attached to the 
liberal political concepts, and was satisfied by the nominal forms of 
multi-party systems that were announced in Egypt, Tunisia, senegal 
and kenya, etc aiming at accepting the new economic policies. how-
ever, it was soon clear that the fast rising American influence would 
stifle all hopes of democratization of these regimes. The new American 
inspired economic policies were designed to promote the interests of 
both the dominant American capital, and its allies in the compradore 
regimes, which were employed to execute specific American tasks, as 
is illustrated by the following cases: 
The full support of the sadat regime in Egypt, which under 
the guise of multi-party democracy, stifled all manner of op-
position by the masses, and gave full rein to the Muslim fun-
damentalists, in order to stand up to the leftist opposition at 
the head of the mass movement. in the mean time, the regime 
coordinated its efforts with those of the reactionary regimes in 
the Gulf against the soviet supported government in Afghani-
stan, and encouraged Egyptian islamists to join the bin Laden 
led groups there. The sadat Regime also supported the Us im-
perialist projects in Congo, Angola, Ethiopia and sudan. it also 
aborted the partial victory of the Egyptian army against the 
israeli occupation in 1973, by signing the Camp David peace 
agreements with israel (1979).
The support given to the non democratic regime of saddam 
hussein in iraq during his aggressive war against the islamic 
Regime in iran. Curiously enough, the Us never noticed the 
dictatorial nature of the regime until the end of that war, when 
saddam hussein thought he had the approval of the Us to an-
nex kuwait.
by the 1990’s, the hegemony of the imperialist capitalist system 
was consecrated by the disintegration of the soviet Union, and 
the establishment of a uni-polar system dominated by the Us. 
As a corollary, the iMF and the World bank had successfully 
coerced all third world countries into adopting the structural 
adjustment policies. in the ensuing euphoria, the “victorious” 
dominant media crowed in praise of the “democratic” changes 
in Eastern Europe and the republics of the former soviet Un-
ion, while full support was given to the dictatorial regimes in 
the Middle East and Africa, in order to safeguard the interests 
of the Us and its imperialist allies by securing the flow of oil 
from the Gulf, and the stability of their lackeys in Egypt, and 
-
-
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elsewhere. Meanwhile, a country as iraq was literally blockad-
ed, while the rest of the Arab countries were drowned in their 
internal problems, such as to exclude any aspirations for any 
regional cooperation, or community of interests. This virtual 
blockade led to complete paralysis of all regional bodies such 
as the Arab League or the organization of African Unity. This 
ideological siege and the absence of any real hope for progress, 
has left the ground free for all manner of fundamentalist reli-
gious trends to run loose in the Arab region (the terrorist at-
tacks in Egypt and Algeria through out the 1990’s).
in the world arena, the communist threat was replaced by the threat 
of islam, or islamic terrorism, and the struggle of civilizations be-
came the favorite slogan. This obliged the vassal regimes in the re-
gion to combat fundamentalism in order to remain in power. More 
serious was the sanctification of the “market doctrine”, to the extent 
that many onetime socialists adopted the discourse of the free market! 
Needless to say, that islamic thought is essentially market oriented, in 
accordance with the Prophet’s saying: “90% of all wealth comes from 
Trade”. Another islamic attribute is their innate abhorrence to democ-
racy, and their enmity to the National state in favor of Pan islamism. 
All this sends more water into the mill of the globalized system.
The above considerations have paved the way for the dramatic 
events at the start of the new century, while a social base favorable 
to the hegemony of the single pole, was crystallized by the preva-
lence of the consumerist tendencies among the bourgeoisie and even 
among many popular masses, and the infatuation of the intellectuals 
with American computers, science and technology. The situation is 
worsened by the influx of the rural population into the urban centers, 
which undermines the resistance possibilities of the working classes. 
No wonder then if such weakness of the social and political organiza-
tions has left the field open for the imperialist projects to be imple-
mented, and to give much precedence to its israeli advance post in 
the region. 
The Imperialist Projects in the Region Distort
its Democratic Development
After 11 september 2001, the Us global strategy became more aggres-
sive, and more stress was given to the Middle East region. The impe-
rialist political discourse gave great attention to the supposed iraqi 
infractions of UN resolutions, the grave violations of human rights in 
Afghanistan, or the troubled situations in Algeria or in the African great 
lakes region. it was clear that the Americans as the leaders of the politi-
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cal and military globalization process, were using their domination of 
NATo, their transnational monopolies, and their upper hand in the glo-
bal media, to secure their vested interests in the sources of oil and other 
raw materials, and their political influence in the zones of conflict. This 
meant weakening the positions of their European “Allies” on one hand, 
subjugating all UN institutions and even bodies of regional standing 
on the other hand, and finally supporting subservient regimes in their 
sphere of influence, irrespective of their being democratic or not.
The events of 11 september 2001, were a boon in that respect, as 
they gave American imperialism the opportunity to adopt the role of 
the “victim” of islamic aggression, and to take up the role of the de-
fender of the camp of democracy all over the world. it was assumed 
that “terrorism” was the enemy of democracy in the first place, and 
indeed, there was no mention in the terrorist discourse of any enmity 
to capitalism as such.
The important document issued in september 2002 under the ti-
tle “The National security strategy of the United states”, was very 
revealing in this respect. it tried to cloak the aims of the American 
Leadership in moral terms, glorifying the “democracy” of the Free 
Market, and the American way of life. Followed by the bush vision in 
the strategy of March 2006, U.s extolled the Global Leadership, stress-
ing the unity of interests of the (international) community, and those 
of the (American) individual, and pinpointed the public enemy of the 
civilized world, embodied in the axis of evil, and the rogue states. This 
meant the Us had a “spiritual Mission” defined by the New Conserva-
tives and entrusted by them to President George W. bush, who would 
then start his “Crusade” against religious terror (islamic, of course), 
and the Dictatorships that support such terrorism (yet saddam had no 
relations with such terrorism!). 
We should point out to two main tenets of this American strategy: 
The Democracy of the Market, and The American internationalism. 
The first was the main basic tenet for imposing its sphere of influ-
ence through the World Trade organization in order to open all vis-
tas for the American economy. The second was the framework within 
which it would be able to impose a “democratic” regime here, or get 
rid of an unwanted regime there, phrasing it as “building the infra-
structure of Democracy”. For the purpose of competition with Eu-
ropean influence, it was necessary to implement certain projects of 
collective organizations under its wing, and combating other projects 
it frowned down upon.
it may be argued that the logic of the market economy enhances 
the chances of liberal democracy, in the case of liberal capitalist devel-
opment. but in a region like the Middle East where such development 
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is absent because of the supremacy of the Rent “tributary” economy 
(oil rent in many countries), and a history of despotic rule, nearer to 
the Asiatic mode of production, such a market economy leads to des-
potism rather than democracy. Under these conditions, the despotic 
regimes in the region, air a formal discourse about the “liberation of 
Palestine”, or the imperatives of the Arab israeli conflict, or the threat 
of islamic fundamentalism jumping into power, etc. on the level of 
the African Continent, the regimes try to justify their despotism by a 
discourse on ethnic strife, or the burden of foreign debts, or the injus-
tice of the world trade conditions, etc.
Under the guise of the world war on terrorism, at the beginning of 
the 21st century, various forms of regional collectives were promoted, 
the ugliest being the “broader” Middle East imposed on the Arab World. 
in sub saharan Africa, no such collective was proposed, precedence be-
ing given to the spread of formal liberal democracy, in order to promote 
market economy, and the traffic of lethal arms to intensify ethnic strife. 
in both regions however, the aim is to prop up regimes loyal to the Us, 
and block any attempt at a south/south dialogue, or coalition.
in order to implement its new World strategy, the Us let loose all 
its arsenal of projects, and proposed policies. The observer will cer-
tainly note the following: 
Many sessions of the World Economic Forum of Davos outside 
Europe were held in Arab countries (Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, Mo-
rocco and bahrein), also an important session of the WTo was 
held in Qatar (Doha).
The proposed projects for regional collectives under the vari-
ous headings of the broader or New Middle East, or other de-
nominations, all emanate directly from the American leader-
ship (Colin Powel, or Condoleeza Rice). All such projects were 
proposed after severe blows to the Arab Countries were handed 
down by the Us and their forward post of israel, to iraq, Pales-
tine, sudan and now, Lebanon.
These proposed American projects compete with older Euro-
pean projects of integration of the Arab Countries with their 
European counterparts (The Lisbon or the Euromed initia-
tives). They also aim at dislodging all previous Arab projects 
of cooperation or integration (The common Arab market, Afro 
Arab cooperation, the non aligned nations or the group of 77).
These Us sponsored projects were preceded by an ideological bar-
rage of propaganda about terrorism being an innate product of the 
-
-
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Region (due to the nature of islam, or the nature of the Arabs). The 
aim was to put pressure on the Arab peoples and governments, and 
influence their intellectuals, to prove the fallacy of the accusation of 
terrorism by accepting the proposed projects. Thus it managed not 
only to promote projects that secure political dominance, but also en-
list the intellectuals, and civil society, and even the “liberal” left, for 
its implementation. hence, the American projects called for the ideo-
logical “dialogue” with Arab intellectuals, and managed to mobilize 
some representatives of the intellectual movements, and civil society, 
into colloques for “political reform” and “promotion of democracy” in 
conformity with the American agenda, and not the real answer to the 
crisis of democracy in the region.
We shall monitor here some of the proposed initiatives as examples 
of the tireless efforts of Us diplomacy in this respect, but a comprehen-
sive study of such projects is indicated for more specialized fora.
After President bush announced his “strategic Vision of the Us” 
(sept. 2002), his secretary of state, Colin Powell, announced his ini-
tiative for “partnership Us/Middle East, for hope building” in Decem-
ber 2002. This initiative specified a vast Middle East to include the 
countries from Pakistan to the Maghreb (but later, other plans were 
envisaged for the greater Maghreb). in this huge area, that includes 
israel, Turkey, iran and Pakistan, reminiscent of the old Middle East 
Pacts of the 1950’s, the Arab group would be a minority, and would 
find itself cooperating with israel, and virtually under its hegemony, 
without any mention of a just solution of the core of the Arab israeli 
conflict, i.e. the Palestinian Problem. however, the hidden implica-
tion was the right to eliminate “rogue” regimes, such as the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, and a few months later, the invasion of iraq (March 
2003). here, the Us imposed its arbitrary right to destroy any regime 
it considers is inimical to its hegemony (and that of its main ally in the 
region, israel), and that by brute force, irrespective of all its discourse 
about democracy and human rights.
Two years later, the initiative was renamed the “broader Middle 
East”, to include the same region minus the francophone North Af-
rican, which was to be negotiated with France and Western Europe. 
The project is not confined to the political reform of the region, but 
also economic reform (private entrepreneurs, and micro projects), 
social reform (empowerment of women), and intellectual reform (re-
appraisal of education). The overall ideological framework, aims at 
reforming the system of values to combat the fundamental heritage 
that develops into terrorism. The project was announced in February 
2004, and was expected to be endorsed by the Arab summit in March, 
and approved by the G-8 in April of the same year. however, the Arab 
79
Helmy Sharawy
summit failed to endorse the project, claiming refute of the “imported 
reform!” and tried to conciliate the Americans by regimenting some 
intellectuals in order to “authenticate political reform and democ-
racy”. one such meeting was held in the biblioteca Alexandrina, at-
tended by some one hundred intellectuals who formulated “The Alex-
andria Declaration”. This Declaration adopted the plans for political 
reform, so as to become a local aspiration, but its economic agenda 
was nothing more than the neo-liberal agenda of market economy 
and dismantling of all public sector projects. This belied its pious ad-
vocacy of the values of liberties, democracy and peace, reiterated ad 
nauseum by the American discourse. As American globalization is not 
confined to the announcement of some vague projects, it tries to in-
still its concepts deeply into society, to preempt any unforeseen steps 
in pursuit of real democratic reform. hence the hasty participation of 
its “friends” in various formations such as the “Future Forum” active 
in a wide area from Maghreb to bahrein and Qatar, through Jordan. 
similarly, there are projects of so called promotion of democracy, fi-
nanced openly by American Embassies.
such progress for this Middle East initiative, must be linked to 
the “American internationalism”, which was announced several years 
before. Thus, some pro American organizations and personalities, 
from Poland, Chile, Mali, south Africa, india and Mexico, announced 
in 2000, a so called “Community of Democracies”. A typical “Demo-
cratic internationalism” reminiscent of the second internationale of 
old times, or the Atlantic organizations after World War ii, to oppose 
the socialist camp.
This “internationalism” held its preparatory meetings in Warsaw, 
and was attended by 110 Countries, including the former soviet Re-
publics, Third World Countries, and presided by the United states. 
This international proceeded actively after the announcement of the 
Us strategy in 2002, and chose a Council in Chile, and an executive 
secretariat from the state Department and some member states, The 
secretariat helped create the “World Forum for Democracy”, and a 
civil society forum for the member states. The literature of this Forum 
is published in Chile under the heading “Participa”.
Thus we are confronted by a private international organization, 
more encompassing in its scope than the Davos Forum, or the G-8, 
and directed against popular activities and the World social Forum. 
As it includes many third world countries, including india, south Af-
rica and Mexico, which have special preponderance within the third 
world, it presents a real obstacle to any south/south dialogue. by such 
means, the Us are not containing the Arab World and Africa alone, 
but the whole World Wide Movement for freedom and real democ-
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racy. Despite all these efforts to dupe Third World Peoples, the Us 
exonerate themselves from all restrictions on their activities against 
humanity or the environment, as is manifested by excepting their citi-
zens from all responsibility of their acts violating the jurisdiction of 
the international Criminal Court, or the kyoto agreement on the En-
vironment, or even the rules of the World Trade organization. As for 
the American invasion of iraq, or the israeli criminal aggression on 
Lebanon, no comment is needed. 
Current Resistance and its Development within
the South/South Framework
From the above, we realize that the American globalization project is 
not merely a project of economic domination by world capitalism, nor 
is it the use of military might to dominate one region or another in the 
third world, but it is also an ideological project, to be implemented in 
the spheres of information, education and values. it is aimed at the 
spirit and life of our peoples, hence a serious effort must be deployed 
by the intellectuals of the third world to combat such projects.
As the Arab World and Africa make up a region of extreme stra-
tegic importance, and an essential source of oil and mineral raw ma-
terials, American imperialism tries to paralyze the movement of the 
peoples of the region, as well as any cooperation with outside forces. 
in the meantime, it does not hesitate to use brute military force di-
rectly or through its main allies to stifle any attempt at independence. 
Witness its aggression in iraq, its blatant threats to syria, iran, or the 
israeli sustained aggression on the Palestinian People, and its destruc-
tion of Lebanon. Under such conditions, Condoleeza Rice reiterates 
the discourse about the “New” Middle East, meaning by that qualifica-
tion, building it out of communal, religious and ethnic fragments, to 
fit what she once called, the policy of constructive chaos.
We can note that the masses are strongly aware of the imperial-
ist plans but they are still uprising spontaneously in many countries 
of the south. The social movements and political parties do not ex-
press a strong resistance, specially in the Arab world; where they 
are more present on issues related to national questions or at the 
international level. 
Under such conditions, the intellectuals of the south should reas-
sess their analysis of the regional systems, the developmental state, 
and the concept of limited sovereignty, and international legitimacy. 
They should also reassess the concept of liberal democracy in the 
south, in the absence of any real market economy.
in light of such reassessment, we believe the obvious aim will be 
the reactivation of the three continent’s movement started in 1965, in 
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pursuit of whose first conference in 1966, Mehdi bin barka was assas-
sinated. i believe the time is ripe for reinvigorating this community of 
nations in the presence of the following elements:
The current vigor of the mass movement in Latin America, 
with its bolivarian or socialist trends.
The probable reactivation of the Arab mass movement, in the 
light of the stand of the Palestinian and Lebanese Peoples to is-
raeli aggression, and the manifestations of solidarity with them 
from the Peoples of the Third World.
The sustained activity of the World social Forum in Africa, in 
the light of the Durban session (July 2006), and the Nairobi 
session (January 2007).
Thus an alternative democratic globalization to replace the dominant 
American led globalization, may be possible.
-
-
-
Patrick Bond*
The Looting of Africa
Introduction
Unequal trade and investment relationships are nothing new for Af-
rica, although beginning in 2005 the world’s attention was drawn to 
Africa’s plight as never before. however, in contrast to the neo-or-
thodox strategy implied by Gordon brown, bono, bob Geldoff and 
other mainstream campaigners, Africa’s deepening integration into 
the world economy has typically generated not wealth but the out-
flow of wealth. There is new evidence available to demonstrate this 
conclusively, just as the current fusion of neoliberalism and neocon-
servatism consolidates. 
in fact, the deeper global power relations that keep Africa down 
(and, simultaneously, African elites shored up) should have been obvi-
ous to the world during 2005. it was a year in which numerous events 
1 A longer version of the argument under the title Looting Africa: The Economics of 
Exploitation is published by Zed books in July 2006.
* PhD from the Johns hopkins University Department of Geography and Environ-
mental Engineering in baltimore, UsA. Professor at the University of kwaZulu-Na-
tal school of Development studies, Durban. Director at the University of kwaZulu-
Natal Centre for Civil society, Durban.
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were lined up to ostensibly help liberate Africa from poverty and pow-
erlessness, to provide relief from crushing debt loads, to double aid 
and to establish a ‘development round’ of trade:
the mobilization of NGo-driven citizens campaigns like brit-
ain’s Make Poverty history and the Johannesburg-based Global 
Call to Action Against Poverty (throughout 2005);
Tony blair’s Commission for Africa (February);
The main creditor countries’ debt relief proposal (June);
a tour of Africa by the new World bank president Paul Wolfow-
itz (June);
the G8 Gleneagles debt and aid commitments (July);
the Live 8 consciouness-raising concerts (July);
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals review 
(september);
the return to Nigeria of monies looted by sani Abacha and de-
posited in swiss bank accounts (september);
the iMF/World bank annual meeting addressing debt and Third 
World ‘voice’ (september);
a large debt relief package for Nigeria (october); and
the deal done at the World Trade organization’s ministerial 
summit in hong kong (December).
These all revealed global-elite hypocrisy and power relations which 
remained impervious to advocacy, solidarity and democratization. At 
best, partial critiques of imperial power emerged amidst the cacoph-
ony of all-white rock concerts and political grandstanding. At worst, 
polite public discourse tactfully avoided capital’s blustering violence, 
from Nigeria’s oil-soaked Delta to northeastern Congo’s gold mines to 
botswana’s diamond finds to sudan’s killing fields. Most of the Lon-
don charity NGo strategies ensured that core issue areas –debt, aid, 
trade and investment– would be addressed in only the most superfi-
cial ways. The 2005 events also revealed the limits of celebrity-chasing 
tactics aimed at intra-elite persuasion rather than pressure. Tragically, 
the actual conditions faced by most people on the continent continued 
to deteriorate. 
Today, Africa is still getting progressively poorer, with per capita 
incomes in many countries below those of the 1950s-60s era of in-
dependence. if we consider even the most banal measure of poverty, 
most sub-saharan African countries suffered an increase in the per-
-
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centage of people with income of less than $1/day during the 1980s 
and 1990s, the World bank itself concedes2 (World bank, 2005c:66). 
Not just poverty but also inequality must be central to the analysis, 
for Africa hosts some of the world’s worst cases. The following coun-
tries exceed a 0.50 Gini coefficient score, placing them at the very 
top of the world’s ranking: Namibia, botswana, the Central African 
Republic, swaziland, Lesotho, south Africa, Zambia, Malawi, The 
Gambia and Zimbabwe.
The looting of Africa has also been intensely gendered. Women are the 
main victims of systemic poverty and inequality, whether in produc-
tive circuits of capital (increasingly subject to sweatshop conditions) 
2 For a critique of the $/day measure, see Reddy, s. (2005). 
Namibia 72 Burundi 41
Botswana 65 Nigeria 41
Central African Republic 62 Burkina Faso 40
Swaziland 61 Angola 39
Lesotho 58 Senegal 39
South Africa 57 Mozambique 39
Zambia 53 Mali 38
Malawi 51 Ghana 38
The Gambia 50 Guinea 38
Zimbabwe 50 Mauritania 37
Madagascar 46 Benin 36
Cote d’Ivoire 43 Tanzania 35
Kenya 42 Níger 33
Uganda 42 Etiopía 28
Cameroon 41 Mauritius 19
Source: World Bank (2005), World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development, Washington, p.39.
* A Gini score of 0 is perfect equality while 100 indicates that one person has all the income and all others have none. Scores 
above.50 represent quite extreme conditions. Bank staff calculated Gini coefficients from household survey data, and dates differ by 
data availability.
Table 1
African inequality (Gini coefficients by country, early 2000s)*
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or in the ‘sphere of reproduction’ of households and labour markets, 
where much primitive accumulation occurs through unequal gender 
power relations. There are many ways, Dzodzi Tsikata and Joanna 
kerr have shown, that markets and mainstream economic policy ‘per-
petuate women’s subordination’ (Tsikata and kerr, 2002).
in particular, the denial of Africans’ access to food, medicines, 
energy and even water is a common reflection of neoliberal domi-
nance in social policy, as people who are surplus to capitalism’s la-
bour power requirements find that they had better fend for themselves 
–or simply die. in even relatively prosperous south Africa, an early 
death for millions –disproportionately women– was the outcome of 
state and employer reaction to the AiDs epidemic, with cost-benefit 
analyses demonstrating to the state and capital that keeping most of 
the country’s five to six million hiV-positive people alive through pat-
ented medicines cost more than the people were ‘worth’3. 
The decimated social wage is one indicator of Africa’s amplified 
underdevelopment in recent years. in the pages that follow, however, 
we focus on the material processes of Africa’s underdevelopment via 
trade and extractive-oriented investment, largely through the deple-
tion of natural resources. This is an area of research that has already 
helped catalyse the ecological debt and reparations movement, and 
that has sufficient intellectual standing to be the basis of a recent World 
bank study, Where is the Wealth of Nations? (World bank, 2005a) (A 
similar critique could be levelled against financial processes, showing 
how the June 2005 G7 Finance Ministers’ debt relief deal perpetuates 
rather than ends debt peonage4.)
The story is not new, of course. We can never afford ourselves the 
luxury of forgetting the historical legacy of a continent looted: trade 
by force dating back centuries; slavery that uprooted around 12 
million Africans; land grabs; vicious taxation schemes; precious 
metals spirited away; the appropriation of antiquities to the brit-
ish Museum and other trophy rooms; the 19th century emergence 
of racist ideologies to justify colonialism; the 1884-85 carve-up of 
Africa into dysfunctional territories in a berlin negotiating room; 
the construction of settler-colonial and extractive-colonial systems 
3 in the case of the vast Johannesburg/London conglomerate Anglo American Cor-
poration, the cut-off for saving workers in 2001 was 12%. The lowest-paid 88% of em-
ployees were more cheaply dismissed once unable to work, with replacements found 
amongst south Africa’s 42% unemployed reserve army of labour, according to an inter-
nal study reported by the Financial Times. For more, see bond, Patrick (2005).
4 one of the strongest recent overviews of African debt is Capps, G. (2005); see also 
bond, P. (2006).
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–of which apartheid, the German occupation of Namibia, the Portu-
guese colonies and king Leopold’s belgian Congo were perhaps only 
the most blatant– often based upon tearing black migrant workers 
from rural areas (leaving women vastly increased responsibilities as 
a consequence); Cold War battlegrounds –proxies for Us/UssR con-
flicts– filled with millions of corpses; the post-Cold War terrain of 
unipolar power; other wars catalysed by mineral searches and off-
shoot violence such as witnessed in blood diamonds and other pre-
cious metals and minerals such as coltan (the cellphone ingredient 
found in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo); poacher-
stripped swathes of East, Central and southern Africa now devoid 
of rhinos and elephants whose ivory became ornamental material 
or aphrodisiac in the Middle East and East Asia; societies used as 
guinea pigs in the latest corporate pharmaceutical test; and the list 
could continue.
As is also abundantly clear, Africa also suffers a systemic cultur-
al and ideological impoverishment in the North. international mass 
media images of Africans were nearly uniformly negative during the 
recent period. it was from West Africa that the neoconservative, neo-
Malthusian writer Robert kaplan described for his frightened Us 
audience a future defined in terms of ‘disease, overpopulation, un-
provoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the in-
creasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the 
empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international 
drug cartels’ (kaplan, 1994: 46). As the ‘dark continent’, Africa has 
typically been painted with broad-brush strokes, as a place of hea-
then and uncivilized people, as savage and superstitious, as tribalis-
tic and nepotistic. David Wiley has shown how western media cov-
erage is crisis driven, based upon parachute journalism, amplified 
by an entertainment media which ‘perpetuates negative images of 
helpless primitives, happy-go-lucky buffoons, evil pagans. The me-
dia glorify colonialism/European intervention. Currently, Africa is 
represented as a place of endemic violence and brutal but ignorant 
dictators’. Add to this the ‘animalization of Africa via legion of na-
ture shows on Africa that present Africa as being devoid of humans’, 
enhanced by an ‘advertising industry that has built and exploited 
(and thereby perpetuated) simplistic stereotypes of Africa’5. Thus it 
was disgusting but logical, perhaps, that African people were set-
tled into a theme village at an Austrian zoo in June 2005, their huts 
placed next to monkey cages in scenes reminiscent of 19th century 
exhibitions. in an explanatory letter, zoo director barbara Jantschke 
5 <http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/curriculum/lm1/1/lm1_teachers.html>.
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denied that this was ‘a mistake’ because ‘i think the Augsburg zoo is 
exactly the right place to communicate an atmosphere of the exotic’ 
(hawley, 2005).
ironically, the World bank’s ecological economists have conceded 
as much in their calculations of natural resources depletion: petro-
leum, other subsoil mineral assets, timber resources, nontimber for-
est resources, protected areas, cropland and pastureland. indeed, the 
bank calculates that much of Africa is poorer not wealthier the more 
its comparative advantage in resources is pursued. Where is the Wealth 
of Nations? makes several crucial adjustments to gross national in-
come and savings accounts. by subtracting fixed capital depreciation, 
adding education spending, subtracting resource depletion and sub-
tracting pollution damage, the bank finds that some countries are vast 
losers via export processing.
The picture is not entirely negative, for there has been a slight 
upturn in the terms of trade for African countries thanks to higher 
commodity prices associated with East Asian demand. but this should 
not disguise the profoundly unequal and unfair system of export-led 
growth, which has impoverished Africans in many ways. As a result, 
according to Christian Aid, ‘Trade liberalization has cost sub-saha-
ran Africa $272 billion over the past 20 years… overall, local produc-
ers are selling less than they were before trade was liberalized’6 (Aid, 
2005). Deconstructing African countries according to whether there 
was rapid or slow trade liberalization from 1987-99, Christian Aid 
found a close correlation between trade openness and worsening pov-
erty. one reason was falling commodity prices during the 1980s-90s.
Commodity export dependency
and falling terms of trade 
The most important myth of neoliberal economics is that production 
for export inexorably creates prosperity. in reality, ‘unequal exchange’ 
in trade –including the rising African trade deficit with south Africa– is 
another route for the extraction of superprofits from Africa. The conti-
nent’s share of world trade declined over the past quarter century, but 
the volume of exports increased. ‘Marginalization’ of Africa occurred, 
hence, not because of insufficient integration, but because other areas 
of the world –especially East Asia– moved to the export of manufac-
tured goods, while Africa’s industrial potential declined thanks to exces-
sive deregulation associated with structural adjustment. 
overall, primary exports of natural resources accounted for near-
ly 80% of African exports in 2000, compared to 31% for all developing 
6 see also kraev, E. (2005).
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countries and 16% for the advanced capitalist economies. According 
to the UN Conference on Trade in Development, in 2003, a dozen Af-
rican countries were dependent upon a single commodity for exports, 
including crude petroleum (Angola 92%, Congo 57%, Gabon 70%, Ni-
geria 96% and Equatorial Guinea 91%); copper (Zambia 52%); dia-
monds (botswana 91%); coffee (burundi 76%, Ethiopia 62%, Uganda 
83%), tobacco (Malawi 59%) and uranium (Niger 59%) (oxfam, 2005: 
21). Excluding south Africa, the vast majority (63%) of sub-saharan 
exports in recent years have been petroleum-related, largely from 
Nigeria, Angola and other countries in the Gulf of Guinea. The next 
largest category of exports from the subcontinent (and not including 
south Africa) is food and live animals (17%) (UN Conference on Trade 
in Development, 2003: 250). The problems associated with primary 
product export dependence are not only high levels of price volatility 
and downward price trends for many natural resources. in addition, 
especially for minerals, production is highly capital-intensive, offers 
low incentives for educational investments, and provides a greater 
danger of intervention by parasitical rentiers (Cornia, 1999). 
More than two-thirds of Africa’s trade is with developed countries, 
although beginning in 1990, China’s share rose from 2% to 9%, in the 
process attracting growing controversy over geopolitics (because from 
sudan to Zimbabwe to Angola, Chinese loans and investments propped 
up corrupt regimes) and deindustrialization. The Chinese threat to Af-
rican industry is profound, with Nigeria losing 350,000 jobs directly 
(and 1.5 million indirectly) due to Chinese competition from 2000-05. 
Lesotho’s garment industry collapsed when the Africa Growth and op-
portunity Act benefits evaporated in 2005 once China joined the WTo 
(Chiahemen, 2005). 
but the main damage remains the long-term decline in primary 
product price trends. As Michael barrett brown explains: ‘The value 
added in making up manufactured goods has been greatly increased 
compared with the raw material required; synthetics continue to re-
place natural products in textiles, shoes and rubber goods; and the 
elasticity of demand for agricultural products (the proportion of extra 
incomes spent on food and beverages) has been steadily falling’. Not-
withstanding the 2002-05 price increases –especially oil, rubber and 
copper thanks to Chinese import demand– the value of coffee, tea and 
cotton exports many African countries rely upon continues to stagnate 
or fall. Falling prices for most cash crops pushed Africa’s agricultural 
export value down from $15 billion in 1987 to $13 billion in 2000 not-
withstanding greater volumes of exports7 (barratt-brown, 2004).
7 see also barratt-brown, M. and Tiffen, P. (1992).
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in historical terms, the prices of primary commodities (other than fu-
els) have risen and fallen according to a deeper rhythm. Exporters of 
primary commodities, for example, fared particularly badly when fin-
anciers were most powerful. The cycle for an exporting country typi-
cally begins with falling commodity prices, then leads to rising foreign 
debt, dramatic increases in interest rates, a desperate intensification 
of exports which lowers prices yet further, and bankruptcy. Using 1970 
as a base index year of 100, from 1900 to 1915, the prices of commodi-
ties rose from 130 to 190, and then fell dramatically to 90 in 1919. 
From a low point of 85 in 1930, as the Great Depression began, the 
commodity price index rose mainly during World War ii to 135, as de-
mand for raw materials proved strong and shipping problems created 
supply-side problems. Prices fell during the subsequent globalization 
process until 1968 (to 95 on the index), but soared to 142 at the peak 
of a commodity boom in 1973 when oil and minerals –especially gold– 
temporarily soared. The subsequent fall in commodity prices took the 
index down steadily, well below 40 by the late 1990s (Leon and soto, 
1997: 350). in Ethiopia, to illustrate, coffee exports rose from 1992, 
with the volume of output doubling by 2003. but the export value fell 
from $450 million to less than $100 million during the same period 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2005:141). 
Commodity prices were extremely volatile in key sectors affecting 
Africa. Gold rose from $35/ounce in 1971 to $850/ounce in 1981 but 
then crashed to as low as $250 by the late 1990s. The 2002-05 minor 
Product, Unit 1980 1990 2001
Cafe (Robusta) cents/kg 411.70 118.20 63.30
Cocoa cents/kg 330.50 126.70 111.40
Groundnut oil dollars/ton 1090.10 963.70 709.20
Palm oil dollars/ton 740.90 289.90 297.80
Soya dollars/ton 376.00 246.80 204.20
Sugar cents/kg 80.17 27.67 19.90
Cotton cents/kg 261.70 181.90 110.30
Copper dollars/ton 2770.00 2661.00 1645.00
Lead cents/kg 115.00 81.10 49.60
Table 2
Commodity price declines, 1980-2001
Source: Touissant, E. (2005), Your Money or Your Life, Chicago, Haymarket Books, p. 157.
91
Patrick Bond
boom in some commodity prices reflected strong Chinese import de-
mand and the East Asian recovery from the 1997-98 depression in 
four key countries; from a very low base in early 2002, the prices of 
agricultural products rose 80% and metals/minerals doubled. Perhaps 
most spectacularly, the rise of the oil price from $11/barrel to $70/bar-
rel from 1998-2005 meant that price volatility did indeed assist a few 
countries. but the soaring price of energy came at the expense of most 
of Africa, which imports oil. 
supporters of the status quo argue that there are mitigating fac-
tors in the world trading system designed to offer Africa a safety net. 
but ‘preferential access’ that permits somewhat greater Northern im-
ports from Africa represents only 1% of world trade volume. And the 
‘special and Differential Treatment’ (sDT) concessions grudgingly 
provided some Third World exports are typically hard-fought and 
minimal, as Tetteh hormeku of the Africa Trade Network explains:
Countries at different stages of growth and development should not 
assume the same level of responsibilities in international agreements 
as these are unequal partners. but by end of the Uruguay Round the 
spirit of sDT was reduced to a narrower concept: developing countries 
had to essentially accept the same obligations as developed countries, 
and may be exempted from implementing some measures, as well 
as allowed different time scales. but almost all obligations would be 
adopted by them… [At Doha,] over 200 proposals were made relat-
ing first to strengthening sDT and second to resolving implementation 
issues. since the Round has been launched, all discussions on sDT 
and implementation issues have made no progress, except on 22 issues 
which are widely described as of having little or no commercial value 
(hormeku, 2005).
A related problem is the northern agricultural subsidy system, which 
is worth several hundred billion dollars a year, whether for domes-
tic market stabilization (in an earlier era) or export promotion. over-
productive European, Us and Japanese agro-industrial corporations 
producers find African markets in the form of dumped grains and 
foodstuffs. Rarely examined, however, are the differential impacts of 
subsidies, especially when associated with glutted global agricultural 
markets. This is a general problem associated with export-led growth, 
but is particularly acute in the farming sector because of uneven ac-
cess to state subsidies, especially affecting export crops. 
it is not only a matter of much lower national-scale productive 
potential in the Third World than would have been the case had lib-
eralization not decimated many local industries, including domestic 
farming. in the process, rapid trade-related integration caused grow-
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ing social inequality, as branco Milanovic has reported (Milanovic, 
2002). Those who benefited most include the import/export firms, 
transport/shipping companies, plantations and large-scale commer-
cial farmers, the mining sector, financiers (who gain greater security 
than in the case of produce designed for the domestic market), con-
sumers of imported goods, and politicians and bureaucrats who are 
tapped into the commercial/financial circuits. 
Agricultural subsidies are merely one aspect of growing rural ine-
quality. Farm subsidies today mainly reflect agro-corporate campaign 
contributions and the importance of rural voting blocs in advanced 
capitalist countries. (in the 1930s, the first generation of Us farm sub-
sidies instead reflected the dangers of agricultural overproduction to 
society and ecology, for the ‘dust bowl’ phenomenon in the Midwest 
emerged when many family farmers simply left their failing lands fal-
low after markets were glutted.)
The power of the agro-corporate lobby is substantial and getting 
stronger. The UN Development Programme found that agricultural 
subsidies had risen 15% between the late 1980s and 2004, from $243 
billion to $279 billion (a figure Vandana shiva considers a vast un-
derestimate), with Japan (56%) relatively most subsidy-intensive in 
relation to the total value of agricultural production, compared to the 
EU (33%) and Us (18%) (United Nations Development Programme, 
2005:19).
Unlike earlier periods when farming was smaller-scale and at-
omized, advanced capitalist countries’ agricultural subsidies today 
overwhelmingly benefit large agro-corporate producers. subsidies in 
the EU’s fifteen major countries are even more unequally distributed 
than the Us, with beneficiaries in britain including Queen Elizbeth ii 
($1.31 million), Prince Charles ($480,000) and britain’s richest man, 
the Duke of Westminster ($1.13 million)8 (sharma, 2005a). studies of 
the Gini coefficients of northern agriculture subsidy recipients, as re-
ported by the UNDP, confirm that large farming corporations benefit 
far more than do small farmers. in 2001, the EU 15’s Gini coefficient 
was 78 and the Us coefficient was 67, both far higher than income 
distribution in the world’s most unequal countries (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2005: 130). Were political power relations 
to change, a massive redirection of subsidies to small, lower-income, 
8 sharma argues that in response: “Developing countries should ask for: agricul-
tural subsidies to be classified under two categories: one which benefits small farm-
ers and the remaining which goes to agri-business companies and the big farmers/
landowners; and since less than 20% of the $1 billion farm subsidy being doled out 
every day genuinely benefit small farmers, the remaining 80% subsidies need to be 
outright scrapped before proceeding any further on agriculture negotiations.”
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family farmers in the North would be more equitable and could have 
the effect of moving agricultural production towards more organic 
(and less petroleum-intensive) farming. 
A detailed debate regularly occurs over whether subsidies are 
‘trade-distorting’. if they represent export subsidies or price supports, 
these subsidies belong in what the WTo terms an ‘Amber box’, targeted 
for elimination. Export subsidies of $7.5 billion in 1995 were reduced, 
as a result, to $3 billion by 2001. Formerly trade-distorting subsidies 
were reformed by the EU, with the new aim of limiting production of 
crops (farmers are paid to simply leave land fallow), and are hence 
‘Green box’: not subject to cuts. The Us government proposed that 
the large counter-cyclical payments it makes to Us cotton producers 
when the price declines should not be considered amber, even though 
the WTo itself agreed with brazilian complaints that the subsidies 
still distort trade by increasing Us output and lowering world prices. 
Generally, the complexity associated with the subsidy regimes reflects 
Northern capacity to maintain their subsidies but continually dress 
them up in new language (sharma, 2005b).
What impact would the removal of northern agricultural subsi-
dies have in Africa? Explicit agro-export subsidies, which account 
for less than 1% of the total and are mainly provided by the EU, will 
finally cease in 2013, thanks to concessions at the hong kong WTo 
summit. (implicit EU export subsidies worth 55 billion euros will 
continue, however.) This reform aside, the most important debate 
is over whether substantive reductions would genuinely benefit Af-
rican peasants. 
one problem is that power relations prevailing in the world ag-
ricultural markets allow huge cartels to handle shipping and distri-
bution, and they usually gain the first round of benefits when prices 
change. A second problem is that local land ownership patterns typi-
cally emphasise plantation-based export agriculture, with the danger 
that further cash crop incentives will crowd out land used for food 
cropping by peasants. No reliable studies exist to make definitive 
statements. There are, indeed, African heads of state in food-import-
ing countries who advocate continuing EU agricultural subsidies for 
a third reason, because lower crop prices reduces their own costs of 
feeding their citizenry. 
in sum, two crucial questions associated with subsidies and 
agricultural exports are typically elided by neoliberal economists 
and other pro-trade campaigners: which forces in Northern socie-
ties benefit from subsidies that promote export-orientation, in both 
the short- and long-term?; and which forces in southern societies 
would win and lose in the event exports are lifted? Furthermore, the 
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crucial strategic question is whether self-reliant development strate-
gies –which were the necessary (if insufficient) condition for most 
industrialization in the past– can be applied if low-income export-
ing countries remain mired in the commodity trap. The same points 
must be raised again below with respect to Africa’s mineral exports, 
where depletion of nonrenewable resources drains the wealth of fu-
ture generations. 
but a final reflection of trade-related power relations was also un-
veiled in hong kong. For Walden bello, the most disturbing political 
development was that india and brazil structurally shifted their loca-
tion from an alliance with 110 Third World countries, to the core of 
the ‘Five interested Parties’ (joining the Us, EU and Australia) which 
cut the final deal: 
in the end, the developing country governments caved in, many of 
them motivated solely by the fear of getting saddled with the blame for 
the collapse of the organization. Even Cuba and Venezuela confined 
themselves to registering only ‘reservations’ with the services text dur-
ing the closing session of the ministerial… The main gain for brazil 
and india lay not in the impact of the agreement on their economies 
but in the affirmation of their new role as power brokers within the 
WTo 9 (bello, 2005).
Investment, production and exploitation 
Africa, meanwhile, remains disempowered on fronts ranging from 
trade to direct investment. Walter Rodney described foreign direct in-
vestment in stark terms: 
Under colonialism the ownership was complete and backed by mili-
tary domination. Today, in many African countries the foreign owner-
ship is still present, although the armies and flags of foreign powers 
have been removed. so long as foreigners own land, mines, factories, 
banks, insurance companies, means of transportation, newspapers, 
power stations, etc. then for so long will the wealth of Africa flow 
outwards into the hands of those elements. in other words, in the ab-
sence of direct political control, foreign investment ensures that the 
natural resources and the labour of Africa produce economic value 
which is lost to the continent (Rodney, 1981).
in recent years, Africa has not been overwhelmed by interest from for-
eign corporate suitors. During the early 1970s, roughly a third of all FDi 
9 bello particularly blames brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim and indian 
commerce minister kamal Nath.
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to the Third World went to sub-saharan African countries, especially 
apartheid south Africa. by the 1990s, that statistic had dropped to 5%. 
Aside from oil field exploitation, the only other substantive foreign in-
vestments over the last decade were in south Africa, for the partial pri-
vatization of the state telecommunications agency and for the expan-
sion of automotive-sector branch plant activity within global assembly 
lines. These inflows were by far offset by south Africa’s own outflows 
of foreign direct investment, in the forms of relocation of the largest 
corporations’ financial headquarters to London, which in turn distorted 
the Africa FDi data, not to mention the repatriation of dividends/profits, 
payments of patent/royalty fees to transnational corporations. 
one of the most careful analysts of foreign corporate domination 
of African economies, UN Research institute for social Development 
director Thandika Mkandawire, recently studied African economies’ 
‘maladjustment’ and concluded, ‘Little FDi has gone into the manu-
facturing industry. As for investment in mining, it is not drawn to Af-
rican countries by macroeconomic policy changes, as is often suggest-
ed, but by the prospects of better world prices, changes in attitudes 
towards national ownership and sector specific incentives’. Moreover, 
14% of FDi was ‘driven by acquisitions facilitated by the increased 
pace of privatization to buy up existing plants that are being sold, usu-
ally under “fire sale” conditions’. What little new manufacturing in-
vestment occurred was typically ‘for expansion of existing capacities, 
especially in industries enjoying natural monopolies (e.g. beverages, 
cement, furniture). such expansion may have been stimulated by the 
spurt of growth that caused much euphoria and that is now fading 
away’ (Mkandawire, 2005:6). According to Mkandawire:
it is widely recognized that direct investment is preferable to portfolio 
investment, and foreign investment in ‘green field’ investments is prefer-
able to acquisitions. The predominance of these [portfolio and aquisi-
tion] types of capital inflows should be cause for concern. however, in 
their desperate efforts to attract foreign investment, African governments 
have simply ceased dealing with these risks or suggesting that they may 
have a preference for one type of foreign investment over all others. Fi-
nally, such investment is likely to taper off within a short span of time, as 
already seems to be the case in a number of African countries.
Thus, for Ghana, hailed as a ‘success story’ by the bretton Woods in-
stitutions, FDi, which peaked in the mid-1980s at over $200 million 
annually –mainly due to privatization– was rapidly reversed to pro-
duce a negative outflow. it should be noted, in passing, that rates of 
return of direct investments have generally been much higher in Africa 
than in other developing regions. This, however, has not made Africa 
a favourite among investors, largely because of considerations of the 
intangible ‘risk factor’ nurtured by the tendency to treat the contingent 
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as homogenous and a large dose of ignorance about individual Afri-
can countries. There is considerable evidence that shows that Africa is 
systematically rated as more risky than is warranted by the underlying 
economic characteristics” (Mkandawire, 2005:7). 
The critique of foreign investors in Africa must now extend beyond the 
EU, Us and Japan, to China. For example, the Chinese National Petrole-
um Corporation (CNPC) and two other large Chinese oil firms are active 
in seventeen African countries. one is sudan where $2 billion of oil invest-
ments are underway notwithstanding the Darfur genocide, responsible 
already for of 5% of China’s import requirements, along with Chinese-fi-
nanced development of a homegrown sudanese military capacity. (Arms 
sales to Robert Mugabe are also dubious.) As ben schiller reports,
Concerns have been raised over the environmental impact of various 
Chinese-run mining operations in Africa, including copper mines in 
Zambia and Congo, and titanium sands projects in ecologically sensi-
tive parts of Mozambique, kenya, Tanzania, and Madagascar. 
Moreover, China is a major importer of illegal timber from forests in 
indonesia, Cameroon, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. Though accu-
rate figures are hard to access, www.globaltimber.org.uk says that up 
to 50% of all timber imported to China in 2004 was illegal. Chinese 
businesses have also been implicated in ivory smuggling, notably in 
sudan and Zimbabwe. According to Care for the Wild international, 
Chinese companies buy up to 75% of sudan’s ivory. 
in its rush to expand, development experts say China is reinvigorating 
an older, crude style of development, re-establishing an era of ‘white 
elephants’ and ‘prestige projects’ with little benefit to local people. in 
Ethiopia, the Chinese state-owned Jiangxi international built $4 mil-
lion worth of new housing, after a flood left hundreds destitute. but 
instead of accommodating the homeless, the blocks ended up being 
used by military officials. A Jiangxi manager later told the Wall Street 
Journal: “it was a political task for us and so long as Ethiopia officials 
are happy, our goal is fulfilled” (schiller, 2005).
Given that mining houses have been central to looting Africa for at 
least a century and a half, it is fitting to next consider the damage done 
by depletion of minerals and other non-renewable natural resources. 
FDI and resource depletion 
in the most brazen case, the oil sector demonstrates how profit and 
dividend outflows, often lubricated by corruption, have had extremely 
negative consequences. As demonstrated by the open society-backed 
campaign, ‘Publish what you Pay’, elites in Africa’s oil producing coun-
tries –Angola, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and 
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sudan– are amongst the world’s least transparent10. in Nigeria, de-
mands by the ogoni people relate not only to the massive destruction 
of their Delta habitat, but also to the looting of their natural wealth by 
big oil. According to sam olukoya, 
Reparations is a crucial issue in the struggle for environmental jus-
tice in Nigeria. Many of the ethnic groups in the Niger Delta have 
drawn up various demands. A key document is the ogoni bill of 
Rights which seeks reparations from shell for environmental pol-
lution, devastation and ecological degradation of the ogoni area. 
shell’s abuses in ogoniland were made infamous by the late play-
wright and activist ken saro-Wiwa, who was executed by the Nige-
rian government (olukoya, 2001).
in all these respects, diverse forces in society have moved away from 
considering oil merely a matter of private property, to be negotiat-
ed between corporations and governments, as was the case during 
much of the 20th century. instead, these forces now treat oil as part 
of a general ‘commons’ of a national society’s natural capital. George 
Caffentzis explains:
 
There are three levels of claims to petroleum as common property, cor-
relating with three kinds of allied communities that are now taking 
shape, for there is no common property without a community that 
regulates its use:
– first, some local communities most directly affected by the extrac-
tion of petroleum claim to own and regulate the petroleum under 
its territory as a commons; 
– second, islamic economists claim for the islamic community of 
believers, from Morocco to indonesia, and its representative, the 
21st century Caliphate in formation, ownership of and the right to 
regulate the huge petroleum fields beneath their vast territory; 
– third, UN officials claim for the ‘coming global community’ the 
right to regulate the so-called global commons: air, water, land, 
minerals (including petroleum) and ‘nous’ (knowledge and infor-
mation). This imagined global community is to be represented 
by a dizzying array of ‘angels’ that make up the UN system, from 
NGo activists to UN environmentalist bureaucrats to World bank 
‘green’ advisors” (Caffentzis, 2004).
From a september 2005 conference in Johannesburg organized by the 
south African NGo groundWork, delegates petitioned the World Pe-
troleum Congress: 
10 <http://www.opensociety.org>
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At every point in the fossil fuel production chain where your mem-
bers ‘add value’ and make profit, ordinary people, workers and their 
environments are assaulted and impoverished. Where oil is drilled, 
pumped, processed and used, in Africa as elsewhere, ecological sys-
tems have been trashed, peoples’ livelihoods have been destroyed and 
their democratic aspirations and their rights and cultures trampled… 
Your energy future is modeled on the interests of over-consuming, en-
ergy-intensive, fossil-fuel-burning wealthy classes whose reckless and 
selfish lifestyles not only impoverish others but threaten the global en-
vironment, imposing on all of us the chaos and uncertainty of climate 
change and the violence and destruction of war. Another energy future 
is necessary: yours has failed!11. 
in a remarkable essay, ‘seeing like an oil company’, anthropologist James 
Ferguson argues that ‘capital “hops” over “unusable Africa”, alighting 
only in mineral-rich enclaves that are starkly disconnected from their 
national societies. The result is not the formation of standardized na-
tional grids, but the emergence of huge areas of the continent that are 
effectively “off the grid”. in the process, there emerges ‘a frightening 
sort of political–economic model for regions that combine mineral 
wealth with political intractability’, ranging from African oil zones to 
occupied iraq. The model includes protection of capital by ‘private 
military companies’ (in baghdad, blackwater, Erinys and Global Risk 
strategies), and protection of the ‘big Man’ leader (Paul bremer, John 
Negroponte) ‘not by his own national army but, instead, by hired guns’ 
(Ferguson, 2005: 381). The bottom line is enhanced profit for interna-
tional capital and despotism for the citizenry. 
of interest, though, is that in the wake of higher consciousness re-
garding full environmental accounting, some of the costs of this model 
are now being measured at even the World bank. Along with this we are 
entering a potentially fruitful period in which the depletion of natural re-
sources plus associated negative externalities –such as the social devasta-
tion caused by mining operations– can now begin to be taken seriously as 
a way of envisioning a global commons. That entails at least a rough ac-
counting of the costs associated with tearing resources from the ground, 
forests and fisheries, even as we continue to recognize that many aspects 
of valuation –human life’s worth, indigenous people’s traditions and cul-
ture, aesthetics of the natural environment– are impossible to quantify. 
Accounting for nature 
because of the legacy of environmental economists such as herman 
Daly, even the World bank has begun to address the question of re-
11 <http://www.groundwork.org.za>.
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source depletion, in Where is the Wealth of Nations?, using the meth-
odology of correcting bias in GDP wealth account surprisingly, this is 
nowhere near as expansive as parallel efforts by groups such as san 
Francisco-based Redefining Progress12. There, statisticians subtract 
from GDP the cost of crime and family breakdown; add household 
and volunteer work; correct for income distribution (rewarding equal-
ity); subtract resource depletion; subtract pollution; subtract long-
term environmental damage (climate change, nuclear waste genera-
tion); add opportunities for increased leisure time; factor in lifespan 
of consumer durables and public infrastructure; and subtract vulner-
ability upon foreign assets. Using this approach and accounting for 
natural resource depletion, pollution and the other factors that, in the 
aggregate, comprise the onset of the era marked by neoliberalism, glo-
balisation and the ecological crisis, global welfare began declining in 
absolute terms during the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, the bank’s tenta-
tive approach is at least a step forward in recognizing that extractive 
investments may not contribute to net welfare, and indeed may cause 
national savings and wealth to actually shrink, along with their better 
known qualitative manifestations. 
12 <http://www.redefiningprogess.org.>.
Source: www.redefiningprogress.org
Figure 1
Global GDP versus a genuine progress indicator, 1950-2003
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The bank’s first-cut method subtracts from the existing rate of savings 
factors such as fixed capital depreciation, depletion of natural resources 
and pollution, but then adds investments in education (defined as annu-
al expenditure). The result, in most African countries dependent upon 
primary products, is a net negative rate of national savings to Gross 
National income (GNi). Notwithstanding some problems, the bank’s 
methodology at least indicates some of the trends associated with raw 
materials extraction. in making estimates about the decline in a coun-
try’s wealth due to energy, mineral or forest-related depletion, the World 
bank adopts a minimalist definition based upon international pricing 
(not potential future values when scarcity becomes a more crucial fac-
tor, especially in the oil industry). Moreover, the bank does not fully cal-
culate damages done to the local environment, to workers’ health/safety, 
and especially to women in communities around mines. And the bank’s 
use of average –not marginal– cost resource rents also underestimates 
the depletion costs. in particular, the attempt to generate a ‘genuine sav-
ings’ calculation requires adjusting net national savings to account for 
resource depletion. The bank suggests the following steps: 
From gross national saving the consumption of fixed capital is subtract-
ed to give the traditional indicator of saving: net national savings. The 
value of damages from pollutants is subtracted. The pollutants carbon 
dioxide and particulate matter are included. The value of natural re-
source depletion is subtracted. Energy, metals and mineral and net for-
est depletion are included. Current operating expenditures on education 
are added to net national saving to adjust for investments in human 
capital (World bank, 2005a: 39).
Naturally, given oil extraction, the Middle East region (including 
North Africa) has the world’s most serious problem of net nega-
tive gross national income and savings under this methodology. but 
sub-saharan Africa is second worst, and for several years during 
the early 1990s witnessed net negative GNi for the continent once 
extraction of natural resources was factored in. indeed, for every 
percentage point increase in a country’s extractive-resource depend-
ency, that country’s potential GDP declines by 9% (as against the real 
GDP recorded), according to the bank (World bank, 2005a: 55). Af-
rican countries with the combined highest resource dependence and 
lowest capital accumulation included Nigeria, Zambia, Mauritania, 
Gabon, Congo, Algeria and south Africa. in comparing the poten-
tial for capital accumulation –i.e., were resource rents not simply 
extracted (and exported) and resources depleted– on the one hand 
and, on the other, the actual measure of capital accumulation, bank 
researchers discovered that,
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in many cases the differences are huge. Nigeria, a major oil exporter, 
could have had a year 2000 stock of produced capital five times higher 
than the actual stock. Moreover, if these investments had taken place, 
oil would play a much smaller role in the Nigerian economy today, 
with likely beneficial impacts on policies affecting other sectors of the 
economy (World bank, 2005a: 55).
A more nuanced breakdown of a country’s estimated ‘tangible wealth’ is 
required to capture not just obvious oil-related depletion and rent out-
flows, but also other subsoil assets, timber resources, nontimber forest 
resources, protected areas, cropland and pastureland. The ‘produced 
capital’ normally captured in GDP accounting is added to the tangible 
wealth. in the case of Ghana, that amounted to $2,022 per capita in 
2000. The same year, the Gross National saving of Ghana was $40 per 
capita and education spending was $7. These figures require downward 
adjustment to account for the consumption of fixed capital ($19), as 
well as the depletion of wealth in the form of stored energy ($0), min-
erals ($4) and net forest assets ($8). in Ghana, the adjusted net saving 
was $16 per capita in 2000. but given population growth  of 1.7%, the 
country’s wealth actually shrunk by $18 per capita in 2000 (World bank, 
2005a: 64-65).
how much of this exploitation is based on transnational capital’s extrac-
tive power? in the case of Ghana, $12 of the $18 decline in 2000 could be 
Tangible wealth Adjusted net saving
Subsoil assets $65 Gross National Saving $40
Timber resources $290 Education expenditure $7
Nontimber forest resources $76 Consumption fixed capital $-19
Protected areas $7 Energy depletion $0
Cropland $855 Mineral depletion $-4
Pastureland $43 Net forest depletion $-8
Produced capital $686  
Total tangible wealth $2022 Adjusted net saving $16
Population growth 1.7% Change in wealth per capita $-18
Table 3
Adjustment to Ghana’s 2000 savings rate based upon tangible wealth and resource depletion (per capita $)
Source: World Bank, Where is the Wealth of Nations?, pp.64-65. 
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attributed to minerals and forest-related depletions, a large proportion 
of which now leaves Ghana (World bank, 2005a: 64-65). The largest in-
digenous (and black-owned) mining firm in Africa, Ashanti, was recently 
bought by AngloGold, so it is safe to assume than an increasing amount 
of Ghana’s wealth flows out of the country, leaving net negative per capita 
tangible wealth. other mining houses active in Africa which once had 
their roots here –Lonrho, Anglo, Debeers, Gencor/billiton– are also now 
based off-shore. 
it is logical to assume that an increased drive by London, New 
York and sydney shareholders for profits results in accumulation of 
capital within Africa being systematically stymied. The central ques-
tion is whether any of the financial capital that returns to Africa –by 
way of royalties on minerals or profits to local shareholders (still sig-
nificant in the case of south Africa)– is reinvested, or merely becomes 
the source of further capital flight.
Ghana was an interesting example given that it has often played 
the role of World bank poster child country. other African countries 
whose economies are primary product dependent fare much worse, 
according to the bank methodology. Gabon’s citizens lost $2,241 
each in 2000, as oil companies rapidly depleted the country’s tangi-
ble wealth. The Republic of the Congo (-$727), Nigeria (-$210), Cam-
eroon (-$152), Mauritania (-$147) and Cote d’ivoire (-$100) are other 
African countries whose people lost more than $100 in tangible na-
tional wealth each in 2000 alone. (Angola would rank high amongst 
these, were data available for the bank’s analysis.) A few countries 
did benefit, according to the tangible wealth measure, including the 
seychelles (+$904), botswana (+$814) and Namibia (+$140), but 
the majority of African countries saw their wealth depleted (World 
bank, 2005a: 66).
Even Africa’s largest economy, south Africa, which from the ear-
ly 1980s has been far less reliant upon minerals extraction, recorded 
a $2 drop in per capita wealth in 2000 using this methodology. Ac-
cording to the World bank, the natural wealth of $3,400/person in 
south Africa included subsoil assets (worth $1,118 per person)13; 
timber ($310); non-timber forest resources ($46); protected areas 
($51); cropland ($1,238); pastureland ($637). This sum can be com-
pared to the value of produced capital (plant and equipment) and 
urban land (together worth $7,270 per person in 2000). hence even 
in Africa’s most industrialized economy, the estimated value of natu-
13 According to a different study by the United Nations Development Programme, the 
value of minerals in the soil fell from $112 billion in 1960 to $55 billion in 2000. see 
United Nations Development Programme (2004).
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ral wealth is nearly half of the measurable value of plant, equipment 
and urban land14. 
in part, minerals depletion and associated pollution costs are 
a function of expanded foreign direct investment. Even in south 
Africa, with a 150-year old organic mining-based bourgeoisie, 
mineral depletion today disproportionately benefits overseas min-
ing houses (especially given that some of the largest Johannes-
burg firms relisted their primary share residences to London after 
1994). in addition, Co2 emissions plus a great deal of other pol-
lution (especially so2) are largely the result of energy large mul-
tinational corporations (Mittal steel, bhP billiton and the Anglo 
group). Any assessment of FDi, especially in oil and resource rich 
countries, must henceforth take into account its contribution to 
the net negative impact on national wealth, including the depletion 
and degradation of the resource base. ironically, given the source 
of leadership at the World bank (Paul Wolfowitz of the Us petro-
military complex), the bank’s new accounting of genuine savings 
is a helpful innovation. Taking the methodology forward in order 
to correct biases, and rigorously estimating an Africa-wide extrac-
tion measure in order to better account for the way extractive FDi 
generates net negative welfare/savings, still remain as important 
exercises. 
There are many other modes of surplus and resource extraction 
through FDi, involving swindling. For example, corporate failure to 
pay taxes and state failure to collect them is a point stressed by Law-
rence Cockcroft of Transparency international:
Most African countries operate some form of tax break for new inves-
tors, with varying degrees of generosity. in fact such incentive schemes 
are frequently deceptive in that the real deal is being done in spite 
of them and alongside them, with a key cabinet minister or official 
coming to an alternative arrangement which may well guarantee an 
offshore payment for the individual in question as well as a ‘tax holi-
day’ for the company concerned (Cockcroft, 2001: 2).
14 Given the constant depletion of this natural capital, south Africa’s official gross 
national savings rate of 15.7% of GDi therefore should be adjusted downwards. by 
subtracting consumption of fixed capital at 13.3%, the net national savings is actually 
2.4%, added to which should be education expenditure (amongst the world’s highest) 
at 7.5%. Then subtract mineral depletion of 1%; forest depletion of 0.3%; 0.2% pollu-
tion damage (limited to ‘particulate matter’, a small part of south Africa’s waste prob-
lem); and Co2 emissions worth 1.6% of GDi (a serious undervaluation). in total, the 
actual ‘genuine savings’ of south Africa is reduced to just 6.9% of national income. 
(World bank, 2005a:.179).
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Income per 
capita ($)
Population 
growth rate 
(%)
Adjusted net 
saving per 
capita ($)
Change in 
wealth per 
capita ($)
Benin 360 2.6 14 -42
Botswana 2925 1.7 1021 814
Burkina Faso 230 2.5 15 -36
Burundi 97 1.9 -10 -37
Cameroon 548 2.2 -8 -152
CapeVerde 1195 2.7 43 -81
Chad 174 3.1 -8 -74
Comoros 367 2.5 -17 -73
Rep of Congo 660 3.2 -227 -727
Côte d’Ivoire 625 2.3 -5 -100
Ethiopia 101 2.4 -4 -27
Gabon 3370 2.3 -1183 -2241
The Gambia 305 3.4 -5 -45
Ghana 255 1.7 16 -18
Kenya 343 2.3 40 -11
Madagascar 245 3.1 9 -56
Malawi 162 2.1 -2 -29
Mali 221 2.4 20 -47
Mauritania 382 2.9 -30 -147
Mauritius 3697 1.1 645 514
Mozambique 195 2.2 15 -20
Namibia 1820 3.2 392 140
Niger 166 3.3 -10 -83
Nigeria 297 2.4 -97 -210
Rwanda 233 2.9 14 -60
Senegal 449 2.6 31 -27
Seychelles 7089 0.9 1162 904
South Africa 2837 2.5 246 -2
Swaziland 1375 2.5 129 8
Togo 285 4.0 -20 -88
Zambia 312 2.0 -13 -63
Zimbabwe 550 2.0 53 -4
Table 4
African countries’ adjusted national wealth and ‘savings gaps’, 2000
Source: World Bank, Where is the Wealth of Nations?, p.66. 
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official statistics have never properly picked up the durable problem 
of transfer pricing, whereby foreign investors misinvoice inputs drawn 
from abroad. Companies cheat Third World countries on tax revenues 
by artificially inflating their imported input prices so as to claim lower 
net income. it is only possible to guess the vast scale of the problem 
on the basis of case studies. The oxford institute of Energy studies 
estimated that in 1994, 14% of the total value of exported oil ‘was not 
accounted for in national trade figures as a result of various forms 
of transfer pricing and smuggling’ (Cockcroft, 2001: 2). According to 
a 1999 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development sur-
vey on income shifting as part of transfer pricing, ‘of the develop-
ing countries with sufficient evidence to make an assessment, 61% 
estimated that their own national transnational corporations (TNCs) 
were engaging in income shifting, and 70% deemed it a significant 
problem. The income-shifting behaviour of foreign-based TNCs was 
also appraised. 84% of the developing countries felt that the affiliates 
they hosted shifted income to their parent companies to avoid tax li-
abilities, and 87% viewed the problem as significant’ (UN Conference 
on Trade and Development, 1999: 167).
similarly, another kind of corporate financial transfer aimed at 
exploiting weak African countries is the fee that headquarters charge 
for patent and copyright fees on technology agreements. such pay-
ments, according to Yash Tandon, are augmented by management and 
consultancy fees, as well as other Northern corporate support mecha-
nisms that drain the Third World. For the year 2000, Tandon listed 
export revenue denied the south because of northern protectionism 
of more than $30 billion for non-agricultural products15.
Production, transport and the ecological debt 
Most of the systems of unequal exchange have been identified (aside 
from labour which is considered below) in an indirect manner, such 
that victims are not aware of the process, another crucial outlet for 
Northern investors to exploit Africa is in their consumption of the glo-
bal commons, particularly the earth’s clean air. During the early 1990s, 
the idea of the North’s ecological debt to the south began gaining cur-
rency in Latin America thanks to NGos, environmentalists and politi-
cians (including Fidel Castro of Cuba and Virgilio barco of Colombia). 
According to Joan Martinez-Alier, 
The notion of an ecological debt is not particularly radical. Think 
of the environmental liabilities incurred by firms (under the United 
15 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/devthry/well-being/2000/tandon.htm>. 
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states superfund legislation), or of the engineering field called ‘res-
toration ecology’, or the proposals by the swedish government in 
the early 1990s to calculate the country’s environmental debt. Eco-
logically unequal exchange is one of the reasons for the claim of the 
Ecological Debt. The second reason for this claim is the dispropor-
tionate use of Environmental space by the rich countries16 (Mar-
tinez-Alier, 2003). 
in the first category, Martinez-Alier lists:
Unpaid costs of reproduction or maintenance or sustainable man-
agement of the renewable resources that have been exported; 
actualized costs of the future lack of availability of destroyed 
natural resources; 
compensation for, or the costs of reparation (unpaid) of the lo-
cal damages produced by exports (for example, the sulphur di-
oxide of copper smelters, the mine tailings, the harms to health 
from flower exports, the pollution of water by mining), or the 
actualized value of irreversible damage; 
(unpaid) amount corresponding to the commercial use of in-
formation and knowledge on genetic resources, when they have 
been appropriated gratis (‘biopiracy’). For agricultural genetic 
resources, the basis for such a claim already exists under the 
FAo’s Farmers’ Rights. 
in the second, he cites ‘lack of payment for environmental services or 
for the disproportionate use of Environmental space’:
(unpaid) reparation costs or compensation for the impacts 
caused by imports of solid or liquid toxic waste; 
(unpaid) costs of free disposal of gas residues (carbon dioxide, 
CFCs, etc), assuming equal rights to sinks and reservoirs. 
16 Martinez-Alier elaborates with examples of ecological debt that are never factored 
into standard trade and investment regimes: ‘nutrients in exports including virtual 
water… the oil and minerals no longer available, the biodiversity destroyed. This is 
a difficult figure to compute, for several reasons. Figures on the reserves, estimation 
of the technological obsolence because of substitution, and a decision on the rate 
of discount are needed in the case of minerals or oil. For biodiversity, knowledge 
of what is being destroyed would be needed.’ some of these cases are considered in 
the discussion earlier concerning depletion of natural capital. see also <http://www.
deudaecologica.org>.
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These aspects of ecological debt defy easy measurement. Each part of the 
ecological balance sheet is highly contested, and information is imper-
fect. As Martinez-Alier shows in other work, tropical rainforests used for 
wood exports have an extraordinary past we will never know and ongo-
ing biodiversity whose destruction we cannot begin to value. however, he 
acknowledges, ‘although it is not possible to make an exact accounting, it 
is necessary to establish the principal categories [of ecological debt] and 
certain orders of magnitude in order to stimulate discussion’ (Martinez-
Alier, 1998). 
The sums involved are potentially vast. Vandana shiva and Tandon 
estimate that biopiracy of ‘wild seed varieties have contributed some 
$66 billion annually to the Us economy’17. Moreover, in the case of 
Co2 emissions, according to Martinez-Alier,
Jyoti Parikh (a member of the UN international Panel on Climate 
Change) [argues that] if we take the present human-made emissions of 
carbon, the average is about one tonne per person per year. industrial-
ized countries produce three-fourths of these emissions, instead of the 
one-fourth that would correspond to them on the basis of population. 
The difference is 50% of total emissions, some 3000 million tons. here 
the increasing marginal cost of reduction is contemplated: the first 1000 
million tons could be reduced at a cost of, say, $15 per ton, but then the 
cost increases very much. Let us take an average of $25: then a total an-
nual subsidy of $75 billion is forthcoming from south to North18.
Excess use of the planet’s Co2 absorption capacity is merely one of the 
many ways that the south is being exploited by the North on the ecolog-
ical front. Africans are most exploited in this regard because non-indus-
trialized economics have not begun to utilize more than a small fraction 
of what should be due under any fair framework of global resource al-
location. The amounts involved would easily cover debt repayments. 
A final way in which Africa’s wealth is depleted is via skilled labour 
migration. This problem has become important, even if it is slightly 
mitigated by the inflow of migrant remittance payments to families at 
home. Approximately 20,000 skilled workers leave Africa each year. 
The World bank’s estimate of the share of Africa’s skilled workers with 
a tertiary education who emigrate is more than 15%, higher than any 
other region. it is true that remittances from both skilled and unskilled 
labour flow back to Africa as a result, and in some cases represent 
an important contribution to GDP. but as the World bank concedes, 
17 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/devthry/well-being/2000/tandon.htm>. 
18 Martinez-Alier cites Parikh, J. k. (1995). 
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there are extremely high transaction costs (sometimes 20%) imposed 
upon the small sums that are transferred by migrants. For this reason, 
a great deal of migration-related inflows to Africa have become infor-
mal in nature, via black market systems, and in turn, once the flows 
reach their home destination, further problems often emerge, accord-
ing to sarah bracking: 
While money sent from the ‘other side’ has a beneficial effect on close 
kin, remittances can also undermine the purchasing power of those 
households without migrating members. This is in part a result of as-
set price inflation, and in part due to the inflationary effects of paral-
lel currency markets. The situation for those excluded from benefiting 
from foreign currency inputs is aggravated by chronic scarcity in the 
availability of consumables” (bracking, 2003: 633).
The progressive position on migration has always been to maintain 
support for the ‘globalization of people’ (while opposing the ‘globali-
zation of capital’) and in the process to oppose border controls and 
arduous immigration restrictions, as well as all forms of xenophobia. 
in october 2005, North Africans were expelled from the Moroccan-
spanish border at Granada by lethal force, and the supposedly pro-
gressive Zapatero regime announced it would build the equivalent of 
israel’s notorious apartheid wall at the border. it was, according to 
slavoj Žižek, just another symptom of Fortress Europe: 
A couple of years ago, an ominous decision of the EU passed almost 
unnoticed: a plan to establish an all-European border police force to 
secure the isolation of the Union territory, so as to prevent the influx 
of the immigrants. This is the truth of globalization: the construc-
tion of new walls safeguarding the prosperous Europe from a flood of 
immigrants… 
The segregation of the people is the reality of economic globalization. 
This new racism of the developed world is in a way much more brutal 
than the previous one. its implicit legitimization is neither naturalist 
(the ‘natural’ superiority of the developed West) nor culturalist (we in 
the West also want to preserve our cultural identity). Rather, it’s an 
unabashed economic egotism - the fundamental divide is the one be-
tween those included into the sphere of (relative) economic prosperity 
and those excluded from it19 (Žižek, 2005).
19 Žižek continues, ‘it is thus becoming clear that the solution is not “tear down the 
walls and let them all in,” the easy, empty demand often put forth by soft-hearted 
liberal “radicals.” Rather, the real solution is to tear down the true wall, not the po-
lice one, but the social-economic one: To change society so that people will no longer 
desperately try to escape their own world.’
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According to Yash Tandon and the UN Development Programme, 
there is a substantial ‘loss of revenue on account of blockage on the 
free movement of people’, which they estimated to amount to at least 
$25 billion annually during the 1980s. but setting such numbers 
aside, in migration and many other forms of North-south power, it is 
also important to recognize an important basis for superexploitation 
within patriarchal power relations. in many (though not all) cases, 
women face such disempowering conditions across Africa that 
political-economic and human-environmental systems permit the 
processes discussed above –debt/finance, trade, investment and labour 
migration– to maintain inordinately high rates of exploitation. 
Conclusion: From looting to liberation 
The looting of Africa dates back many centuries, to the point at 
which value transfers began via appropriation of slave labour, an-
tiquities, precious metals and raw materials. Unfair terms of trade 
were soon amplified by colonial and neocolonial relations. These 
processes often amounted to a kind of ‘primitive accumulation’, by 
which capital of Northern countries grew by virtue of looting Africa. 
This was not a once-off set of problems, solved by the 1950s-90s in-
dependence struggles. in recent decades, wealth extraction through 
imperialist relations has intensified, and some of the same kinds of 
primitive looting tactics are now once again evident. Moreover, key 
causes of Africa’s underdevelopment since the early 1980s can also 
be identified within the framework of neoliberal (free market) poli-
cies adopted nearly universally across the continent and indeed the 
world, in part thanks to the emergence of local allies of the North 
within African states. 
The mainstream impression –e.g., Tony blair’s Africa Com- 
mission– is mistaken when citing what appears as a vast inflow 
of aid, for more than 60% –so-called ‘phantom aid’– is redirected 
backwards to the donors or otherwise misses the mark in various 
ways. instead of a sustainable level of debt service payments, as 
claimed by those supporting the elites’ limited debt relief schemes, 
Africa’s net financial accounts went negative during the 1990s. And 
although remittances from the African Diaspora now fund a limited 
amount of capital accumulation, capital flight is far greater. At more 
than $10 billion/year since the early 1970s, collectively, the citizens 
of Nigeria, the ivory Coast, the DRC, Angola and Zambia have 
been especially vulnerable to the overseas drain of their national 
wealth. in addition to the lifting of exchange controls, a major factor 
during the late 1990s was financial deregulation. in south Africa, 
for example, financial liberalization included the relisting of the 
Globalization and the Washington Consensus
110
primary share-issuing residence of the largest south African firms: 
from Johannesburg to London.
Likewise, trade liberalization has, according to Christian Aid, cost 
sub-saharan Africa $272 billion since the early 1980s. Trade is espe-
cially difficult to rely upon for growth, given that agricultural subsi-
dies accruing to Northern farmers rose from the late 1980s to 2004 by 
15%, to $279 billion, mainly benefiting large agro-corporate producers. 
Flows of people –a veritable brain drain– have also been formidable, but 
the value of wealth lost to the process is incalculable, given that more 
than 15% of Africa’s best-educated professionals now live abroad.
Non-financial investment flows are driven less by policy –although 
liberalization has also been important– and more by accumulation op-
portunities. Foreign Direct investment to sub-saharan began rising in 
the late 1990s after two decades of stagnation. but the vast bulk of in-
vestments were accounted for in two major processes: south African 
capital’s changed domicile, and resurgent oil investments (especially 
in Angola and Nigeria). 
in the latter cases, a report by the World bank acknowledges 
stagnant and net negative ‘genuine savings’ in countries with high re-
source dependence and low capital accumulation. Moreover, much of 
Africa –including south Africa– has been victimized by privatization-
related foreign investment. Transparency international blames part 
of the ‘disappointment in many African countries’ upon corruption. 
other forms of corruption occur through tax fraud and transfer pric-
ing. Ecological debt that the North owes the south, especially Africa, 
is also vast. only some of these factors are incorporated in the alterna-
tive accounting systems of the World bank and other ecological and 
social indicators such as Redefining Progress (which to be fair doesn’t 
specify country-level data in sites like Africa). 
in response, progressive African activists and allied intellectu-
als should be increasingly capable of building upon their citizenries’ 
profound skepticism of ruling elites. According to Afrobarometer polls 
and the World Values Survey, ‘Africans care about equity and public ac-
tion to reduce poverty. They are less comfortable with wide wealth dif-
ferentials, and have a strong commitment to political equality. About 
75% of the respondents agree that African governments are doing too 
little for people trapped in poverty’ (World bank, 2005b: 5). The chal-
lenge will be to establish not only alternative conceptions of poverty 
and inequality so that the broader structural processes of accumula-
tion by dispossession are clear –but also a different approach to public 
policy and politics.
Those conceptions are not limited to a set of policy reforms (though 
such can be provided whenever necessary, drawing upon real experiences 
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in history and across the contemporary world). Most importantly, the solu-
tion to the looting of Africa is to be found in the self-activity of progressive 
Africans themselves, in their campaigns and declarations, their struggles 
–sometimes victorious but still mainly frustrated– and their hunger for 
an Africa which can finally throw off the chains of an exploitative world 
economy and a power elite who treat the continent without respect.
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Mammo Muchie*
The Impact of the Washington
Consensus on Democratic Stability:
The case of Ethiopia
iN ThE 21sT CENTURY structural adjustment has been reformulated 
within the developing world to achieve poverty reduction by imple-
menting donor and local elite negotiated poverty reduction strategy 
papers (PRsPs) and also to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals (hereafter MDGs). 
in the case of Africa, many states are expected to be able to meet 
these two objectives. The twenty year period of structural adjustment 
is supposed to have prepared them to meet these goals. The question 
is whether structural adjustment has been conceptualised in a neces-
sary and/or sufficient way to help meet these goals? The answer is of 
course no. The main weakness of the structural adjustment approach 
coming from the Washington institutions is the rupture of the econo-
my from politics. one of the key weaknesses of the structural adjust-
1 For a substantive critique of the ‘poverty reduction’ rhetoric from the donor world, 
see the chapter by Muchie, Mammo “New Analytical Perspectives on Poverty and 
Violence Eradication in Radically Unequal societies: a Mathematical Representation” 
in Muchie, Mammo and Xing, Li (editors) 2006 Globalisation, Inequalities and the 
Commdification of Life and Well-Being (London: Adonis - Abbey Publishers).
* Professor at Aalborg University, Dinamarca. Director of the Development and in-
ternationals studies investigation Center. Especialist in sociological Teory, Political 
sociology and Development studies.
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ment ideology is the sufferance of what karl Polyani calls the rupture 
or disembedding of the economy from society. The economy was con-
ceived separately from the politics that should guide it. The market is 
seen as a technical instrument devoid of political implications. The 
economy was supposed to be managed technocratically and politics 
was to enter into the economy adjusting itself to serve mainly narrow 
economic goals dictated by market and private relations. by applying 
this twisted logic, a process was set where autonomy and accountabil-
ity, growth and redistribution and consensus and inclusiveness moved 
in opposite or bifurcated directions.
Structurally Adjusted Good Governance
vs. Democratic Governance?
The case of Ethiopia illustrates this dilemma emanating from struc-
tural adjustment policies. i shall illustrate the point by taking the issue 
of governance. it is a truism that poverty eradication without a founda-
tion in democratic governance will unravel or will not be irreversible. 
only democratic governance and not what is often sold as ‘good gov-
ernance’ provides the necessary condition for doing away structurally 
with poverty at the root. The difference between democratic governance 
and good governance is significant. The donors invented what they call 
‘good governance’ and mean by it anything but democratic capacitating 
of citizens. by good governance, they stress very often authoritarian 
managerial ability such as: capacity to repress a people to keep law and 
order with authoritarianism, technocratic ability to implement donor-
local elite negotiated agenda such as the so-called poverty reductions 
strategy papers and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As long as 
a regime controls the people and is willing to follow the foreign policy 
of the major donors, it can even qualify for special ally status. This has 
been the way the so-called ‘new generation leaders’ have been selected 
in Africa, not how democratic they are to their people, but how ‘good’ 
and receptive they are to the donors. it is the donors that dubbed them 
as ‘new generation leaders’ and not their own people! None of them are 
qualified as ‘new’ for practising any form of democratic governance. it is 
their volunteered ‘commitment to poverty reduction, economic growth 
and support to global security interests’ that have been considered for 
their positive evaluation, graduation and qualification. And they have 
been feted and given generous budget support despite the fact they have 
been violating human rights, repressing the people and violating the 
rule of law and basic freedoms in their societies.
in some cases of ‘good governance’, donors recommend what they 
call civil society oversight of the state. but the sort of civil society that 
gets invited or selected to do the oversight is often loyal to the regime 
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and makes often inconsequential criticisms. it has been used to fore-
stall real participation by the appearance or form and not the content 
of real popular participation and inscription of people’s interest in the 
state. Loyal civil society is often recruited to legitimise authoritarian 
action by undemocratic regimes and injures real democratic progress 
by postponing the participation of the people under the guise that they 
have representatives that are assumed to carry out oversight of the 
state, regardless of whether the agents such as NGos from civil society 
represent constituencies or not.
standing for, and qualifying for democratic governance is a wholly 
different conceptual matter vis a vis standing and qualifying for good 
governance. The opposite of good governance is bad governance. Good 
and bad in relation to governance connotes degrees in capacities to gov-
ern. That ability can be with or without democratic accountability and 
legitimacy. it connotes degrees of effectiveness and capacities based on 
criteria that may or may not include democratic dispensation. 
The opposite of democratic governance is either non- or/and anti-
democratic governance. This explicitly factors in democracy as the 
bedrock for measuring the effectiveness and capability of governance. 
This is not thus a semantic quibble. it relates to a substantial way by 
which donors frame the politics and economics of the governance of 
the development process. 
Democratic governance is based on people’s choice. it puts at the 
centre people and their real and effective presence or participation 
in Government directly or through their legitimate representatives. 
Good governance centres elite capacity to govern and manage eco-
nomic growth. it focuses more on the economy and security rather 
than politics and democratic development in a country. in democratic 
governance, legitimacy comes from people and society and not exter-
nal donors. Democratic governance stresses political capacity based 
on people’s voices and choices and not authoritarian managerial and 
technocratic ability to employ authoritarian methods to deal with 
poverty. Democracy capacitates the citizen, the society and the peo-
ple by making the state accountable. Democratic Governance shuns 
authoritarianism and celebrates democratic accountability to the rule 
of law and human rights and the protection of basic freedoms. The 
major donors have been often lukewarm to democratic governance 
and quick to prefer and advocate what they describe as ‘good govern-
ance’, in the form of what they often describe as capacity building. 
Democratic governance capacitates the individual, the society and the 
people and the nation. Dictatorship in Africa debilitates, while democ-
racy can revitalise and infuse life with a spirit of freedom to create, 
imagine and make futures.
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Meeting MDGs?
is Ethiopia or for that matter, indeed much of Africa on target to meet 
the MDGs? According to a 2005 report by the iMF and World bank, 
the prospect that the MDGs would be met by 2015 appears dim. so 
what does it mean when World bank officials claim that the regime in 
Ethiopia is committed to poverty reduction and meeting MDGs? Why is 
it that Ethiopia is still a food-dependent economy? how can a country 
be truly sovereign when it begs the most essential matter of all-food for 
the people in a country that has enough arable land to feed not only 
itself but even much of the people in the Middle East? What kind of 
economic management and capacity has this regime? We know it has a 
capacity to kill, but to create economy and food security after 15 years 
in power, that we have not seen, much as we would like to.
Even when donors laud success, it is often at the expense or loss 
of what will build an African national economy. Take the case of the 
cut flower market. Donors laud economies like Ethiopia’s entering the 
cut-flower market. The weird thing about it is that a lot of the East 
African economies are involved in this cut-flower business. The source 
for the cultured seed for the flowers comes from holland. Donors talk 
about how these economies are on the move and the example of suc-
cess that was bandied about is cut-flower. What is interesting is that 
large arable land is devoted in all these regions to this business and 
the seed producer has the last laugh creating many sources for pro-
duction thus creating reduction in prices prompting each economy to 
increase the volume of production. is this sensible economic manage-
ment? Whatever happens to African regional integration when econo-
mies not only compete for the same markets on primary commodities, 
but also on value added manufactures? in Ethiopia who benefits from 
this trade and who owns the cut-flower business? That is yet another 
matter donors do not see before they praise a regime on its success in 
the cut flower business.
Poverty Reduction?
The story of the regime’s commitment to poverty reduction is no dif-
ferent from the failure to meet MDGs. Even if this donor assessment 
of the regime’s assumed commitment to poverty reduction were to be 
taken at face value, commitment to poverty reduction should not be 
used to deny commitment to democracy. in fact if a government is not 
able to resource self-reliantly poverty reduction, deploy institutions, 
put in place systems and incentives, and implement policies based 
on democratic legitimacy, there is no doubt the commitment to pov-
erty reduction would end up being shallow or even misguided. it is 
to be disingenuous by donors to repeat the commitment of the Meles 
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regime to poverty reduction while watering down the much needed 
donor understanding and resolute stand on the side of the people 
that revealed their own agency for democratic governance on May 
15, 2005 so splendidly. it is not simply enough to praise tyrants who 
kill and exonerate their dictatorial sins for their subservience to ideas 
for poverty reduction that are doomed not to lead to an irreversible 
eradication of poverty from Ethiopian soil by launching a simultane-
ous white revolution (milk production), blue revolution (water pro-
duction) and green revolution (agricultural food production) in the 
Ethiopian country side. Deep democracy is the necessary foundation 
for the eradication of poverty in Ethiopia by creating the legitimacy to 
undertake the much over due green, blue and white revolutions in the 
world of the Ethiopian country side.
Concluding remark
Donors must understand that poverty reduction by itself does not 
make regimes democratic no matter how much this is repeated in 
their rhetoric. The distinction between ‘good’ and democratic govern-
ance remains critically important conceptually and in relation to the 
implications to policy decisions and implementation strategies. To 
overlook the distinction is tantamount to fighting democracy itself in 
Africa under the guise of fighting poverty. Dyed in the wool tyrants 
in Africa are tolerated when they must be fought and told off in no 
uncertain terms for violating democracy because they are assumed 
committed to poverty reduction (mind you not poverty eradication!) 
Unfortunately, the donors are trapped by their own discourse of pre-
ferring to subordinate democratic governance to regimes’ gratuitous 
claims of commitment to poverty reduction and meeting the MDGs. 
This donor argument does not stand up to critical scrutiny, and un-
fortunately makes their feeble stand against tyranny to be politically, 
morally and intellectually susceptible.
The donors must not rupture commitment to democracy and 
commitment to poverty reduction and meeting MDGs, if they wish 
to be politically, morally and intellectually sensitive and consistent. 
That requires they learn to be different actors, which is not easy to 
be. They learn to ditch the Washington consensus which is easier said 
than done.
Beluce Bellucci*
All and Nothing:
Capital’s Wager in Mozambique 
This ARTiCLE TAkEs A bRiEF Look at the two economic bets for 
reducing misery in Mozambique, one of the world’s poorest countries, 
showing the complete schizophrenia between them: capital on one side 
and labor on the other, with capital coming out on top, as always.
Located on the east coast of Africa, Mozambique has been wracked 
by crisis since the 1970s, with economic, social, cultural and political 
consequences. it currently has one of the lowest rankings on the hu-
man Development index (hDi) formulated by the United Nations De-
velopment Program (UNDP). on the hDi ranking for 2002 (published 
in 2004), Mozambique placed 174th among the 177 countries listed. of 
the 36 countries with low hDi, 32 are in sub-saharan Africa. of the 50 
African nations listed, 32 have an hDi considered low, 17 have a me-
dium level, and one (seychelles) has a high index. 
since so many African countries have weak human development, 
and most of these were colonies until well into the twentieth century, it is 
logical to assume there is colonial complicity in the Mozambique’s plight 
of today. This colonial action in Africa was a way for capitalism to ensure 
cheap labor and to transfer wealth to the mother countries. The reasons 
why countries formed by colonialism in the twentieth century now face 
* PhD in sociology from sao Paulo University de sao Paulo. Director of the Afro-asian 
studies Center at Candido Mendes University, Rio de Janeiro, brasil. 
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similar macro-structural economic, social and political situations are the 
same when viewed in the light of exploitation and modernization, these 
countries are in similar critical situations.
The modernization of Mozambique, including the establishment 
of a national state and the implementation of socialism, occurred be-
latedly in the world context (in the 1970s): when nation-states began 
to lose weight in international relations and found their margin for 
maneuver and sovereignty constrained.
The late 1980s saw a shift to neoliberal policies and programs, 
aiming to revive the economy, which had been burdened with debt 
and unstructured during the period of developmental modernization, 
its productive capacity reduced to only one-third of its previous level. 
The process of economic modernization in Mozambique occurred very 
slowly during the colonial period, but with consistent signs starting 
in the 1960s. This modernization banner, though totally reformulated, 
was taken up again by the socialist Frelimo government, constituted 
after independence from Portugal. The crisis of modernity in socialist 
molds was particularly felt in Mozambique. but the reasons for the 
crisis cannot be laid on socialism alone, because the majority of Af-
rican countries also faced this crisis and only some of them adopted 
the socialist model. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the socialist 
experience in Mozambique was the deepest and most lasting on the 
continent (1976-86). 
After the second World War, when the new cycle of capitalist eco-
nomic growth accelerated the process of independence in the Euro-
pean colonies, Portugal held back in letting go of its colonies. in the 
case of Mozambique, this delay resulted in ten years of armed strug-
gle for national liberation. The struggle was led by the Mozambique 
Liberation Front (Frelimo), headed by samora Moisés Machel, its sec-
ond president (the first, Eduardo Mondlane, was assassinated by the 
Portuguese secret Police –PiDE– in 1969). Mozambique finally won 
its independence on June 25, 1975, after a short period of transitional 
government initiated on september 7 the previous year, during which 
the Portuguese colonial government shared power with Frelimo, with 
Joaquim Chissano acting as prime minister. When independence be-
came official, Machel became the first president of Mozambique, un-
der a single-party regime and a socialist constitution. The Front was 
transformed into the Frelimo Party in 1977.
With an economy dependent on neighboring south Africa and 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), at the time under racist governments 
supported by the United states, Mozambique suffered the effects 
of a war of destabilization undertaken by these governments, caus-
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ing incalculable losses. Nevertheless, Frelimo went forward with its 
projects to modernize the economy and the social relations begun by 
the Portuguese in the 1960s, by creating a strong state-owned sector 
and putting workers on the public payroll. The destabilization war 
started to become internalized in the 1980s, because of the failure 
of government projects to assure production, the absence of “tra-
ditional” values in the power structure, the abandonment to which 
domestic society was relegated (defined here as the great majority of 
the rural population with its own social organization predating co-
lonialism, which still exists today), and above all, the rearguard and 
substantial military and economic support given to the MNR (later 
Renamo) by south Africa1.
by 1983, the social, political and economic situation had deterio-
rated to the point of making Mozambique extremely vulnerable and 
dependent on humanitarian aid to alleviate the affects of the war, natural 
disasters and economic difficulties. That year the government made a non-
aggression pact with its neighbor south Africa (which did not succeed), 
and another agreement with the international Monetary Fund and the 
World bank (which did succeed), moving away from its socialist policies.
The economic problems faced were of different orders. There 
were internal factors resulting from the gap between the goals of Fre-
limo’s projects and its capacity to achieve them. This mismatch be-
tween what it wanted and could really attain was linked to historical 
factors. it was fruit of the socialist modernizing proposals, within the 
progressive framework of the reigning world system. but it also ran 
up against external factors provoked by the destabilization war, which 
aimed precisely to debilitate the country’s economy.
At the end of the 1980s, Frelimo promoted a series of changes, in-
cluding in the constitution and establishing a multiparty government. 
it abandoned the centrally planned model and shifted over to a market 
economy. in 1992 Frelimo and Renamo signed a peace accord, and di-
rect elections were held in 1994, with Frelimo winning and Joaquim 
Chissamo being elected president, a post he had already occupied since 
1986 when as minister of foreign affairs he replaced President Machel, 
who died in an airplane crash (possibly sabotage) in south Africa. he 
1 MNR stands for the Movement for National Resistance, later called the Mozam-
bique National Resistance. it was founded in 1976 by the racist government of ian 
smith in Rhodesia, and supported by diehard colonialists. With the independence of 
Zimbabwe in 1980, it transferred its staging areas to south Africa and made inces-
sant bloody raids into Mozambique territory. only later, with the adhesion of dis-
sidents from Frelimo, did it become a political party under the Portuguese name 
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, or Renamo, led by Afonso Dhakana, still its head 
today. it now has parliamentary representation and runs some important cities.
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was reelected in 1999. Frelimo also won the 2004 elections, under its 
new standard-bearer, current President Armando Guebuza. 
Peace has effectively been established throughout the country 
since the 1992 accord, despite the lingering effects of the long years 
of strife. The political situation has been stable, without the former 
climate of belligerence. The existing social and institutional violence 
is fruit of the normal process of capital accumulation between those 
who own and do not own goods and properties, with police and private 
militias imposing order. The effects –besides the psychological trauma 
caused by all the deaths and disappearances, the uprooted (data indi-
cate over 4 million had to flee their homes, in a country of 16 million), 
wounded and crippled– are the disorganized social structures, which 
are recomposing slowly, the return of capital and old production rela-
tions from south Africa and Portugal, with the same accents and strict 
control, and the same impunity required for the action of capital, as 
well as the protection of the powerful, only now of all colors.
if the present is nothing to brag about, the future holds little promise. 
The most optimistic forecasts envision it will still take decades to reach 
the 1973 level of economic output, Mozambique’s best. To face this situa-
tion, the Ministry of Planning and Finance starts from the premise that:
Without economic stability, there is no climate to stimulate economic 
growth, without which there is no way to reduce poverty. [...] econom-
ic stability is fundamental for economies to grow. stability is normally 
measured by variations in price levels, interest rates and exchange rates. 
These variations are determined, in general, by policies that affect de-
mand in the economy. These policies are monetary, fiscal and exchange 
rate policies, which are generally determined by governments (Franco, 
2000: 215-6).
in 1950, Mozambique’s population was around 6.5 million people. 
From there it took off, reaching 7.6 million in 1960, 9.4 million in 
1970, 12.1 million in 1980, 14.4 million in 1991 and 16.9 million in 
1999. it is the fourth most populous country among the 14 that make 
up the southern African Development Community (sADC). 
in 1997, the country’s GDP was calculated at between 2.4 billion 
and 3.4 billion dollars, varying according to the source (UNDP or World 
bank). in 1998, its GDP had reached roughly 3.9 billion dollars, of which 
the northern region contributed 21%, the central region 31% and the 
southern 48%. According to government reports, nearly 70% of the peo-
ple live in abject poverty, represented by both material and cultural pri-
vation, not to speak of privation of life itself. indeed, the country’s hu-
man Poverty index is the highest in the entire southern cone of Africa.
in overall terms, the economic results since the start of the cur-
rent decade continue to show concentration in the country’s southern 
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region, with nearly 51% of the people and 49% of the production, the 
standout being the capital of Maputo, which is responsible for nearly 
36.9% of the country’s output. The central region contributes 27.7% of 
production, while the northern figure is only 21.3%.
The national yearly per capita GDP reached 200 dollars in 2000. 
The importance of agriculture in Mozambique is shown, above all, by 
the fact that it occupies 80% of the people, although it only contributes 
30% to the GDP volume, while approximately 70% of aggregate export 
revenue derives from agricultural products and renewable resources.
Agriculture continues to be the activity with most weight in the 
economy, both at the national and regional level. but its participation 
has been declining over the years in favor of other sectors, such as in-
dustry and commerce. in 1997, agriculture accounted for 24.9% of GDP, 
while in 2000 its total share of the economy had fallen to 22.9%. in the 
same period, in contrast, the manufacturing sector racked up a solid 
gain, rising from 9.9% of the economy in 1997 to 13.6% in 2000.
Life expectancy in Mozambique is 42 years, against 48.9 in sub-sa-
haran Africa. According to the organizers of the UNDP Report, the data 
could have been “even more positive”:
had in not been hiV/AiDs, certainly captured by the birth and death 
trends of the population recount of 1997, and if the rate of economic 
growth had maintained the trend of recent years, the results would have 
surly been more positive. The results renew the hope that although there 
is still far to go, Mozambique is, in purely relative terms, ready to take 
important steps to reduce the needs of its population (PNUD, 2000: 21).
The literacy rate of the adult population is 39.6%, meaning that only 
some 6.4 million of the 16.1 million Mozambicans know how to read 
and write. The percentage of people attending school, from the elemen-
tary through college level, increased from 29% in 1997 to 36% in 2000.
Until 1975 Mozambique had colonial-style capitalism, with the 
strong presence of Portugal’s salazar regime2. With independence, so-
cialist modernization was imposed, conceived as a system to produce 
manufactured goods supported by a strong state, formally different 
than capitalist models. starting in 1992, a capitalist, democratic and 
liberal system was instituted. People, goods and capital could circu-
late freely throughout the country, from Rovuma to Maputo. The le-
gal system was adjusted accordingly, readying the country for its new 
international insertion, to the liking of big investors. however, never 
before did the country face such misery with so little autonomy. After 
all the contribution to the production of wealth for the world system 
2 Referring to António salazar, Portugal’s dictator from 1932 to 1968.
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in the twentieth century, the country was basically abandoned on the 
junk pile of the new world order.
Against this backdrop, in general lines, two economic policy pro-
posals were formulated at the end of the century by the Ministry of 
Planning and Finance, with the direct help of international organiza-
tions and respected university experts. They were presented as comple-
mentary, to form the main productive base for eliminating poverty.
The Mega Projects
Foreign direct investment (FDi) is one of the pillars of economic poli-
cy, used by large business groups, usually in partnerships, in planning 
their productive actions on a worldwide scale.
African countries have received scanty foreign investments, while 
suffering large-scale capital flight, “as the holders of assets transfer them 
to more secure places” (MacPherson, 2002, p. 134). For this reason, 
the Ministry of Planning and Finance sought to carry out institutional 
reforms to attract foreign capital, creating a scenario in which the re-
turn on private investments had risks proportional to those available 
abroad (might this be called the “Mozambique risk”, to keep capital 
properly nourished?).
in 1997, FDi in Mozambique totaled 65 million dollars, but in the 
following two and a half years this skyrocketed after the government 
approved a huge undertaking to produce aluminum worth 1.34 billion 
dollars. This was the Mozal Project, which started operating in June 
2000. According to the World Investment Report (2000) from UNCTAD, 
this investment put Mozambique in sixth place in the ranking of Afri-
can nations receiving FDi, behind only Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, south 
Africa and Morocco. in 1999, Africa as a whole received FDi of nearly 
10 billion dollars, a paltry sum compared with the 106 billion dollars 
that went to Asia and 90 billion dollars invested in Latin America.
since Mozambique’s GDP in 2000 was only about 4 billion dol-
lars, projects of this nature have a profound impact on the country’s 
accounts. And other mega-projects are on the drawing board: dou-
bling the capacity of Mozal, which will involve expanding the Cahora 
bassa hydroelectric facility; construction of a new hydropower project 
at Mepanda Uncua; the Temane and Pande natural gas project; the 
project for an iron and steel foundry in Maputo; the heavy sand corri-
dors project to exploit titaniferous mineral sands; and the Dobela Port 
project, to build a deepwater port in Maputo, among others.
studies carried out for the Ministry of Planning and Finance by 
consultants from harvard University reveal that these mega-projects 
will have a large impact on the country’s GDP and trade balance, but 
not on national income and the balance of payments, because of the 
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return financial flows for debt service payments and repatriation of 
profits. since the projects are capital intensive, a good part of the cash 
flow will go to pay off foreign creditors and for profit remittances. The 
impact of these projects on the creation of local jobs will be small, due 
to their technical characteristics. only five thousand direct jobs would 
be created in six mega-projects, with another fifteen thousand support 
jobs. This works out to over a million dollars for each job created.
it took two and a half years to construct Mozal. in 1998, 220 million 
dollars was spent on land grading and buildings, followed by another 
875 million in 1999 and 245 million in 2000 to acquire equipment. only 
6% of the project’s value was spent on goods, services and labor in Mo-
zambique. A key reason for this low remuneration of local factors was 
the fact that the subcontractors largely called on foreign resources.
The total annual production capacity is 245 thousand metric tons of 
aluminum, all for export, worth an estimated 400 million dollars. A year-
ly total of 500 thousand tons of alumina and 96 thousand tons of coke 
are imported, at a cost of 90 million dollars, besides the intensive use of 
electricity, supplied by Motraco, a new company with transmission lines 
running through south Africa, at a cost of 60 million dollars. Additional 
costs are 80 million dollars for imported services, 2 million for local 
services and 4 million for value-added taxes. The project employs about 
650 Mozambicans, with salaries adding to 5 million dollars a year (an 
average of about 7,700 dollars), along with 90 foreigners. other jobs are 
being created, such as for security services, food supply, etc.
The financial structure consisted of 38% equity capital, 50% senior 
debt (nearly all from south Africa, in the form of an export loan, with 
that country being the supplier of electricity) and 12% subordinated 
debt. The equity investment was 520 million dollars, divided among 
billiton (47%), Mitsubishi (25%), iDC (24%) and the Mozambican 
government (4%). The government’s part, 20 million dollars, was fi-
nanced by the European investment bank. The annual debt service 
(interest and amortization) of all the loans is 80 million dollars, and the 
direct domestic aggregate value is approximately 160 million dollars a 
year. The project’s production has an impact on GDP of slightly more 
than 5%, but the direct effect on national income, that is, the extra 
income earned by Mozambicans, is only 18 million a year.
Profits are around 65 million dollars a year, with the government’s 
share (4%) being 3 million. The contribution to the trade balance is 
positive 160 million dollars (400 million in exports less 240 million in 
imports), but the overall effect on the balance of payments is small, 
because all the profits are being repatriated except the government’s 3 
million. Thus, only the 4 million dollars in value-added taxes and the 
3 million in dividends accrues to the government. To this another 1 
Globalization and the Washington Consensus
128
million dollars can be added in payroll taxes. because it is a duty free 
zone, Mozal is exempt from indirect taxes.
Phase 2 of the project, concluded in 2004 (but for which data are 
not available at this writing), was planned to double output. however, 
projections were that only 2,650 new jobs would be created for construc-
tion, and that the number to maintain production would only be 1,300.
other mega-projects are on the cards with the same size and output 
characteristics as Mozal. in other words, there will be a strong impact 
on GDP, some on the trade balance, less still on the balance of pay-
ments and very little on the value aggregated to the local economy 
in terms of job and income creation. since all output is earmarked 
for export, as is nearly all the profit, what these projects amount to is 
extraction of value from Mozambique, not because of its cheap labor 
supply, but instead because of the existence of abundant electric pow-
er (particularly important to make aluminum in the case of Mozal), 
along with a political climate accepting highly polluting industries 
and easy profit repatriation.
The government sees these mega-projects as important, because 
they are export oriented and “bring benefits by linking Mozambique 
to the international economy”. besides this, it is believed that “inter-
national trade has proved to be particularly important as a channel for 
development and diffusion of technology”. (Andersson, 2002, p. 553). 
only time will tell how justified is the optimism that Mozambique will 
benefit from aluminum production technology. but to continue with 
the harvard consultant working for the Ministry of Planning and Fi-
nance, in defense of the mega-projects:
The projects are showcases of the possibility of investments in Mozam-
bique. They improve infrastructure and spread many benefits to the 
citizens. They provide opportunities for the Mozambican labor force to 
learn skills. The mega-projects are also linked to Mozambique’s large 
natural resource base. beyond this, Mozal, MisP [Maputo iron and 
steel Project] and the sands Corridors all require huge quantities of 
electric power, and the availability of cheap energy has been important 
to their location decisions. An important aspect to Mozal has been the 
treatment received in Mozambique on the part from the European Un-
ion under the Lomé Convention. The aluminum produced in Mozam-
bique will be imported into the EU with tax exemption.
The mega-projects, however, will not resolve the unemployment problem 
in Mozambique. All are capital intensive and only a limited number of 
direct jobs are being create (Andersson, 2002:553).
The overall impact on GDP of the six mega-projects together will doubt-
less be large. if they are realized, they can cause GDP growth by 2010 
of around 37%, but only a 7% increase in national income, with 20 
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thousand new jobs. in this same period, it is estimated that another 3.7 
million people will enter the country’s labor market. What will be done 
with these potential workers? The experts have the solution. Alongside 
these big capital-intensive projects, they propose labor-intensive ones, 
also aimed at the export market, the so-called labor-intensive manu-
factured exports (LiME) investments. These are discussed below.
Labor-Intensive Manufactured Exports (LIME)
Labor-intensive manufactured exports should be a central element of 
a “pro-poor” development strategy, according to soumodip sarkar, an 
expert working for the Ministry of Planning and Finance, who feels 
that Mozambique has everything to attract investments of this type. in 
contrast with the mega-projects, which generate very few jobs, LiME 
industries can create them quickly. As an example, he cites the case 
of three factories built with Taiwanese capital in Vietnam that make 
sports shoes as Nike subcontractors, generating 45 thousand jobs. he 
also mentions Lesotho, which generated 19 thousand jobs in the ap-
parel and footwear industry with annual export revenues of 100 mil-
lion dollars. in this case, it must be remembered that these are values 
exported, not values aggregated to the country. he goes on to say that 
many of the so-called “Asian tigers”, such as south korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and even Vietnam, triggered their industrialization based on 
these types of industries. he also cites Mauritius, which transformed 
itself from a poor exporter of cotton to a rich country with diversified 
exports. And finally, he proposes that because of 
the high level of FDi inflows in recent years, and the abundance of cheap 
labor in Moçambique, one would expect that the country is ideally suited 
for labor-intensive manufacturing operations in areas such as apparel 
and textiles, agro-processing, leather goods, toys, sporting goods and 
electronic assembly. Moçambique’s fundamental comparative advantage 
and favorable geography place her in an advantageous position for at-
tracting LiME investments as an engine of sustainable growth and job 
creation. in addition, the tax environment is highly favorable, and the 
creation of export processing zones (sarkar, 2002:475).
but i ask how one can intend “sustainable development” to rest on an 
industry practically devoid of fixed capital, one that can be transferred 
to another country quickly in function of fluctuations, such as lower 
wages in another country or a domestic wage increase?
Later the planner confesses: “Recent large increases in the min-
imum wage, if continued, will also threaten to undermine Moçam-
bique’s competitive advantage in labor-intensive industries”. (sarkar, 
2002, p. 476). As can be seen, even before starting the process, there is 
already the looming risk of a possible increase in the minimum wage. 
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And this is in a country (attested in the same Ministry of Planning and 
Finance document) whose priority is to reduce absolute poverty and 
whose minimum wage is under 40 dollars a month... Either the pro-
posal for industrialization through LiME is not serious, or the inten-
tion to reduce poverty is not serious. i believe the latter is most likely.
According to the proposal, there are several advantages of this 
type of industrialization, namely: (i) passage of the Africa Growth and 
opportunity Act by the U.s. Congress in June 2000, opening the Amer-
ican market to these types of products; (ii) the “flying geese” phenom-
enon, in reference to the flight of investments from countries such as 
Mauritius, where wages have increased (when they rise, it’s all over...); 
(iii) the new sADC trade protocol, which facilitates these transactions; 
and (iv) the existing preferential trade agreement with Europe.
These industries, it cannot be forgotten, are generally based on 
individual or family labor, using means of production (sewing ma-
chines, glue, etc.) belonging to the workers, who receive the raw mate-
rials and only provide their own intense physical input, in a process of 
cutting, sewing and assembly, depending on the product involved. The 
company employing them does not have capital in the country, brings 
in its own raw materials for a piecework cycle carried out locally, 
and obtains a finished product to be sold in the international market. 
These goods are the world’s designer label pants, shirts and ties, the 
branded athletic shoes, and in a slightly more sophisticated process, 
the electrical, electronic and computer products. This, then, involves 
individualized labor processes that permit extra exploitation.
individualization of work is the process by which the contribu-
tion of 
labor in the productive process is defined in specific form for each 
worker and because of each worker’s contribution, whether in the form 
of autonomous or individually contracted work, based on a highly de-
regulated market (Castells, 2002:97).
This process, utilized in exports of labor-intensive manufactures, is one 
of the aspects of acute exploitation, responsible for exclusion of various 
countries and regions, and can be defined as indicating labor relations
that permit capital to systematically retain the payments/allocation of re-
sources or impose more rigorous working conditions on certain types of 
workers, worse than are considered the norm/rule in a given labor market 
in a determined time and place. This refers to the discrimination against 
immigrants, minorities, women, youths or other categories of marginalized 
workers, in a way that is tolerated or sanctioned by regulatory bodies.
A significant trend in this context is the emergence of paid child labor 
in various parts of the world, under conditions of extreme violence, ex-
ploitation and defenselessness, reversing the historical pattern of social 
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protection of children, existing not only in the last industrial stage of 
capitalism, but also in industrial statism and traditional agricultural 
societies (Castells, 2002:97).
The proposals of the iMF, the World bank and big capital (the LiME 
alternative), which have been accepted by various governments, such 
as that of Mozambique, a country where 70% of the population lives 
in absolute poverty, differ little, not even in cynicism, from the welfare 
programs for Africans in the colonial period.
From a novel perspective, the mega-projects act in the old Mozam-
bican picture with much dead labor and nearly no live labor, while the 
LiME initiatives act with much live labor and nearly no dead labor.
At the current moment of neoliberal globalization, there is no con-
vocation of the population, as defended by Frelimo in the 1970s and 80s, 
for participation and integration in the economy, either as workers or as 
consumers. integration in the globalized world is through a production 
process and not through a labor process. Much has been invested in 
Mozambique in the mega-projects, aiming at exporting and using little 
local labor. but capital does not extract now income from domestic soci-
ety. The high value added extracted comes from the high composition of 
capital that exploits little labor. Furthermore, these ventures pay few lo-
cal taxes, and do not produce for internal consumption. The integration 
in the globalization process is in practical terms the rent that big inter-
national capital pays to the government, for a space where it produces 
for the benefit of outside capital itself, along with a small local elite. 
To occupy the population, then, they propose labor-intensive man-
ufactured exports. These enterprises are not based anywhere because 
they are inherently volatile. They are an itinerant way of international 
exploitation that is part of the so-called globalized world. 
Nevertheless, Mozambique’s exclusion is not only social. Above 
all, it is economic. And political exclusion is a condition for economic 
exclusion. Mozambique has unconditionally adhered to all the letters 
of intention with the iMF and impositions of international lenders. it 
established the peace process with Renamo, democratized the coun-
try with direct elections, freedom of political parties, the press and 
circulation of capital, and above all, it brought good governance, per-
mitting high profits and their repatriation. 
The proposal of the iMF, World bank and big international inves-
tors, endorsed by the government, to attract mega-projects and LiME 
–in a country with 70% of the population living in abject misery– puts 
a new face on exploitation, but continues with the same colonial po-
litical objectives of despoiling the Mozambican people. The exploita-
tion and humiliation the people suffered during colonialism were jus-
tified as a mission to assimilate and civilize the natives for work and 
consumption, with the myth of development. Now, in the neoliberal 
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policies, exploitation and exclusion are presented with the objective of 
diminishing poverty and misery...
The absence of effective alternatives permits the flowering in Mo-
zambique of Mafia-style and paternalistic relations, known as perverse 
integrations. These are relations that did not exist in the country and 
now dominate the drug trade, arms smuggling, the actions of “protec-
tion groups”, etc., occupying leading positions in the world of busi-
ness, politics and society in general. They correspond to the forms of 
labor practiced in the criminal economy, generating their own profits, 
which by the legal rules are considered criminal. These relations are 
in full flower in Mozambique and give a particular dynamic to social 
exclusion, in articulation with global capital.
in the final analysis, the bets of capital for Mozambique are trans-
lated into mega-projects, with much dead labor and nearly no live la-
bor, and the efforts to generate exports from labor-intensive industries, 
with much live labor and nearly no dead labor. This is the essence of 
the current economic policy, which takes advantage of the reigning 
misery to increase the gains of big capital, borne on the bandwagon of 
democracy, peace, security and good governance. in this context, per-
verse integrations multiply in the breast of the people, without capital 
and without work, but other seeds are also being sown among the 
multitude, which will grow into future rebellions. 
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Walden Bello*
The Global Crisis of Legitimacy
of Liberal Democracy
iN MY book, DiLEMMAs oF DoMiNATioN, i identify three dimen-
sions of the crisis of liberal democracy. The first is the crisis of overex-
tension, or the growing gap between imperial reach and imperial grasp, 
the most striking example of which is the Us’s being drawn into a quag-
mire in iraq. This has led to an erosion of its strategic position globally 
and made the threat of the employment of Us military force to dis-
cipline recalcitrant governments and forces throughout the world less 
credible than it was three years ago. hugo Chavez’ scintillating defiance 
of American power would not be possible without the iraqi resistance’s 
successfully pinning down Us interventionist forces in a war without 
end. The second is the crisis of overproduction, overaccumulation, or 
overcapacity. This refers to the growing gap between the tremendous 
productive capacity of the global capitalist system and the limited global 
demand for the commodities produced by this system. The result has 
been, over time, drastically lowered growth rates in the central econo-
mies, stagnation, and a crisis of profitability. Efforts by global capital 
to regain profitability by more intensively exploiting labor in the North 
or moving out to take advantage of significantly lower wages elsewhere 
* PhD in sociology from Princeton University. Full professor of sociology and public 
administration at the University of the Philippines. Executive director of Focus on 
the Global south.
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have merely exacerbated the crisis. on the one hand, neoliberal policies 
in the North and structural adjustment programs in the south have gut-
ted global demand. on the other hand, the export of capital has created 
massive new industrial capacity in China and selected other countries. 
New productive capacity and stagnant if not declining global demand is 
the recipe for the exacerbation of the crisis of profitability. 
one indicator of the deepening crisis of profitability is that com-
petition has replaced cooperation as the dominant aspect of the re-
lationship among global capitalist elites. From the project of globali-
zation that more or less united the global capitalist class during the 
Clinton era, we have entered, in the bush period, into a period of 
intense national or regional capitalist competition. in so far as the 
bush administration adheres to the globalist capitalist project, it is 
that of managed globalization, one that ensures that Us corporate 
interests do not get hurt but become the main beneficiaries of the 
process. Protection for Us corporate interests and free trade for the 
rest of the world- this is the operational dictum of Washington, one 
that is now on display in the Us’s adamant refusal to abide by the 
NAFTA ruling on Canadian softwood imports. Given this nationalist-
protectionist posture on the part of Washington, it is not surprising 
that the WTo talks leading to the sixth Ministerial in hong kong are 
in danger of collapse.
The third dimension of the crisis that i identify is the crisis of legiti-
macy of Us hegemony. This, i think, is as serious as the other two crises, 
since, as an admirer of Gramsci, i do think that legitimacy, more than 
force or the market, is the lynchpin of a system of social relations. one 
dimension of this crisis of legitimacy is the crisis of the multilateral sys-
tem of global economic governance owing to the Us’ no longer wanting 
to act as a primus inter pares, or first among equals, in the WTo, World 
bank, and the iMF, and its wishing to unilaterally pursue its interests 
through these mechanisms, thus seriously impairing their credibility, 
legitimacy, and functioning as global institutions. Another dimension of 
this crisis of legitimacy is the crisis of Lockean democracy, that model 
of democratic rule that the Us has promoted as the system of self-rule 
both in the North and in the south. i would like to focus the rest of my 
talk on this dimension of the crisis of hegemony. 
Lockean democracy is in crisis throughout the whole world today. 
This is ironic, given the fact that just over a decade ago, liberal democ-
racy American-style was supposed to sweep everything before it. how 
different from the Fukuyaman end-of-history mood is the sense of cri-
sis today, one that the thinker Richard Rorty captures quite well in his 
comment: “in the worst case scenario, historians will someday have to 
explain why the golden age of Western democracy, like the age of the 
Antonines, lasted only about two hundred years” (Rorty, 2004: 10). 
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Let me begin with the United states. There, the “democracy” in 
liberal democracy has long been put into question by the massive hi-
jacking of elections by corporate financing that has corrupted both 
the Republican and Democratic parties and the systematic disenfran-
chisement of poor people symbolized by the Florida elections of 2000 
and the ohio elections of 2004. 
There, corporate rule has reached its apogee with George W. bush 
doing the bidding of Us industry in torpedoing the kyoto Protocol, 
awarding his vice president’s corporate allies such as halliburton with 
no-bid contracts, going to war for his oil cronies, and creating a free-
market paradise for Us corporations in iraq. 
There, the military establishment has become so unaccountable 
to its nominal civilian superiors that one cannot but agree with Wil-
liam Pfaff when he writes, “The United states is not yet eighteenth 
century Prussia, when the military owned the state, [but] the threat is 
more serious than most Americans realize” (Pfaff, 2001). 
There, the “liberal” in liberal democracy has been subverted by 
a Patriot Act that eliminates many of the few barriers that had re-
mained between the individual and total monitoring and control by 
big brother. The Patriot Act is best described by harvard Professor 
Elaine scarry as “a gigantic license to search and seize that violates 
the Fourth Amendment” (scarry, 2004: 12).
What is clear is that what prides itself as the first modern democ-
racy has ceased to be a model for the rest of the world. What i would 
like to dwell on a bit is the state of democracy in the developing world. 
Just a decade ago, we were supposed to be in the midst of samuel 
huntington’s so called “third wave” of democratization, as country 
after country in Latin America, Asia, and Africa threw off ruling dic-
tatorships and adopted variants of the Anglo-American democratic 
model. Today the recurrent question is: are we undergoing a reversal 
of that wave? Let me take as an example of the changing fortunes of 
democracy the situation in my country, the Philippines. 
Whatever Happened to People Power? 
“People power” used to be synonymous with the Philippines. in Feb-
ruary 1986 Filipinos captured the imagination of the world when they 
rushed out to the streets to support a military rising and ousted the 
strongman Ferdinand Marcos. Fifteen years later, in January 2001, 
they again surged to the streets to bring down President Joseph Es-
trada, who was widely believed to be the recipient of hundreds of mil-
lions of pesos from illegal gambling activities. Today, however, they 
are largely absent while another president stands accused, this time of 
stealing elections. 
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intercepted telephone conversations between President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo and an electoral commissioner during the elections 
of May 2004 showed her attempting to influence the outcome of the 
polls. Unable to deny it was her voice in the taped intercepts, Arroyo 
publicly apologized for a “lapse in judgment”. instead of defusing the 
situation, the admission triggered widespread calls for her to resign. 
in early september 2005, nearly three months after the scandal 
broke, Arroyo blocked a bid to impeach her, clinging to power despite a 
recent poll giving her the lowest overall performance rating among the 
country’s five most recent presidents. Those numbers were not, howev-
er, translated into numbers in the streets. The biggest rally anti-Arroyo 
forces could muster numbered, at most, 40,000. in contrast, hundreds 
of thousands had clogged the main highway running through Manila, 
popularly known as “EDsA”, for days on end in 1986 and 2001. 
What happened, asked Manila’s veteran street activists. Why were 
the people no longer protesting a clear-cut case of electoral fraud by 
a president who was already vastly unpopular owing to ineptitude, 
uninspiring leadership and widely believed allegations of corruption 
even before the telephone intercepts surfaced? 
The truth is that while people dislike Arroyo, they are also deeply 
disillusioned with the political system, which has come to be known 
as the “EDsA state”. Conversations with middle- and lower-class citi-
zens inevitably produce the same answer to why they’re not out dem-
onstrating: “Well, whoever replaces her will probably be as bad, if not 
worse”. intrigued at the discovery that only a handful of students in 
my undergraduate class in political sociology at the University of the 
Philippines, the traditional hotbed of activism, had attended the ral-
lies, i posed to them the question, “is this democracy worth saving?” 
Two thirds said no.
Rather than taking to the streets, people are fleeing in large num-
bers to Europe, the United states and the Middle East. some 10 per-
cent of the Filipino labor force now works overseas, and one out of 
every four Filipinos wants to emigrate. it is estimated that at least 30 
percent of Filipino households now subsist on remittances sent by 8 
million expatriates. 
The widespread cynicism about democracy is understandable, 
especially when Filipinos compare their lot with the Chinese or the 
Vietnamese. some point out bitterly that while authoritarian Vietnam 
reduced the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty 
from 51 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2003, the Philippines could 
only bring it down from 20 percent to 14 percent in the same period. 
They decry the fact that at 0.46, the Philippines’ gini coefficient, the 
most reliable measure of inequality, is the worst in southeast Asia. 
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Elite Capture of Democratic Processes 
i think that one key reason for the crisis of democracy in the devel-
oping world is that electoral democracies of the kind favored by the 
West have been extraordinarily vulnerable to being hijacked by elites. 
The system of democracy reestablished in the Philippines after the 
ouster of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 illustrates the problem. it is 
one that encourages maximum factional competition among the elite 
while allowing them to close ranks against any change in the social 
and economic structure. 
ViPPThe Philippine system is democratic in the narrow sense of 
making elections the arbiter of political succession. in the principle of 
“one man/woman, one vote”, there is formal equality. Yet this formal 
equality cannot but be subverted by its being embedded in a social and 
economic system marked by great disparities of wealth and income. 
Like the American political system on which it is modeled, the 
genius of the Philippine democratic system, from the perspective of 
the elite, is the way it harnesses elections to socially conservative ends 
(bello, 2003: 80-91). Running for office at any level of government is 
prohibitively expensive, so that only the wealthy or those backed by 
wealth can usually stand for elections. Thus the masses do choose 
their representatives but from a limited pool of people of means that 
may belong to different factions-those “in” and those “out” of power 
–but are not different in terms of their political programs. The beauty 
of the system in the eyes of the elite is that by periodically engaging 
the people in an exercise to choose among different members of the 
elite, elections make voters active participants in legitimizing the so-
cial and economic status quo. Thus has emerged the great Philippine 
paradox: an extremely lively play of electoral politics unfolding above 
a class structure that is one of the most immobile in Asia. 
Allowing for institutional and cultural variations, one can say 
that the dynamics of democratic politics in countries such as bra-
zil, Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, and Thailand are similar to those in 
the Philippines. Elite democracy is one word that some have used to 
describe this system. Polyarchy is another. however, elite capture of 
democratic processes is, in my view, only one factor that subverted the 
performance of the new democracies that emerged in the 1980s. An-
other development was equally critical: their economic promise was 
undermined by the demands of external actors. 
The External Subversion of Democracy 
Let us revisit that historic conjuncture of the early 1980s. The military 
dictatorships were collapsing not only because of internal resistance 
but also because key external actors such as the United states, Euro-
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pean Union, the World bank, and international Monetary Fund (iMF) 
withdrew their support from them. Now, one of the major reasons 
for this about face was that the dictatorships had lost the credibil-
ity, legitimacy, and minimum support to impose the economic reform 
programs, better known as “structural adjustment”, that these influen-
tial forces demanded. Promoted as necessary for economic efficiency, 
these programs were designed to more widely open these economies 
to foreign capital and foreign trade and to enable countries to pay off 
their enormous foreign debts. 
For instance, in brazil and Argentina, tight monetary policies and 
tight fiscal policies drew opposition not only from labor and other civil 
society groupings in the early eighties but also from business groups. 
business interests once benefited from labor-repressive policies im-
posed by these military dictatorships. Now, however, business circles 
began to distance themselves from repressive governments when neo-
liberal policies failed to produce the promised economic growth. As 
stephen haggard and Robert kaufmann observed: 
With economic problems mounting, business elites began to reevalu-
ate the costs and benefits of the technocratic decision-making style 
that characterized authoritarian rule. business groups had complained 
periodically about their lack of access to the remote technocrats who 
conducted macroeconomic policy, but such concerns had been offset 
by particularistic benefits and the fact that governments were willing 
to repress popular sector challenges. The private sector’s gradual dis-
affection did not reflect a democratic epiphany, but a pragmatic re-
sponse to changing circumstances. With authoritarian governments 
increasingly unable to deliver their side of the bargain, “voice” began 
to appear increasingly important to business groups, even if it meant 
reopening the arena to the previously excluded popular sectors” (hag-
gard and kaufman, 1995: 59-60, 192).
The democratic governments which displaced authoritarian regimes 
soon confronted their own dilemma. on the one hand, redistributive 
policies were blocked by elites that had joined the anti-dictatorship 
coalition, a development that we have already discussed. At the same 
time, expansionary fiscal policies were discouraged by the World 
bank and the iMF. it soon became clear that what the multilateral 
agencies wanted them to do was to use their democratic legitimacy 
to impose structural adjustment programs. in Argentina, for instance, 
the international financial institutions pressured the new government 
of Raul Alfonsin to abandon neo-keynesian policies, implement tax 
reforms, liberalize trade, and privatize public enterprises. When the 
regime quailed, the World bank “concluded that the government had 
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not made sufficient progress toward its reform goals and suspended 
disbursements on a structural adjustment loan”. 
Electoral democracy became the prime mechanism for the impo-
sition of stabilization or structural adjustment programs in Jamaica, 
haiti. the Philippines, Peru, and Pakistan. in Jamaica, the progressive 
Manley government suffered a devastating loss of legitimacy when it 
caved in to pressure to impose an iMF stabilization program blessed by 
Washington. The program eroded living standards. it led to Manley’s 
crushing defeat in the 1980 elections by a successor who proceeded 
to continue the same policies at the behest of the iMF. in Peru, the 
government of Alberto Fujimori was elected on a populist, anti-iMF 
platform, but proceeded to impose a neoliberal “shock” programs that 
included steep price increases in the rates charged by state enterprises 
as well as radical trade liberalization (huber and stephens, 1997: 8). 
These measures provoked a deep recession, leading to popular discon-
tent that in turn provoked Fujimori to suspend the constitution, close 
Congress, and rule as a strongman with little respect for constitutional 
restraints. 
in the Philippines, the Us and the multilateral agencies aban-
doned Marcos. Not only was his political position untenable owing to 
massive popular resistance, but his government’s lack of legitimacy 
had made it an ineffective instrument for repaying the massive $28 
billion foreign debt and for implementing iMF stabilization poli-
cies. An economic crisis accompanied the end of the old regime, but 
that did not stop the World bank and the iMF from demanding that 
the fledgling democratic government of President Corazon Aquino 
make debt repayment its top national economic priority. People were 
shocked, and some of Aquino’s economic advisers protested, but the 
government submitted, issuing a decree that affirmed the “automatic 
appropriation” of the full amount needed to service the foreign debt 
from the budget of the national government. With some 40 to 50 per 
cent of the budget going to service the debt, this practically precluded 
national development, since all that was left went to salaries and op-
erational expenses, with little left over for capital expenditures. in 
some years, 10 per cent of the country’s GDP was spent servicing its 
foreign debt. Thus, it is hardly surprising then that the Philippines 
registered average growth of below 1.5 per cent per annum between 
1983 and 1993. 
it is ironic that today former President Aquino marches against 
President Arroyo when she herself was responsible for many economic 
policies, notably the model debtor policy, that Arroyo inherited. As in 
Peru, Argentina, and the Philippines, the return of democracy to bra-
zil was accompanied by scarcely veiled warnings from the iMF and 
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the Us that the first order of business for the new regime was to ac-
complish what the exiting military regime had failed to do, that is, to 
impose stabilization programs raising interest rates, cutting back gov-
ernment expenditures, devaluing the currency, and liberalizing trade. 
From the mid-eighties to the 2002, a series of governments eroded the 
credibility of democracy by undertaking unsuccessful efforts to im-
pose on a recalcitrant population the economic stabilization desired 
by Washington and the iMF1. 
The latest victim is the government of “Lula” or Luis inacio da 
silva of the brazilian Workers’ Party, one of the most committed anti-
neoliberal parties on the continent. before he even won the presiden-
tial elections in the fall of 2002, Lula did the unprecedented in Latin 
America: he promised the iMF that he would honor the high- interest, 
expenditure-restrictive conditions of a stabilization loan negotiated 
with the outgoing President Fernando henrique Cardoso. Lula acted 
under duress. The Fund made it clear it would not release the remain-
ing $24 billion of the stabilization loan unless he behaved. 
Lula was true to his word. Consequently, in 2003 brazilian GDP 
contracted by 0.2 per cent in Lula’s first year; unemployment surged 
to a record 13 per cent. This bitter medicine for the brazilian people 
was, however, a tonic for foreign investors. in the first eight months 
of the year, even though the economy remained depressed, brazil-
ian stocks soared by over 58 per cent, prompting business Week to 
advise speculative investors: “Don’t leave this party yet”2 (business 
Week, 2003: 63). As for Lula, he faced mounting criticism from with-
in his own Workers’ Party and governing coalition as well as from 
ordinary voters; only 28 per cent of the population voicing support 
for his government (smith, 2004). in other words, even before the 
current crisis stemming from corruption among Lula’s closest advis-
ers, the government was already in trouble owing to its adoption of 
contractionary policies. 
Reversal of the third wave of democratization now looms as a 
threat throughout Latin America, where a poll conducted by the United 
Nations Development Program in 2004 that showed that 54.7 per cent 
of Latin Americans polled said they would support authoritarian re-
gimes over democracy if the shift would resolve their economic woes 
(Diamond, 2001: 358). 
in south Asia reversal of the third wave is already a reality. 
When Gen. Pervez Musharraf seized power in Pakistan in october 
1 see, among others, Geisa (2002: 5-33); also haggard and kaufman (1995: 193-
196, 209-211).
2 see also burbach (2004).
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1999, and sent the Prime Minister Nawaz sharaf packing, he ended 
11 years of unstable democracy. so worrisome to many orthodox 
students of democracy was Pakistan’s democratic breakdown that 
analyst Larry Diamond wrote: “Pakistan [may] not be the the last 
high-profile country to suffer a breakdown of democracy. indeed, if 
there is a ‘third reverse wave’, its origin may well be dated to 12 oc-
tober 1999” (kemal, 2001).
Post-mortems of Pakistan’s parliamentary democracy tend to fo-
cus on corruption, collapse of the rule of law, ethnic and religious 
polarization, and economic failure. other explanations center on an 
unaccountable military that had enjoyed special relations with the 
Pentagon owing to its key role in driving the Russians out of Afghani-
stan. Certainly, all this played a part. but also crucial was the role 
played by the iMF and World bank, which pushed the democratic 
regimes of both benazir bhutto and Nawaz sharif to impose stabiliza-
tion and structural adjustment programs that contributed significant-
ly to the rise of poverty and inequality as well as fall in the growth rate. 
(13) Noted one eminent Pakistani economist: “The almost obsessive 
concern with short-term macroeconomic stabilization has with it the 
danger [...] that some of our basic social programs might be affected, 
and this would have inter-generational consequences on development 
in Pakistan” (shore, 1999). since democracy became associated with 
a rise in poverty and economic stagnation, it is not surprising that the 
coup was viewed with relief by most Pakistanis, from both the middle 
classes and the working masses. 
The Challenge 
in a recent essay, the philosopher Richard Rorty sketches a bleak dys-
topian portrait of where Western democracy is headed: 
At the end of this process of erosion, democracy would have been re-
placed by something quite different. This would probably be neither 
military dictatorship nor orwellian totalitarianism, but rather a rela-
tively benevolent despotism, imposed by what would gradually become 
a hereditary nomenklatura. 
That sort of power structure survived the end of the soviet Union and 
is now resolidifying under Putin and his fellow kGb alumni. The same 
structure seems to be taking shape in China and in southeast Asia. 
in countries run in this way, public opinion does not greatly matter. 
Elections may still be held, but opposition parties are now allowed to 
pose any serious threat to the powers that be. Careers are less open 
to talent, and more dependent on connections with powerful persons. 
since the courts and police review boards are relatively powerless, it is 
often necessary for shopkeepers to pay protection money to the police, 
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or to criminals tolerated by the police, in order to stay in business. it is 
dangerous for citizens to complain about corruption about the abuse 
of power by public officials. high culture is restricted to areas that are 
irrelevant to politics [...] No more uncensored media. No more student 
demonstrations. Not much in the way of civil society. in short, a return 
to the Ancien Regime, with the national security establishment of each 
country playing the role of court in Versailles. (Rorty, 2004). 
This dark vision may not yet be applicable to western democracies, 
though some of my friends claim it is a perfect portrayal of Washing-
ton under the bush regime. it is, however, a credible end point if the 
forces that are eviscerating democracy are not subdued. This is not an 
unfamiliar vision. At the turn of the 20th century, Max Weber referred 
to the “iron cage” of bureaucratization and Robert Michels called at-
tention to the “iron law of oligarchy”. Today, the “iron cage” is being 
forged by a number of forces: bureaucratic centralization that has run 
out of control, the drive of a national security establishment playing 
on terrorist fears, corporate concentration and control of production 
and markets. in the case of the third world, one must add to this brew 
the draconian policies of powerful multilateral institutions and the 
systematic subversion of democratic mechanisms by local elites to 
gain a comprehensive picture of the threats that are strangling de-
mocracy globally. 
To respond to these threats we very badly need first of all a recon-
ceptualization or fundamental revisioning of democracy at various 
levels. Too long have we identified democracy with elections, so that 
once we had trooped to the polls and elected the people and party 
of our choice, we considered our democratic responsibilities fulfilled. 
Today, more than ever, today, Rousseau’s warning about representa-
tive systems being corrupted so that they generate the corporate will 
of the representatives rather than the general will of the represented 
remains very relevant. Today more than ever, Michels’ warning about 
elections becoming less a question of the people freely choosing their 
representatives than their so-called representatives using elections to 
maintain themselves in office rings true. Moving on boldly to innovate 
more direct and participatory methods of democratic governance is 
one of the key challenges facing all of us, and here the anti-globali-
zation movement with its emphasis of direct democratic methods of 
decisionmaking can be of great assistance to us. 
Then there is the challenge of how to restore equality as one of the 
key dimensions of democracy. We can no longer pretend that a func-
tioning democracy can be sustained when there is a formal equality of 
citizens but there are very real and large inequalities of wealth among 
them. We have seen both in the United states and in the developing 
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world the systematic perversion of democracy at every turn by money 
and wealth. Campaign finance reform is only a first step in reversing 
this trend. in my view, strengthening democracy is inseparable from 
achieving a more equitable distribution of assets and income--mean-
ing reversing the spontaneous drive of the market to create and per-
petuate inequalities. The disembedding of the market from society, 
to borrow an image from the great hungarian scholar karl Polanyi, 
in the name of efficiency and prosperity has been the greatest creator 
of inequality, the greatest subverter of democratic legitimacy in the 
last quarter of a century. We have relearned the hard way what we 
have been taught by the classic theorists of democracy-that you can-
not divorce equality from democracy. We have learned the hard way 
that, contrary to Milton Friedman’s classic dictum, market freedom 
translates to more freedom for corporations and more unfreedom for 
citizens. We must understand that the modus vivendi between democ-
racy and capitalism called Lockean democracy has long been dysfunc-
tional, and that to survive, contemporary democracy must break out 
of the rigid Lockean shell that now imprisons it. 
We must, above all, face the fact that capitalism and democratic 
deepening are no longer compatible, and that the challenge lies in the 
nature and degree of the restraints that we put on the market while 
we restructure the system of production and consumption around the 
satisfaction of the needs of people and the community rather than 
profitability. Call this participatory economics, social democracy, peo-
ple’s economics, or socialism-what is essential is that the market be 
drastically re-embedded in society, subject to the primordial human 
values of community, justice, equality, and solidarity. 
Then, finally, there is the challenge of reining in the big bureauc-
racies which have come to view themselves as above democratic poli-
tics. There are the corporate elites that say that achieving efficiency in 
production and distribution can only be achieved through hierarchi-
cal control –that democracy has to do strictly with political represen-
tation but stops at the realm of production; the technocratic elites that 
say that management of the modern state and economy is too complex 
for ordinary citizens and must be left to the experts; the national se-
curity elites that say that the exigencies of providing national security 
and carrying out contemporary warfare involving split– second deci-
sions necessitate a limitation of the classical freedoms of an earlier era 
and insulation of the national security establishment from what they 
disdainfully regard as the “vagaries” of civilian democratic politics. 
What is insidious about the behavior of these elites is that even as they 
quietly maintain that a technocratic centralization is the imperative 
of modern societies and that democratic practice must adjust this fact 
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of life, they opportunistically use the slogan of limiting and reducing 
government to hide their technocratic agenda. i am of course speak-
ing about the most influential sectors of the Republican Party of the 
Us, who cleverly use the Christian Right and the Cato institute small 
government types as canon fodder to advance their program of con-
servative centralization. 
Let me end by saying that with democracy facing a crisis glo-
bally, we cannot approach the problem as if it were simply one of 
tinkering with processes that are essentially sound and simply need 
sorting out. We are being faced with the classical questions of demo-
cratic theory, the fundamental questions, to which we must frame 
ideas and institutional solutions appropriate for the times. We must 
grasp and face with courage the full dimensions of the threat posed 
to democracy, for it is our ability to confront them that will provide 
the answer to the question of whether the global democratic revolu-
tion will deepen or it will become a thing of the past, leaving future 
historians, as Rorty puts it, with the puzzle why the golden age of 
democracy, like the age of the Antonines, lasted only about two hun-
dred years. 
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Virginia A. Miralao*
Globalization, Democracy and
Development: Some Asian Patterns 
and the Philippines’ Experience
i CoNsiDER iT a rare honor and privilege to participate in this south-
south workshop. The great distance that separates our continents 
prevents us from engaging in as much dialogue and exchange as we 
probably should and reflect better on the social and intellectual issues 
facing our countries whether in Latin America, Africa, or Asia. i hope 
i can do justice to representing an Asian perspective in this workshop 
but let me say at the outset that the workshop topic itself is quite vast 
and the Asian region is so diverse that it is not easy to capture and 
much less to generalize about Asia’s experience on the topic at hand.
but allow me to begin first with a few observations about the 
workshop theme –globalization, democracy and development–, and 
then proceed to describing some of the patterns regarding these 
processes as they have unfolded or are unfolding in countries of our 
(Asian) region. i end my presentation with a somewhat more focused 
examination of the impact of globalization on the educational profiles 
of Filipinos and on the nature of their employment and thereby, on the 
Philippines current state of development.
General Observations: Globalization, Democracy
and Development
Most countries and most peoples desire democracy and development. 
Democratic tendencies or the yearning for freedom are human and 
* Chair, Philippine social science Council. 
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universal, as are development aspirations to be lifted up from eco-
nomic backwardness and material want. beyond these general tenden-
cies and aspirations however, countries differ considerably in their no-
tions and/or concepts of what is democracy and what is development 
and hence, also in the manner they pursue and express these within 
their borders. one recalls for example, that some years back, the then 
singapore Prime Minister Lee kuan Yew forcefully argued that Asian 
democracies should not be judged by Western values and standards 
of democracy (which put a premium on personal freedoms) as the 
region embodies Asian values quite different from the West (e.g., as 
communitarianism and respect for and deference to government au-
thority). Likewise, countries differ in the importance they put on the 
preservation of their national cultures and identities while in the proc-
ess of development, with many adhering to the view that economic 
progress which erodes native cultures and values or which does not 
address issues of poverty and social justice is not development at all. 
Along with the country-to-country differences and ambiguities in 
prevailing notions and expressions of democracy and development, is 
also the tension between the pursuit of democracy and development. in 
many countries, practices and measures taken to uphold and/or advance 
democracy do not always redound to development or to the good of the 
national economy. some other countries on the other hand, have found it 
more expedient to put a cap on the so-called “democratic freedoms” while 
aggressively pushing measures for economic growth and development.
Globalization –taken to mean the complex of changes occurring 
today owing to improved travel and communications technology and 
giving rise to transnational flows of goods, services, people, and capital– 
has opened new spaces for the exchange of local, national and regional 
experiences and ideas on democracy, development and related social 
processes beyond the conventional structures and relations set up by 
governments/nation-states. All these in turn are engendering an ethos 
of freedom and mobility among countries worldwide, and are exerting 
pressure on nation-states to open up and liberalize their economic and 
political systems. here, we note that given their unique histories and 
cultures and varying temperaments and circumstances, countries re-
spond differently to globalization pressures and influences.
Some Patterns of Democracy and Development
Experiences in Asian Countries
bearing in mind the general observations above, i now turn to some 
of the patterns that have been cited on how Asian countries have pur-
sued and/or managed their national development objectives as well as 
their political systems and democracy/democratization goals.
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one pattern is exemplified by india and the Philippines, the ear-
liest countries in the region that gained independence from colonial 
rule and embraced republicanism upon independence. india is re-
puted as the world’s “largest democracy” being the most populous 
country with a working parliamentary system, while the Philippines 
too is seen as displaying unique “democratic characteristics”, e.g., 
exhibiting the “freest” press in Asia and being the first country ever to 
topple a dictatorship by “people power”. both india and the Philip-
pines have pursued national economic development within the frame-
work of their respective constitutions and have chosen a democratic 
path to development. in previous decades however, both countries 
were better known for their high rates of poverty and glaring social 
and economic inequalities that for their economic performance. but 
recent developments show that india and the Philippines are now 
benefiting economically from globalization. india in particular is be-
ing hailed (together with China) as the world’s next economic giant, 
while the Philippine economy appears to be picking up, growing at 
higher rates than previously.
Another pattern emerges from the experience of singapore, Malay-
sia, south korea and Taiwan (and to some extent also Thailand). These 
countries of the region hold the distinction of having rapidly modern-
ized their economies over the last 35 to 40 years and liberated vast num-
bers of their populations from poverty, under one-party or military gov-
ernment or political system that were less than democratic. some have 
pointed to the economic miracle of these countries as countering the 
liberal notion that rapid economic growth is possible only in a liberal 
democratic environment, with others in fact arguing that the limita-
tions imposed on individual freedoms and civil rights by authoritarian 
regimes greatly aided the economic transformation of these countries.
still another pattern is shown by China and Vietnam, two of the 
three countries in the region (the third being india) which are mak-
ing dramatic entries and advances into the global economy or the 
world market. both China and Vietnam remain politically communist 
and continue to curtail individual freedoms but have liberalized and 
opened up their economies to market forces. both countries currently 
exhibit the highest annual GDP growth rates in the region (around 
10% for China and 8% for Vietnam in 2005).
in general, country experiences in the region lend support to the 
proposition that the opening up of national economies to global market 
forces (through trade liberalization, privatization, opening up of capital 
accounts, etc.) puts pressure on societies to also liberalize their politi-
cal systems. Democracy movements pressing for greater freedoms and 
various human rights therefore, have sprung up in an increasing number 
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of Asian countries. in recent years, democracy movements have openly 
erupted into street protests and demonstrations even in Communist Chi-
na and in other places as south korea, Taiwan, Thailand and indonesia.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the Association of southeast 
Asian Nations (AsEAN) as a regional body composed of 10 countries 
in the region has been exerting pressure on its members to democ-
ratize and pursue free market policies and reforms. Even as AsEAN 
upholds the principle of non-interference with regard its members’ 
own internal affairs, the alliance is in the process of including in its 
charter the establishment of a human rights commission for its mem-
bers. AsEAN, of course, has been more aggressive in pursuing its eco-
nomic goal of regional integration -and forming itself into a single 
market and investment and production base- to then negotiate better 
as a block vis-à-vis China, india, Japan, and other trading partners. 
For the most part, AsEAN members have moved in concert along eco-
nomic and political liberalization lines but to date, the alliance has 
not been as successful in enjoining fellow-members, like Myanmar, to 
democratize and allow its citizens greater political freedoms.
Globalization and Philippine Democracy
and Development
Against the foregoing regional background, i thought of examining 
more closely the impact of globalization on the Philippines’ attain-
ment of its avowed democratic and development goals and ideals, spe-
cifically by looking into how ongoing globalization forces are imping-
ing on the country’s employment structure and on the educational 
profiles of Filipinos.
it should be mentioned that since the mid-1990s, under its last 
three Presidents, the Philippines has been trying to open up its econo-
my and pursue various “free market” reforms as well as sociopolitical 
ones, to make the country so-called “globally competitive” (as a place 
of investments, a trading partner, a supplier of quality goods and serv-
ices, a tourist destination etc.). it has not been very successful how-
ever, in attaining rapid economic growth, and although some observers 
now think that the Philippines is poised for an economic take-off (and 
many hope, also for sustainable growth), it continues to grapple with 
significant problems of poverty and social inequalities. These problems, 
which have historically beset the Philippines, are also at the root of the 
country’s two major insurgency movements (the communist insurgency 
led by the New People’s Army and the Moro National Liberation Front 
in Muslim Mindanao) and which are the longest running insurgencies 
in Asia. issues arising from the economic divide between the rich and 
the poor and between the country’s major cities and its regions likewise 
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continue to be used or exploited by military adventurists, politicians, 
and other groups opposed to government to topple it.
but because Philippine democracy –considered to be among the 
region’s freest– has had a long history of allowing and upholding hu-
man freedoms and civil liberties, it has not been easy for the country’s 
national leadership to resort to autocratic rule in order to quash in-
surgencies, and more single mindedly pursue national development 
goals. Consequently, the Philippine government, then as now, has had 
to deal with threats to itself and to national political stability. in turn, 
this lack of political stability is known to have stymied national efforts 
at economic development and related measures for addressing the 
country’s poverty and inequality problems. seen this way, the Philip-
pines desire to consolidate its democratic elements and strengthen its 
democratic tradition and to develop economically and equitably, have 
remained rather elusive goals.
An examination therefore of some of the employment and educa-
tion-related data from recent rounds of the country’s Labor Force sur-
veys (LFs) and Family income and Expenditure surveys (FiEs) may 
help us gauge how the Philippines is progressing towards becoming 
more economically vibrant and egalitarian and more politically stable 
and democratic.
The employment data in Table 1 are taken from the January 2001 
Labour Force survey (LFs) and are presented by sector or type of 
industry (e.g. agriculture, fishing and forestry; industry; and services) 
and by cohort or the decade when members of the labor force were 
born. one can look at the members of each cohort (e.g., those born in 
the 1930s vs. those born in the 1960s) as mirroring their time and thus 
embodying unique histories and biographies. Comparing the employ-
ment profiles of older cohorts with those of younger ones should pro-
vide us a sense of how the Philippine economy has shifted over time, 
from being more agrarian and rural-based to being more industrial 
and modern. Moreover, data on the employment profile of the young-
est cohort –those born in the 1970s and aged 22 to 31 years at the time 
of the survey in January 2001– may be taken to reflect in part current-
day globalization influences on employment and the economy.
As expected, we note from Table 1 a significant drop in the propor-
tion of the labor force engaged in agriculture and a shift of the coun-
try’s employment structure to the industry and services sectors over 
time. While the majority (53%) of older workers (or those born in the 
1930s) were engaged in agriculture, fishing and forestry work in 2001, 
only around a fourth (21.8%) of their youngest counterparts (those 
born in the 1970s) were in similar work. Most of this latter group 
(56.4% of them) had found employment in industry or services.
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That the modernization of the Philippine economy favored more the 
non-poor than the poor is also readily supported by the data in Ta-
bles 2 and 3. Among the non-poor (defined as those belonging to 
families in the top seven income deciles), the shift in the labor force 
from agrarian to modern occurred more rapidly than in the general 
population. by 2001, only some 12.3 percent of the youngest cohort 
of the non-poor (aged 22 to 31 years) remained in agriculture, with 
over two-thirds (or 68.7%) of them having found jobs in industry 
or the services sector. in contrast, among the non-poor (defined as 
belonging to the lowest 30 income percentiles), the majority of the 
youngest cohort (53.8%) continued to be found in agriculture, fish-
ing and forestry, with only about a third (33.7%) finding jobs in the 
modern sector. Further comparing the non-poor and the poor, we 
Table 1
Philippines: Employed by Decade Born Industry*
Source: Labor force Survey January 2001
*Includes those born before 1980 only. 
INDUSTRY 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s NUMBER
Unemployed
Not Elsewhere Classified
Agriculture, Fishery and 
Forestry
Mining and Quarrying
Manufacturing
Utilities
Construction
Industry
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade
Transportation, Storage, 
and Communications
Finance, Real Estate, and 
Business Services
Community, Social, and 
Personal Services
Services
6.1
1.6
53.2
0.2
5.7
0.1
2.1
8.1
17.6
2.2
1.7
9.4
30.9
8.2
2.4
37.7
0.4
7.0
0.4
3.9
11.6
17.2
5.4
1.5
15.9
40.1
5.7
3.0
32.6
0.5
8.6
0.5
5.7
15.3
17.1
7.5
2.5
16.2
43.4
7.6
3.2
29.0
0.4
9.9
0.5
6.4
17.2
16.7
8.5
2.9
14.9
43.0
17.7
4.0
21.8
0.3
11.8
0.3
5.4
17.9
14.6
7.5
3.8
12.6
38.5
2,874,737
8,050
9,015,838
113,445
2,704,601
112,652
1,509,187
4,439,885
4,728,589
2,028,137
800,586
5,007.579
12,564,891
Absolute Number 2,547,362 4,103,082 6,630,643 7,585,226 8,037,086 28,903,401
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note that the latter consistently exhibits lower unemployment rates 
across cohorts, testifying to the poor classes’ greater need for income 
and for work.
The transformation of the employment structure expectedly came with 
related improvements in the educational attainment of Philipinos, gener-
ally demonstrating the relationship between higher levels of skills, knowl-
edge and education with modern- sector jobs. Mirroring the changes in 
the country’s employment structure, Tables 3, 4 and 5 reveal substantial 
improvements in educational profiles between the older cohort of work-
ers and their younger counterparts. of those in the labor force, fewer 
than 10% of the generation of the 1930s had attained some or completed 
a college education. Among the youngest 1970s generation on the other 
hand, the proportion reaching college had quadrupled to 38.4%. 
INDUSTRY 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s NUMBER
Unemployed
Not Elsewhere Classified
Agriculture, Fishery and 
Forestry
Mining and Quarrying
Manufacturing
Utilities
Construction
Industry
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Transportation, Storage, 
and Communications
Finance, Real Estate, and 
Business Services
Community, Social, and 
Personal Services
Services
6.2
0.1
45.3
0.2
5.7
0.1
2.3
8.4
21.7
2.7
2.3
13.4
40.1
8.9
0.0
26.7
0.4
7.7
0.5
4.2
12.8
20.3
6.6
1.9
22.7
51.6
6.3
0.1
19.6
0.6
9.7
0.7
6.1
17.0
20.6
9.1
3.3
24.0
57.0
8.6
0.0
16.0
0.5
11.9
0.7
6.4
19.6
19.4
10.1
3.9
22.4
55.8
19.0
0.0
12.3
0.3
13.7
0.4
5.8
20.2
16.2
8.1
4.8
19.4
48.5
2,296,733
7,539
4,128,943
83,021
2,254,893
106,166
1,147,482
3,591,561
3,973,263
1,699,530
754,860
4,407,352
10,835,005
Absolute Number 1,797,199 3,038,789 4,633,464 5,201,428 6,188,899 20,859,780
Table 2
Philippines Non-Poor: Employed by Decade Born Industry*’**
Source: Labor force Survey January 2001 and FIES 2000
*Includes those born before 1980 only
**Poor is defined as belonging to the bottom 30 percent of the families in terms of per capita income. 
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Again, the improvements in educational levels are most marked among 
the non-poor. by January 2001, closer to half (46.3%) of the youngest 
cohort of workers had gone to college as against a much lower 11.6 per-
cent of their poor counterparts. hence, owing to their much improved 
educational backgrounds, younger people from the non-poor classes 
are obviously in a much better position to seize the job opportunities 
brought about by modernization and further opened up by globaliza-
tion. in contrast, with only 0.9 percent to 11.6 percent of poor workers 
of all ages attaining some college education, the poor cannot benefit 
equally since their lack of skills and education prevents them from com-
peting for the better-paying occupations in the job market.
Table 3
Philippines Poor: Employed by Decade Born Industry*’**
Source: Labor force Survey January 2001 and FIES 2000
*Includes those born before 1980 only
**Poor is defined as belonging to the bottom 30 percent of the families in terms of per capita income
INDUSTRY 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s NUMBER
Unemployed
Not Elsewhere 
Classified
Agriculture, Fishery 
and Forestry
Mining and Quarrying
Manufacturing
Utilities
Construction
Industry
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade
Transportation, 
Storage, and 
Communications
Finance, Real Estate, 
and Business 
Services
Community, Social, 
and Personal Services
Services
6.0
0.0
72.3
0.2
5.7
0.0
1.6
7.5
7.9
0.8
0.4
5.1
14.1
6.0
0.0
69.0
0.3
5.0
0.1
2.9
8.3
8.4
2.0
0.3
5.9
16.6
4.4
0.0
62.7
0.4
6.2
0.0
4.7
11.3
9.0
3.9
0.6
8.0
21.6
5.5
0.0
57.2
0.4
5.3
0.1
6.2
12.0
10.7
5.1
0.6
8.8
25.3
13.4
0.0
53.8
0.5
5.6
0.1
4.1
10.3
9.2
5.5
0.7
7.0
22.4
578,004
511
4,886,895
30,424
449,708
6,487
361,705
848,324
755,326
328,607
45,726
600,227
1,729,886
Absolute Number 750,163 1,064,293 1,997,179 2,383,798 1,848,187 8,043,365
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Given the foregoing trends in 2001, there are reasons to expect that 
ongoing globalization influences on employment and education may 
Highest Grade 
Completed
30s 40s 50s 60s 70s Number
No Schooling
Elementary 
Undergraduate
Elementary Graduate
High School 
Undergraduate
High School Graduate
College Undergraduate
College Graduate
(not classified)
10.0
39.2
23.5
8.4
9.2
3.7
5.9
0.0
4.3
25.9
26.2
9.1
14.3
7.8
12.3
0.0
2.2
17.6
22.6
11.9
21.2
11.3
13.2
0.0
1.6
12.3
17.0
13.0
26.1
14.6
15.4
0.0
1.3
8.9
11.7
12.5
27.2
17.5
20.9
0.0
802,625
4,877,362
5,400,874
3,374,276
6,394,470
3,676,261
4,373,963
3,570
Total 2,547,362 4,103,082 6,630,643 7,585,226 8,037,086 28,903,401
Table 4
Philippines: Labor Force by Decade Born by Highest Educational Attainment*
Source: Labor force Survey January 2001
*Includes those born before 1980 only
Highest Grade 
Completed
30s 40s 50s 60s 70s Number
No Schooling
Elementary 
Undergraduate
Elementary Graduate
High School 
Undergraduate
High School Graduate
College Undergraduate
College Graduate
(not classified)
6.8
34.3
25.0
9.4
11.3
5.0
8.2
0.0
2.1
19.6
25.5
9.3
17.0
9.9
16.5
0.0
1.0
9.9
19.1
11.7
25.0
14.8
18.5
0.0
0.7
6.1
12.6
10.9
29.2
18.7
21.7
0.0
0.7
4.5
8.6
10.9
28.9
20.3
26.0
0.0
309,731
2,269,281
3,298,272
2,236,892
5,187,777
3,306,647
4,247,610
3,570
1,797,199 3,038,789 4,633,464 5,201,428 6,188,899 20,859,780
Table 5
Philippines: Philippines Non-Poor: Labor Force by Decade Born by Highest Educational Attainment*
Source: Labor force Survey January 2001 and FIES 2000
*Includes those born before 1980 only.
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be further worsening the state of the Philippine socioeconomic in-
equalities in the post 2001 period. This is so because at present, the 
occupational category that is registering dramatic increases in em-
ployment is that of “financial, real estate and business services” as a 
result of the great demand for call center services and employees in 
the Philippines. While there were only four call centers operating in 
the country in 2003 and employing some 2,000 workers, the industry 
has since grown phenomenally to more than 100 call centers in 2006 
employing 200,000 personnel.
seeing the potential of this “sunrise industry”, the private sector 
and the government are now devising and fast-tracking programs to 
increase the Philippines’ competitiveness in call center and business 
process outsourcing (bPo) operations. To push the industry forward, 
local and foreign businesses and investors and government are moving 
to expand iT outsourcing jobs to beyond the usual customer care and 
medical transcription services being done in the country at present, to 
include other iT work in administration, accounting and finance, and 
human resources and consulting work for various commercial firms 
and government clients. The next few years therefore will likely wit-
ness a surge in employment opportunities for Filipinos in iT-enabled 
services which in turn are known to require not only a college degree 
but high levels of proficiency in English (and other foreign languages) 
and computer operations.
The bright job prospects in iT work then, will once more favor 
(younger) Filipinos from richer or non-poor households who are able 
to obtain college degrees and train in the skills required by call centers 
and bPos. With less than a college education, most of the poor will not 
be able to penetrate this sector and benefit from global iT outsourcing 
businesses. Already, in 2001, a full 50 percent of employees in the “fi-
nance, real estate and business services” category to which call centers 
and bPos belong, were college graduates - making this employment cat-
egory the most demanding of education and skills preparation.
The other employment area in the Philippines that has been affect-
ed most by globalization developments is overseas work/employment, 
statistics of which are maintained separately from those of the national/
domestic labor force. As is widely known, the Philippines is one of the 
world’s largest exporter of labor and in 2005, close to 8 million Filipi-
nos were estimated to be working/living overseas. The predilection of 
Filipinos to work abroad has its roots in the country’s migration history 
which began 100 years ago and which peaked in the 1960s as a result of 
the liberalization of Us immigration laws, and then again in the 1980s, 
following the construction and development boom in the Middle East. 
since then, there has been no let up in the numbers of Filipinos leaving 
the country for temporary or permanent work abroad.
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The continuing demand for foreign workers in the world (par-
ticularly among developed countries, the Middle East and rapidly in-
dustrializing China) has also diversified Filipino overseas labor migra-
tion, so that today, Filipino workers and immigrants are found in all 
world regions (from Africa to oceania) and in almost all countries. 
in terms of occupations too, while waves of Filipino worker migra-
tion earlier consisted of agricultural and plantation workers to hawaii 
and the Us West Coast, nurses and doctors to the Us, maids and en-
tertainment workers to hong kong and Japan, and construction and 
domestic workers to the Middle East, recent waves include not only 
all these, but increasingly also computer programmers, pilots, sales 
and marketing people, managers, teachers, accountants and other 
professionals. one notes that this diversification trend also suggests 
that overseas employment, very much like employment in call centers 
and bPos in the country is becoming more selective of Filipinos with 
high educational attainment.
That such is the case can be seen from the data in Tables 6 and 
7 which show that the job requirements for overseas employment 
favor the younger cohorts (i.e., those born in the 1960s and 1970s) 
and those with higher educational attainments (at least a high school 
graduate but more often, a college graduate). it is of course the young-
er cohorts who also exhibit the highest educational attainments and 
so they are the most ready and able to migrate. More than two-thirds 
of the youngest (1970s) generation of Filipino overseas workers have 
attained some college education or graduated from college.
Table 8
Overseas Contract Workers by Decade Born*
Source: Labor Force Survey January 2001
*Includes those born before 1980 only
**The figures do not include permanent emigrants,
***Tan (2006) puts the figures of temporary overseas workers at 
4.5 M which is a way above the figure here from the LFS.
Decade born No. % share
30s
40s
50s
60s
70s
15,219
71,300
255,694
375,145
363,678
1.4
6.6
23.7
34.7
33.6
Total 1,081,036 100.0
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since overseas work is selective of those with much education and 
skills, it is also not surprising that the country’s overseas contract 
workers disproportionately come from families that are not poor. Ta-
ble 7 shows the educational profile of Filipino overseas workers to be 
Table 9
Overseas Contract Worker by Decade Born by Highest Educational Attainment
Source: Labor force Survey January 2001 
*Includes those born before 1980 only
Highest Grade Completed 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s Total
No Schooling
Elementary Undergraduate
Elementary Graduate
High School Undergraduate
High School Graduate
College Undergraduate
College Graduate
(not classified)
1.5
0.8
28.2
0.0
41.3
4.7
23.5
0.0
0.0
1.5
8.9
5.3
29.9
20.4
34.1
0.0
0.1
1.6
4.9
5.2
30.6
27.1
30.5
0.0
0.2
1.0
3.1
6.3
27.2
28.4
33.7
0.1
0.1
0.3
2.3
4.5
24.5
30.4
38.0
0.0
0.1
0.9
4.0
5.3
27.5
27.9
34.3
0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Highest Grade 
Completed
Poor % share Non-poor %share No. % share
No Schooling
Elementary Undergraduate
Elementary Graduate
High School Undergraduate
High School Graduate
College Undergraduate
College Graduate
(not classified)
1,002
3,768
3,589
5,500
11,303
9,506
4,030
0
2.6
9.7
9.3
14.2
29.2
24.6
10.4
0.0
1,036
9,077
39,829
56,941
283,246
291,704
360,181
323
0.1
0.9
3.8
5.5
27.2
28.0
34.6
0.0
2,038
12,845
43,418
62,441
294,549
301,210
364,212
323
0.2
1.2
4.0
5.8
27.2
27.9
33.7
0.0
Total
% share in total
migrant workers
38,698
3.6
100.0 1,042,338
96.4
100.0 1,081,036
100.0
100.0
Table 10
Overseas Contract Workers by Poverty Status by Highest Educational Attainment
Source: Labor force Survey January 2001 
*Includes those born before 1980 only
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much better than the national education profile of Filipino in-country 
workers cohort by cohort; and Table 8 shows that only a minimal 3.6 
percent of overseas contract workers come from poor families (or the 
bottom 30% income-wise) while the overwhelming 96.4 percent ma-
jority are from non-poor families.
income from overseas worker remittances has been increasing 
(amounting to some $10.7 billion or the equivalent of half the national 
budget in 2005) but they evidently go to non-poor families. Remit-
tances from overseas employment therefore cannot be expected to al-
leviate the poverty conditions in the country, and this in fact, may be 
exacerbating existing socioeconomic inequalities.
in summary, this brief look into the impact of globalization on 
Philippine development and democracy reveals emerging trends 
that seem to be uplifting the national economy, although not al-
ways in ways that also adequately address issues on poverty and 
inequalities. As mentioned earlier, these issues along with bureau-
cratic ineptitude, poor governance, and graft and corruption, have 
historically threatened democratic practices and institutions in the 
Philippines.
Nonetheless, after years of economic stagnation and uncertainty 
since the Martial Law years in the 1980s, the Philippines’ currently im-
proving prospects for economic recovery and sustained growth may 
yet help the country solve its age-old economic and political problems. 
At this point, the national effort should perhaps focus on: 
raising further the economic growth rate beyond the 4% to 
5% per annum mark and sustaining higher rates of growth in 
coming years. For economic growth to contribute to poverty 
reduction, the experience in other Asian countries indicates 
that annual growth rates in GNP should be in the order of 8 or 
more percent;
mobilizing the new income or wealth that is created (e.g. as 
improving worker income and remittances from among the 
non-poor classes of Philippine society) for raising savings and 
investments rates and supporting businesses and enterprises 
that can generate new and additional jobs for those at the bot-
tom of the social hierarchy;
and aggressively pursuing social and economic programs and 
affirmative actions in favor of the poor, as among others, and 
investing more in agricultural-rural infrastructure and devel-
opment will generate more jobs and livelihood opportunities in 
agriculture and the countryside where the poor are found. in-
-
-
-
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vesting more in programs and/or areas to improve the access of 
children and the youth from poorer families to basic education 
and to other forms of training will also improve their ability to 
land jobs and compete in the labor market.
Utsa Patnaik*
Theorizing Poverty and
Food Security in the
Era of Economic Reforms
Introduction
The correct theorizing of the questions of food security and poverty 
has become particularly important at the present time, which is one 
of rapid changes in the economic environment in which small produc-
ers including farmers and workers are living. in a poor developing 
country, the incidence of poverty is very closely linked to the availabil-
ity of food, in which the staple food grains still remain predominant, 
accounting for three-fifths of the daily energy intake of the popula-
tion. The measurement of poverty in india has traditionally adopted a 
nutritional norm specified in terms of an average daily energy intake 
measured in calories. The National Nutrition Monitoring bureau has 
informed us that 
the NNMb has consistently confirmed in successive surveys that the 
main bottleneck in the dietaries of even the poorest indians is energy 
and not protein as was hitherto believed… the data also indicates that 
the measurement of consumption of cereals can be used as a proxy 
for total energy intake. This observation is of considerable signifi-
* Professor of Economics at the Centre for Economic studies and Planning, Jawaha-
rlal Nehru University New Delhi. she is on the Editorial Advisory board of Social 
Scientist (Delhi) and Journal of Agrarian Change (London). 
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cance as it helps to determine rapid, though approximate, estimates 
of energy intake at the household level (National Nutrition Monitor-
ing bureau, 1997). 
it is this strong link between the staple food grains intake and poverty 
based on a nutritional norm, which enables us to put forward an analy-
sis of the recent trends in food security and in poverty, in the light of 
the impact of changing economic policies during the last fifteen years.
The majority of academics and the Government of india today 
make two claims which i believe to be factually incorrect, claims 
which are underpinned by a wholly fallacious theoretical understand-
ing of the current situation. They claim first, that there is ‘over supply’ 
of food grains relative to demand, (which they assume to be growing 
normally) and so infer that food grains production should be cut back 
in favour of ‘diversification’; second, that poverty has been declining 
in india in the era of reforms, specifically in the1990s. My contention 
as regards both propositions is that they are incorrect, and that the 
correct position on theoretical and factual grounds is precisely the 
opposite. First, there is not over supply of food grains, but a decline 
in food grain supply and an even more drastic decline of effective de-
mand for food grains especially in rural india owing to an abnormally 
fast loss of purchasing power during the last six years: so, far from 
cutting back food grain output, the correct policy is to raise purchas-
ing power and restore effective demand as well as restore access to 
affordable food grains through a combination of a universal, and non 
targeted, employment guarantee scheme and through reverting to a 
universal, non targeted public distribution system.
second, far from the percentage of population in poverty declin-
ing as claimed, the factually correct position on the basis of current 
data is that poverty is very high, affecting at least three-quarters of 
rural and over two-fifths of the urban population. Moreover the data 
shows that the depth of poverty has increased considerably during the 
fifteen years of reforms, with more people being pushed down into a 
poorer nutritional status than before in most of the indian states and 
at the All-india level. The reason that many academics and the Plan-
ning Commission reach the conclusion that poverty is declining, is 
that they use an estimation procedure which has no basis on logic and 
is indefensible on academic grounds. What that estimation procedure 
is and how it differs from the correct procedure is one of the main 
questions i would try to explain, for i believe that it is part of the ‘right 
to information’ that the intelligent citizen should be able to independ-
ently reach a judgement about the validity of the official procedure 
and not simply take the truth of certain statements for granted. Thus 
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i will focus on the correct theorizing of these two main questions –of 
declining effective demand for food grains, and of the extent of pover-
ty. This has become extremely important because the widely prevalent 
incorrect theorizing in academic and government circles is leading 
to policy formulations and measures which will only serve to worsen 
mass welfare and plunge even larger sections of the rural population 
in particular into higher unemployment and food deprivation.
The first and second sections will briefly discuss the deflation-
ary macroeconomic policies combined with exposure to global price 
declines, which has led to massive loss of purchasing power in rural 
india in the last six years and is reflected in falling food grains absorp-
tion and falling energy intake. The third section discusses the inter-
pretation of the decline in food grain absorption while the fourth and 
last section takes up the question of poverty estimation and how of-
ficial and most academic estimates use a particular indirect method of 
estimation, which completely de-links poverty from nutrition norms 
by ignoring current data which show the reality of rising nutritional 
deprivation and increasing depth of poverty.
What Deflationary policies and Trade Liberalization
have meant for the Rural Economy in India 
Deflationary macroeconomic policies are strongly favoured by interna-
tional and domestic financial interest groups who are quite obsessive 
about controlling inflation and would prefer to see even an economy 
with a high rate of unemployment, growing slowly and raising unem-
ployment further, rather than risk any possibility of prices rising owing 
to expansionary policies reducing unemployment. international credi-
tors wish to maintain high real values of their financial assets and high 
real interest rates (inflation would erode both) - and are happy with 
bouts of asset deflation in developing countries so that these assets can 
be snapped up at low prices by their corporations. Their insensate and 
obsessive fear of inflation can be seen in the policies advised uniformly 
by the international Monetary Fund to 78 developing countries in the 
1980s and summarized in Table 1 from an iMF study. The first three 
policies –restraint on central government expenditure, limits on credit 
expansion, and reduction of budget deficit to GDP ratio, add up to a 
strongly deflationary package and all three were actually implemented 
at the same time by four-fifths of the countries concerned, while two-
thirds capped wages and over half devalued their currency. 
The results of deflationary policies of the decade up to the mid-
1980s have been documented as sharp decline in rates of investment 
in both capital formation and in the social sectors, leading to reduced 
or negative GDP growth and negative impact on the human develop-
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ment indicators (see in particular Cornia, Jolly and stewart, 1987). 
A number of studies since then have confirmed the adverse impact 
and have argued for expansionary policies (baker, Epstein and Pollin, 
1998; halevy and Fontaine, 1998; Patnaik, 2000).
india has been following exactly the same deflationary package of 
policies since 1991, whose impact has been especially severe in in-
dia’s agricultural sector which saw sharp reduction in planned pub-
lic development expenditures in rural areas, which has traditionally 
included agriculture, rural development, irrigation and flood control 
–all vital for maintaining output– to which we add also the outlays 
on special area programmes, and village and small scale industry to 
define overall ‘Rural Development Expenditures’ or RDE. The employ-
ment- generating programmes had assumed a special importance 
from the drought year 1987 onwards. 
Percentage of Total Number of Countries 
Implementing Policy
Restraint on Central Government Expenditure
Limits on Credit Expansion
Reduction in Ratio of Budget Deficit to GDP
Wage Restraint
Exchange Rate Policy
91
99
83
65
54
Table 1
Policies Followed by 78 countries under Fund-guided Economic Reforms
Source: IMF study quoted in Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (eds) Adjustment with a Human Face 1987, Vol..1, p.11.
1985-90 1993-4 1995-6 1997-8 2000-1
1.Rural 
Development 
Expenditures as 
Percent of NNP
3.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 1.9
2.Above plus 
Infrastructure
11.1 8.4 6.9 6.4 5.8
Table 2
Reduction in Rural Development Expenditures under Economic Reforms, Selected Years 1985–90 to 2000–01
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, annual Economic Survey, for years 2001–02 to 2003–04, Appendix Table S-44. 
‘Rural development expenditures’ here are the plan outlays of Centre and states under the five heads of agriculture, rural development, 
irrigation and flood control, special areas programmes, and village and small scale industry. Infrastructure includes all energy and 
transport including urban. Calculated from current values of expenditure and NNP at factor cost.
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over the 7th Plan period marking the pre-reforms phase, from 1985 to 
1990, Rs.51,000 crores was spent on rural development, amounting 
to almost 4 percent of Net National Product, and Rs. 91,000 crores 
or over 7 percent of NNP was spent on infrastructure1. by the mid- 
1990s, annual spending on rural development was down to 2.6 percent 
of NNP, and after including infrastructure, less than 7 percent was be-
ing spent compared to 11 percent during the 7th Plan. Further declines 
took place so that by 2000-01 the share of spending under these heads 
was down to 5.8 percent of NNP, the rural development part halving 
to only 1.9 percent (see Table 2). The per capita expenditures obvi-
ously declined even more sharply. i estimate that in constant 1993-4 
prices about Rs.30,000 crores less was being spent by the end-decade 
year 1999-2000, compared to the beginning, 1990-91. A crude point-
1 in infrastructure we are including the expenditures on Energy and Transport.
Period Foodgrains Non-Foodgrains AllCrops Population
1980-81
to
1989-90
2.85 3.77 3.19 2.1
1980-81
to
1989-90
1.66 1.86 1.73 1.9
Table 3
Decelerating Growth rates of Agricultural Output
Source: Govt of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2001-02, p.189. Note that slowing down of output growth is much steeper 
than slowing down of population growth implying falling per head output.
Year
1983
Year
1993-1994
Year
1999-2000
Growth per Annum
1983 to            1993-4 to
1993-4             1999-00
1.Population, mn. 546.6 658.8 727.5 1.79                 1.67
2. Labour force, mn. 204.2 255.4 270.4 2.15                 0.96
3. Work force mn. 187.9 241.0 250.9 2.40                 0.67
4. Unemployed mn. 
(2-3)
16.3 14.4 19.5 -1.19               5.26
Table 4
Employment Decline in Rural India
Source: Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2002-03, p.218.
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to-point comparison would suggest an annual income loss of between 
120,000 to 150,000 crores of rupees assuming a multiplier value be-
tween 4 and 5. Actual income loss would have been greater taking 
the cumulative losses over successive years. This harsh contractionary 
policy had nothing to do with any objective resource constraint but 
simply reflected the deflationary policies of the bWi which were inter-
nalized and sought to be justified by the indian government.
 There is no economic rationale for believing that “public invest-
ment crowds out private investment” which is the common argu-
ment put forward for reducing the state’s role in rural development. 
Precisely the contrary has been shown to hold for certain types of 
investment essential for an irrigation-dependent agriculture like in-
dia’s such as irrigation projects of all types. Private tube-well invest-
ment is profitable only where the water table remains high owing to 
seepage from state-built canal irrigation systems, and where com-
munity integrated watershed management (planting trees and using 
check-dams) is encouraged with state help. Private over-exploitation 
of ground water has now reached a crisis point in many states in 
india, with the water table falling rapidly and with even the richest 
farmers unable to reach water after investing heavily in deep bore-
wells and submersible pumps. other infrastructure investment such 
as rural power projects, roads, bridges, school buildings, clinics and 
so on, are never undertaken by private investors but are vital for 
stimulating development and providing livelihoods both directly to 
those employed in building them and through the important mul-
tiplier effects on employment and incomes, of the increased wage 
incomes being spent on simple consumer goods and services within 
the villages. The market for machine made textiles and other goods 
also thereby expands.
The net result of the unwise cut-back of public investment and in 
RDE has been a slowing of the rate of output growth –both food grain 
and non-food grain growth rates almost halved in the nineties com-
pared to the pre-reform eighties, and both have fallen below the popu-
lation growth rate even though this too is slowing down (Table 3). This 
has led to declining per capita output during the nineties, for the first 
time since the mid-sixties agricultural crisis, which however had been 
short- lived, whereas per head agricultural output continues to fall to-
day even after a decade: The Agricultural Universities had earlier played 
a major role in developing and helping to disseminate new crop varie-
ties, and the cut in funding for research in these Universities by affect-
ing the search for better rain-fed crop varieties, has also contributed to 
the deceleration in the growth of yields. With increasing use of land for 
commercial and residential purposes, the gross sown area in india has 
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remained static since 1991, so it is only through yield rise that output 
growth can be maintained and it is here that the failure is evident.
The combination of decline in state RDE and the near-halving of 
agricultural growth has produced a major crisis of rising unemploy-
ment. There is both fast growing open unemployment and a fall in 
number of days employed of the work force during the economic re-
form period. Even with constant labour coefficients (labour days used 
per unit of crop output) a near halving of employment growth was to 
be expected given the decline in crop output growth, but the decline 
in jobs has been even more as mechanization especially of harvesting 
and use of herbicides has led to falling labour coefficients. Further-
more the rural non-farm employment growth, which was robust in 
the 1980s owing to reasonably high state RDE, had declined in the 
nineties. The ratio of labour force to population, or the participation 
rate, has declined (lower participation rate reflects difficulty of finding 
work), the ratio of work force to labour force has declined because 
open unemployment has been growing at over 5% annually (Table 4). 
The elasticity of employment with respect to output was 0.7 during 
1983 to 1993-4 but has declined to 0.01 or virtually zero, taking the 
reforms period 1993-4 to 1999-00. 
No-one should imagine that unemployed rural workers are mi-
grating and finding employment in industry: there have also been 
massive job losses in manufacturing during the reform period and the 
share of the secondary sector in GDP has fallen from 29 to around 22 
percent during the nineties, in short india has seen de-industrializa-
tion. The agricultural depression has reduced the share of agriculture 
in GDP from about a third at the beginning of the nineties to just over 
a fifth a decade later, but the labour force and population dependent 
on agriculture has hardly fallen reflecting decline in per head incomes. 
Thus both the material productive sectors have declined and the only 
sector which has ballooned in an abnormal manner2 is the tertiary or 
services sector which now accounts for over half of GDP.
only a small proportion of the services sector comprises iT-ena-
bled high income services, business process outsourcing, domestic 
tourism services and the like. The major part in employment terms, 
is still low-productivity activities in which the rural displaced workers 
stagnate at low income levels, servicing the requirements of the up-
2 A rising contribution of services to GDP from an initial situation of a high share 
of industry to GDP has been typical for advanced economies. india however is seeing 
a fast shift to services from a relatively low initial share of manufacturing and min-
ing output, less than 30% of GDP, which is now down to about one-fifth. This shift to 
services reflects de-industrialization and worsening income distribution. 
Globalization and the Washington Consensus
168
per income elites who have been improving their real income position 
fast. Disposable incomes have risen even faster for this segment since 
a part of the neo-liberal reforms include reduction in direct tax rates. 
Advanced countries usually have this upper-income 10 to 15 percent 
minority of indians in mind when they demand market access for 
their manufactures and agricultural products, and no doubt 100 to 
150 million people is a large potential market. but the situation of the 
vast majority of the mainly rural population who do not merely stag-
nate at low income levels but whose position is considerably worse 
today than a decade earlier, cannot be ignored: a potentially highly 
destabilising situation is in the making. 
While income and employment reduction through deflationary 
policies is the first main reason for loss of purchasing power in rural 
india, the second main reason is the unwise opening to global markets 
through full trade liberalization at a time from the mid-1990s, when 
global markets went into recession and primary product prices started 
falling –a fall which continues to this day. 
More Trade leads to more Hunger
in Developing countries under Global
and local Deflationary Conditions
The land resources of india, more so than in most developing countries, 
have the potential for producing a highly diversified range of products 
–not only the crops and fruits grown in the summer season in temper-
ate lands but also the typically tropical crops, which cannot be grown at 
all in advanced countries located in temperate regions. The crops of our 
lands have been demanded abroad in advanced countries for over three 
centuries for meeting their direct consumption and raw material needs. 
but, historically the growth of exports from tropical agriculture under 
free trade regimes, has always led to a fall in domestic food grains out-
put and availability, plunging the mass of the population into deepening 
under-nutrition and in extreme cases into famine. in the half-century 
before indian independence, per capita food grain output fell by nearly 
30 percent while export crops grew ten times faster than food grains. i 
have earlier discussed some historical and current cases in developing 
countries, of the inverse relation between primary sector exports and 
domestic foodgrains absorption (Patnaik 1996, 2003a).
This is bound to happen since land is not a reproducible resource, 
and heavy external demand made on our more botanically diverse 
lands by advanced countries to meet their ever-rising and diversifying 
needs, leads to diversion of our land and resources away from locally 
consumed food staples to meet export demands. The position is wors-
ened by exports out of more slowly growing food output itself. The 
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Ricardian theory of comparative advantage which says there is neces-
sarily mutual gain from specialization and trade, contains a material 
and logical fallacy since the conclusion is based crucially on assuming 
that ‘both countries produce both goods’ which is factually untrue for 
agriculture. The advanced countries mainly located in cold temperate 
regions cannot produce tropical crops at all, so the cost of production 
of say coffee or rubber cannot even be defined in these countries, let 
alone relative cost and transformation frontiers3 (Patnaik, 2005). 
in theory, more primary exports from developing countries can 
accompany more food production for domestic needs, but this can 
only happen when there is substantial rise in investment to raise pro-
ductivity, for land is a non-producible resource whose ‘supply’ can 
only increase via investment permitting one hectare to produce what 
two hectares did earlier. it also requires that mass domestic demand 
grows, and is not held in check by income-deflating policies or exces-
sive taxation as was the case under colonial systems. 
The deeply disturbing feature of the current thrust for liberalizing 
trade is that it has been taking place within an investment-reducing, 
deflationary regime. i predicted in 1992 that given the deflationary 
climate, food security would be undermined with trade liberalization 
in india and that is precisely what has happened. As soon as trade 
was liberalized from 1991, within a few years, 8 million hectares of 
food-growing land were converted to exportable crops leading to a fall 
in per head food grain output, but farmers did not benefit since their 
exposure to steeply falling global primary prices from mid-decade 
plunged them into spiralling farm debt and insolvency. Nearly nine 
thousand recorded farmer suicides in india since 1998 are only the 
tip of the iceberg –there is a pervasive agrarian crisis and food grain 
absorption in india is back to the level prevailing fifty years ago. 
Trade liberalization and an export thrust makes sense when local 
and global markets are expanding owing to expansionary developmen-
tal policies which promote growth in the material productive sectors, 
rising employment and incomes. but when the opposite is the case, 
when both globally and in local economies the dominant policy senti-
ment is strongly deflationary as at present, then trade liberalization 
spells lowered mass welfare in developing countries4. india’s experi-
ence in the last fourteen years provides a good illustration of this. 
india, as a signatory to GATT 1994, removed all quantitative restric-
tions on trade and converted to tariffs by April 2001, lowering the 
average tariff rate at the same time to 35%, or well below the bound 
3 A shorter version is available in Patnaik, U. (2003a).
4 see my discussion in Patnaik 1996, 2003c. 
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rates which were 100% for crops and 150% for agricultural processed 
products. india’s thrust for trade liberalization could not have been 
worsely timed, since advanced country markets were in recession and 
global primary product prices went into a free fall with a 40%-50% de-
cline in unit dollar prices of all crops –cereals, cotton, jute, sugar, tea, 
coffee– and up to an 80% decline in some oil crops between 1995 and 
2001 as Table 5 shows. With a brief rise in 2002 prices have continued 
to fall and some prices are today lower than as far back as 1986. The 
price to growers is even lower than world price as the activities of the 
state marketing boards have been replaced by private transnational 
companies for many crops. 
Table 5
Prices of some important traded primary products, in US dollars
Source: Food Outlook, Various issues from 1986 to 2001; available from Global Information and Early Warning System on Agriculture, 
U N Food and Agriculture Organization; and Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, UNCTAD 2001. For the cereals, edible oils and seeds the 
unit is USD per ton, for cotton and sugar, US cents per lb. and for Jute, USD per metric ton.
* Relates to 1999, and percent change is 1999 compared to 1995.
The 2004 price data shows that sugar, cotton and jute prices continue to remain flat around 2001 levels while cereals show some rise.
1988 1995 1997 2000
2001
(Jan.)
Percent Change
2001 over 1995
Wheat (US HW) 167 216 142 130 133 - 38.2
Wheat (US RSW) 160 198 129 102 106 - 46.5
Wheat (Argentine) 145 218 129 112 118 - 45.9
Maize (Argentine) 116 160 133 88 80 - 50.0
Maize (US) 118 159 112 97 92 - 22.0
Rice (US) 265.7 - 439.0 271 291 - 33.7
Rice (Thai) 284 336 316 207 179 - 46.7
Cotton 63.5 98.2 77.5 66 49.1 - 50.0
Groundnut Oil 590 991 1010 788* - 20.5*
Palm Oil 437 626 93.5 74.7* - 88.1*
Soyabean Oil 464 479 625 71.4* - 85.1*
Soyabean Seed 297 273 262 199 178 - 34.8
Sorghum seed 110 156 111 102 99 - 36.5
Sugar 10.2 13.3 11.4 10.2 9.2 - 30.8
Jute 370 366 302 276* - 24.6*
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As prices fell for indian producers of export crops, their access to low-
cost credit was reduced under financial sector reforms. since the na-
tionalization of banks in 1969 agriculture and small scale industry 
had been treated as priority sectors and were offered bank credit at 
a lower than average interest rate but that ended with financial re-
forms, thrusting farmers into dependence on private moneylenders 
and high-cost credit (interest rates are usurious, ranging from 36% to 
60% annually). other crucial input prices including power tariffs were 
raised as part of the neo-liberal dicta on reducing subsidies (which 
were already meagre compared to developed countries). Reduced tar-
iff protection meant that producers of rice, fresh fruit and dairy prod-
ucts faced the undermining of their incomes from an influx of usually 
heavily subsidized foreign goods. 
Nearly six thousand indebted farmers, mainly cotton farmers, 
have committed suicide in Andhra Pradesh alone since 1998 as its 
government which had entered into a state-level structural Adjust-
ment Programme with the World bank, raised power tariffs five times 
even as cotton price fell by half (Table 6). over a thousand farmer sui-
cides have also taken place in Punjab, mainly in the cotton belt, new 
rounds of suicides are recorded in karanataka and Vidarbha, and in 
the four years from 2001, over 1,250 suicides are recorded in Wynaad 
in kerala as prices to the local growers of coffee, tea and spices have 
nose-dived even more steeply than global prices once large companies 
have taken over purchase and marketing. Thus by 2003 the price of 
coffee to the grower was only one-quarter and that of tea and pepper 
only one-third of the prices prevailing in 1999.
The agrarian crisis was the main reason for the decisive mass re-
jection of neo-liberal policies and the May 2004 electoral defeat of the 
NDA coalition at the Centre as well as the TDP government in Andhra 
Pradesh. in recognition of the employment crisis the new United Pro-
gressive Alliance or UPA had promised to implement a National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act which has been recently formulated and 
passed, but which has been diluted by taking the household as the 
unit, where only one member is entitled to work, and by setting the 
wage below the statutory minimum wage.
india has exported record volumes of wheat and rice during the 
last six years, and its share in global exports of rice and wheat has risen 
quite noticeably. Despite the drastic slowing down of output growth 
noted in Table 3, india exported 22 million tonnes of food grains dur-
ing 2002 and 2003 (bhalla 2005), and the share of grain exports in 
total exports has risen from under one –fifth to almost a quarter. There 
is higher global trade integration reflected in rising trade-GDP ratio. 
During the severe drought year starting from monsoon 2002, despite 
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grain output being 30 million tonnes lower than in the previous year, 
from June 2002 to November 2003, a total of 17 million tonnes of food 
grains were exported by the former NDA government. superficially it 
looks as though policies of trade liberalization have ‘worked’.
however the crucial fact which is suppressed in official publications 
and in the writings of pro-reform economists, and this is true even 
Table 6
Suicides of farmers in Andhra Pradesh by district
No. District 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
1. Warangal 77 7 7 28 903 1022
2. Ananthapoor 1 1 50 50 10 112
3. Mahaboobnagar 14 2 25 10 - 51
4. Karimnagar 31 10 6 30 1220 1297
5. Guntur 32 10 1 6 - 49
6. Khammam 20 5 3 6 2 36
7. Medak 15 3 2 8 - 28
8. Adilabad 9 8 5 13 - 35
9. Nalgonda 5 1 10 11 8 35
10. Nizamabad 9 1 - 11 457 478
11. Rangareddy 5 - 3 6 - 14
12. Kurnool 4 4 2 4 - 14
13. Chittoor 3 - - 2 - 5
14. Krishna 4 1 1 3 1 10
15. Prakasham 1 3 - 2 - 6
16. West Godavari 1 - - 5 - 6
17. East Godavari - - 1 2 - 3
18. Sreekakulam - 1 - - - 1
19. Cuddapah - - - 4 - 4
20. Visakapatnm - - - 1 - 1
Unknown 2 1 - - - 3
Total 233 58 116 202 2601 3210 
Note: The total number of suicides up to 2004 is over five thousand. Data from police records up to Jan. 27, 2002, presented by Kisan 
Sabha at a symposium on farmer suicides held at Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), 3 February 2002 and attended by the author. The Table 
has been partially updated by incorporating information for the whole of 2002, so far available for the three districts only (Warangal. 
Karimnagar and Nizamabad) as reported in The Hindu, Hyderabad edition, Jan.6 2003. For the other districts the figures given in the 
last column continue to refer to a single month, January 2002. Additional suicides numbering 1700 have taken place since then, for 
which the district break-up is not yet available.
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after the elections and the change in government, is that the vastly in-
creased grain exports have been coming out of more and more empty 
stomachs as millions of rural labourers and farmers have suffered job 
loss and income decline. Food grain absorption in india today has 
reached a historic low as a result of the massive decline in purchasing 
power especially in villages owing to the combination of rising unem-
ployment, rising input and credit costs for farmers and exposure to 
global price declines. Loss of purchasing power is pervasive affecting 
both the 158 million wage-dependent workers as well as the 120 mil-
lion cultivating workers and their families. Targeting the food subsidy 
from 1997-8 by restricting supply of cheaper grain to only those offi-
cially identified as ‘below the poverty line’ has also added to the insti-
tutional denial of affordable food grains to the poor, not merely owing 
to mistakes of wrong exclusion from the set of the officially poor, but 
also owing to the gross official underestimation of the numbers in 
poverty, discussed at the end of the paper.
Large decline in Food grains Absorption per
Head is owing to Falling Purchasing power,
not ‘voluntary choice’
The per capita availability or absorption of food grains in india has 
declined alarmingly during the decade of deflationary neo-liberal eco-
nomic reforms, to only 155 kg. annually taking the three year average 
ending in 2002-03. This current level is the same as fifty years ago dur-
ing the First Plan period, and it is also the level seen during 1937-41 
under colonialism. This means that the food security gains of the four 
decades of protectionism up to 1991, have been totally reversed. 
After independence, from the early 1950s to four decades later, 
taking the 3 years ending 1991, the per capita food grain availabil-
ity had climbed slowly from 155 kg. to 177 kg. -the achievement not 
only of a ‘Green Revolution’ but of expansionary policies slowly rais-
ing mass incomes and demand, without too much rise in already high 
inequality. While the Green Revolution had many problems, its posi-
tive achievement in raising grain availability and absorption, should 
not be underestimated. All this was reversed from the early 1990s. As 
the new regime, of deflationary economic reform policies from 1991 
eroded mass employment and incomes, we find a decline of per capita 
absorption to 174 kg between 1995 and 1998 and a very steep fall after 
that to the current abysmally low 155 kg level. Forty years of success-
ful effort to raise availability has been wiped out in a single decade, 
with over four-fifths of the decline coming in the last six years5.
5 i have discussed this in more detail in Patnaik 2003b, 2004. 
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Availability or absorption, is calculated from the hardest data we 
have, on annual net output6 adjusted only for change in public stocks 
and in trade, so by definition it has to cover all final uses –direct use 
for consumption as grain and its products, use as feed for convert-
ing to animal products (a part of this is exported), and industrial use. 
Per head availability/ absorption (the two are used as synonyms) is 
now one of the lowest in the world, with only sub-saharan Africa 
and some least developed countries registering lower absorption than 
india. since urban india has been increasing average absorption and 
average calorie intake, it is rural india where the fall has been very 
steep. in comparison, China absorbed 325 kg. grains per capita (ex-
cluding tubers) in the mid-1990s compared to india’s less than 200 kg. 
at that time, Mexico absorbed 375 kg., European countries absorbed 
700 kg. or more and UsA absorbed 850 kg. Except under abnormal 
conditions of war or famine, grain absorption is always observed to 
rise as a country’s average income rises. This is why the fall in india is 
so unusual, and it is not being correctly theorized.
Although grain output per head fell by about 12 kg over the five 
years ending in 2002-03, as may be checked from Table 7 the per head 
absorption has fallen much more, by 21 kg over the same period. The 
average indian family of five members is absorbing 100 kg. less of food 
grains annually than a mere five years ago and since in urban india 
absorption has risen (calorie intake has also risen), it is the rural family 
which is absorbing even less than the average fall indicates. This abnor-
mal fall is because of the loss of purchasing power for reasons already 
discussed, and it was reflected in a massive build-up of unsold public 
food stocks, reaching 63 million tonnes by July 2002, nearly 40 million 
tonnes in excess of the normal stocks for that time of year. Rather than 
starting large-scale food-for work schemes to restore lost work and in-
comes, between June 2002 and october 2003, over 17 million tonnes 
of food grains were got rid of by the NDA government by exporting 
subsidized stocks to feed European cattle and Japanese pigs. 
There can be two very different ways that such huge food stocks 
can build up: demand growth is normal but output increases much 
faster, or alternatively output increase is normal, but demand reduces 
very fast owing to loss of incomes, and the demand curve shifts down-
wards. in both cases supply exceeds demand, but for very different 
reasons. As already shown output growth has not been normal but has 
actually gone down, so the first reason does not hold. it is mass effec-
6 The official practice for 50 years, which i have followed in Table 7 is to deduct 
12.5 percent from gross output in tonnes, of foodgrains (cereals plus pulses) on ac-
count of seed, feed and wastage, and to the net ouput so obtained, add net imports 
and deduct net addition to public stocks.
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tive demand, hence absorption which has declined to a much greater 
extent, so it is the second reason and not the first which accounts 
for the present paradox of increasing rural hunger and record grain 
exports. if rural demand had been maintained even at the 1991 level 
(forget about any increase) the absorption of foodgrains today would 
be 26 million tonnes higher than it is, and there would be no crisis in 
the agriculture of Punjab and haryana, which have lost an internal 
market to that extent in the last six years alone. instead of rural per 
capita calorie intake declining to below the urban average, as has been 
the case in the nineties, energy intake would have been maintained.
since all-india per capita income has been rising during the reform 
period, such a drastic fall in food grains absorption is clearly, only com-
patible with a drastic rise in the inequality of income distribution as 
we had earlier pointed out (Patnaik, 2003b). but rising inequality can 
also occur when all incomes are rising. Rising inequality per se is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for the observed drastic absolute decline 
in grain absorption7. The only scenario which is compatible with it, is 
a particular type of rise in inequality, namely absolute decline in real 
incomes and rise in absolute poverty, concentrated mainly in the rural 
areas, combined with a large rise in real incomes for the top fractiles of 
the population, concentrated mainly in urban areas. The data is partly 
reflecting this: one indicator is the decline in the per capita real expendi-
ture on consumption by the lowest four-fifths of rural population during 
the end- 1990s and a very sharp rise by the top one-fifth of urban popula-
tion, which has been noted by sen and himanshu (2005). but even these 
findings are likely to understate the true extent of income decline for 
the mass of the rural population (we have no direct data on incomes). 
This is because this mass has been obliged to lose assets to maintain 
consumption and stay alive, while the well-to do have been saving much 
more over and above their greatly enhanced real expenditure and have 
entered real estate and financial markets. in short, there are in addition 
to the changes in observed flow variables like expenditure, also stock ad-
justments going on, namely changes in the distribution of assets which 
are adverse for the poor and on which data is not available.
The official position is one of wholesale denial of these obvious 
facts and the creation of what can only be called a fairy tale, fit only 
for intellectual infants. it is argued that there is voluntary reduction in 
food grain intake and thus there is ‘over-production’ requiring a cut-
back in cereals output –a position not supported by the facts. The full 
7 Rising inequality is not necessary because we can have fall in grain absorp-
tion when all incomes are falling and inequality is unchanged. it is not sufficient 
because if with increasing inequality all incomes are rising, grain absorption will 
not fall. 
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fairy tale set out in official publications goes like this: every segment 
of the population is reducing demand for cereals because average in-
come is rising; (here, the increased income is assumed to be distrib-
uted in the same way as earlier, with no increase in inequality). People 
of all expenditure classes are voluntarily diversifying their diets away 
from cereals. The only reason that farmers continue to produce more 
cereals than demanded, and hence big stocks build up, is because too 
much output has been encouraged by ‘too high’ administered, mini-
mum support prices of cereals. so MsP should be cut, cereals output 
in excess of what is demanded at present should be discouraged and 
the output pattern in agriculture should be diversified to more com-
mercial export crops under the aegis of agro-businesses. 
This analysis is completely incorrect and is inconsistent with the 
hard facts of rising unemployment, falling output growth, impover-
ishment of farmers in debt and land loss, and resulting deep agrarian 
distress. it is dangerous in reaching policy conclusions which are the 
opposite of those required, and which if implemented will reduce food 
security further and pauperize even more farmers. 
To give an analogy, albeit an imperfect one, suppose that a patient 
has been wrongly diagnosed by a doctor and loses weight rapidly to 
the extent of 30 kg. The doctor then blames the tailor for making the 
clothes of the patient too big and advises that the old clothes should 
be thrown away and new ones sewn to fit his wasted body. such ad-
vice will certainly alarm the patient for it shows that an abnormal 
situation is being rationalized as normal and no treatment to restore 
the patient to health will be followed. The official position on food 
grain output and food security, regrettably shared by many academics 
who seem not to have applied their minds to the matter, is indicative 
of such illogical reasoning and is alarming indeed for farmers and 
labourers in distress. The official prescription of reducing MsP, end-
ing open-ended procurement and cutting back on output will worsen 
food deprivation and deepen poverty for the millions of farmers and 
labourers already in deep distress. The idea that price fall benefits ‘the 
consumer’ ignores the fact that three-fifths of consumers in a poor 
country are themselves rural producers or dependent for jobs on pro-
ducers, and deflation harms their incomes. 
it is an alarming scenario too for the farmers of Northern india who 
over the last four decades have been asked to specialize in food grain 
production, and have performed magnificently, selling their rising sur-
pluses uncomplainingly to the Food Corporation of india even when the 
domestic procurement price was far below world price in the 1970s and 
again in the decade up to the late 1990s. They have ensured cheap food 
to urban areas and food deficit regions by not seeking to maximize their 
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own incomes. Today, as a result of the official embracing and putting 
into practice of mindless deflationary policies which have reduced mass 
purchasing power, they have lost internal grain markets to the tune of 26 
million tonnes and are being given the irresponsible advice to ‘diversify’ 
and export to world markets even though these continue to be in reces-
sion, and even though all international organizations predict continuing 
fall in agricultural terms of trade up to 2009-10. Calculations by FAo 
shows that the terms of trade for agriculture globally, with 1990-91 as 
base year equal to 100, was about 50 by 2001, compared to over 200 in 
the 1970s. All projections up to 2009-10 by international bodies, show 
continued absolute price fall and further decline in terms of trade.
The question that is neither raised nor answered in official pub-
lications like the Economic Survey and the Reserve bank of india’s 
Report on Currency and Finance which articulate the fairy tale of vol-
untary diversification, is - how can people suffering employment loss 
and facing unprecedented crop price declines, be inferred to be better 
off and be voluntarily reducing cereals demand, and how is it that the 
current reduced level of total absorption of food grains per head of 
155 kg per annum, is not seen in any country except the least devel-
oped and sub-saharan African countries? The observed falling share 
of food expenditure in total expenditure for almost every expenditure 
group, is officially cited as proof of every income segment including 
the poorest diversifying diets and becoming better off, and seems to 
have persuaded some academics. No attention is paid to steadily fall-
ing average calorie intake in rural india as ‘diversification’ proceeds. 
The argument is quite fallacious and is based on a simple confusion 
between the necessary and sufficient conditions for improvement.
A falling share of food expenditure in total expenditure, as a well as a 
falling share of grain expenditure in food expenditure, are necessary, but 
not sufficient indices of the consumer becoming better off, particularly 
when we are considering, not an advanced country rich population, but 
a population already at a low standard of life. The food spending share 
of total spending can fall and is actually observed to fall, when people are 
getting worse off because their real income is constant or falling, since 
owing to greater monetization of the economy and higher cost of utilities 
they are forced to spend more on the bare minimum of non-food essen-
tials. Thus even when real income is unchanged over time, some food 
expenditure has to be sacrificed to buy fuel (which is jointly demanded 
with food grains), incur higher transport costs in search of work, incur 
higher health costs and so on. since the overwhelmingly large part of 
food expenditure itself is on staple grains, it is this which falls when food 
expenditure is cut. Data for sub-saharan African countries shows dietary 
‘diversification’ as per capita income declines. We observe a falling share 
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of calories from cereals and rising share from animal products, even as, 
with the large decline in cereal intake absolute calorie intake is seen to 
decline quite steeply (see Patnaik 2003b for a discussion). in effect, a 
sub-saharan Africa already exists in rural india today.
The official solution is inhumane in rationalizing increasing hunger 
as voluntary choice, basing its prescriptions on bad theory and fallacious 
reasoning. The only solution which is both humane and is based on sound 
economic theory, is to restore lost internal purchasing power through a 
universal Employment Guarantee and to revert to a universal Public Dis-
tribution system. The Finance Minister unwisely cut rural development 
expenditures drastically to only Rs.13.5 thousand crores last year – the 
same absolute sum as was spent fifteen years earlier in 1989-90. Rs. 13.5 
thousand crores is an all-time low of only 0.6 percent of NNP and this 
gratuitous act of deflation in the face of farm crisis, has worsened the 
problems of unemployment and hunger. it may be compared to the Rs, 
51,000 crores spent by the NDA in 2003-04 in the aftermath of drought, 
which sum itself was inadequate at 2.5 percent of NNP. 
To meet the 10th Plan budget estimates on rural development, the 
government now needs to spend at least Rs. 100,000 crores during fiscal 
2005-06 and 2006-07, of which up to Rs.30,000 crores should be on the 
national rural employment guarantee, and the remainder on the urgent 
and neglected needs of agriculture, rural development, irrigation and 
village and small scale industry. Although one lakh crores may sound 
a large sum it is still less than 4 percent of anticipated NNP in the next 
two years and inadequate for the needs of 700 million people, three 
fifths of the nation, whose fate depends on the government’s policy.
The bizarre official efforts to re-invent increasing hunger as free 
choice, are buttressed by spurious estimates of the population in pov-
erty, discussed in the last section.
Alternative Measures of Head-Count Poverty:
or, How to Count the Poor Correctly versus
Illogical Official Procedures 
Poverty studies in india since the early 1970s, have been based on 
the use of a ‘poverty line’ expenditure level, defined as that level of 
expenditure per capita per month on all goods and services, whose 
food expenditure component provided an energy intake of 2400 kcal 
per capita in rural areas and 2100 kcal per capita in urban areas. All 
persons spending below the poverty line expenditure are considered to 
be poor. The required daily allowance (RDA) of energy was specified 
by the indian Council for Medical Research and recommended by the 
Nutrition Expert Group to the Planning Commission in 1969. This is 
obviously a very minimalist definition of poverty, since no norms are 
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set for essential non-food items of spending such as on fuel for cooking 
and lighting, clothing, shelter, transport, medical care or education. 
The data base for estimating poverty has been the National sample 
survey Rounds on Consumption Expenditure which take the house-
hold as the sampling unit. These surveys present the distribution of 
persons by monthly per capita expenditure groups, and since the 
quantities of foods consumed and their calorie equivalents are avail-
able, they also present the calorie intake per capita per diem by ex-
penditure groups. That particular expenditure group whose food ex-
penditure met the calorie requirement in 1973-74, was identified and 
the relevant expenditure was defined as the poverty line expenditure 
(often this is mis-labelled as poverty line income, but we have no infor-
mation on income). Large sample surveys are carried out at five-yearly 
intervals, the latest available data being from the 55th Round relating 
Table 7
Summary of Annual per capita Foodgrains Output and Availability in India
in the Nineties (Three Year Average)
Three-yr.
Period
Ending in
Average
Population
Net Output
per Head
Net Availability per Head
Cereals Food Cereals Pulses Foodgrain
million Kg. grains Kg. Kg.
 Kg./ 
Year
Gms./ 
day
1991-92 850.70 163.43 178.77 162.8 14.2 177.0 485
1994-95 901.02 166.74 181.59 160.8 13.5 174.3 476
1997-98 953.07 162.98 176.81 161.6 12.6 174.3 477
2000-01 1008.14 164.84 177.71 151.7 11.5 163.2 447
2002-03 1050.67 153.85 164.09 142.91 10.12 153.0 419
Individual Year
2003-04* 1087.6 158.33 170.83 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2004-05* 1107.0 151.21 162.35 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Change in Per Capita Availability of Foodgrains, %
Triennium ending 1991-92 to Triennium ending 1997-98 - 1.6
Triennium ending 1997-98 to triiennium ending 2002-03 - 12.2
Total Change, 1991-92 to 2002-03. -13.6
Source: For output, trade and stocks, Reserve Bank of India, Report on Currency and Finance, various years; and Govt.of India, Ministry 
of Finance, Economic Survey, various years. For population, the annual compound growth rate of 1.89 % has been derived from the 
Census population totals for 1991 and 2001 and used to interpolate for inter-censal years. Before 1991 and from 2001 onwards, the 
population figures given in the Economic Survey have been used.
* Indicates provisional..
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to 1999-2000, from which the relevant data for All-india is reproduced 
in Table 8 using two published Reports of the Nss. 
A good idea of the current magnitude of head-count poverty can be 
obtained by the lay person without any calculations, simply by inspect-
ing the data in Table 8. Looking at the first, third and fifth columns, 69.7 
percent or say seven-tenths of the rural population of india, spending less 
than Rs.525 per month per person, was below the average calorie level 
of 2403 (nearly the same as the 2400 norm), which was obtained only 
by the next higher spending group of Rs. 525-615. since persons in the 
lower part of this group also obtained below 2400 calories, the poverty 
percentage is a bit higher than seven-tenths, and on plotting the data on 
a graph we obtain the more exact figure of 74.5 percent. Yet, the official 
Planning Commission figure of rural head-count poverty from the same 
data is only 27 percent! The difference between the estimate obtained by 
direct inspection of the latest data and the figure as given by the Planning 
Commission, is 47.5 percent, so nearly half of the actually poor rural 
population, about 350 million persons, are excluded from the set of the 
officially poor. Again, from direct inspection we see that about two-fifths 
of the urban population spending below Rs.575 per capita per month ob-
tained less than 2091 calories (very close to the 2100 urban norm) which 
was the average for the next higher spending group. The exact percentage 
in urban poverty on plotting the graph, is 44 percent. The Planning Com-
mission figure for urban poverty for the same year is only 23.5 percent. 
What explains this big difference? The Planning Commission has never 
officially given up the nutritional norm of 2400 calories. The majority 
of economists in india believe that this norm is still being followed. The 
reality is that the actual estimation procedure followed by the Planning 
Commission has de-inked its poverty estimates completely from the nu-
trition norm. The poverty line was obtained following the norm, only in 
1973-74 using the 28th Round Nss data, a date three decades in the past. 
For that year at prices then prevailing, the rural and urban poverty lines 
were Rs.49.09 and Rs. 56.64 per capita per month, since at these expendi-
tures the 2400 rural and 2100 urban calorie intake norms were satisfied. 
it was found that 56.4 percent of the rural and 49 percent of the urban 
population were below these poverty lines8.
For later years, strange though it may seem, no use was made of a 
single iota of the actual consumption data and calorie equivalents, 
thrown up by as many as five successive large-sample surveys (in 
1977-8, 1983,1988-9,1993-4, and 1999-2000). There was no official at-
tempt to update the poverty lines on the basis of the available current 
8 it is a curious matter of chance that poverty lines were Rs.49.1 and Rs 56.6 while 
the corresponding poverty percentages were 56.4 and 49.
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information on what expenditure was actually required to meet the 
nutrition norm. Rather, the three decade old poverty lines (Rs 49.1 
and Rs.56.6, rural and urban), were simply adjusted upwards by us-
ing a price–index, while assuming an invariant 1973-74 consumption 
basket. The adjusted poverty line was then applied to the cumulative 
distribution of persons by expenditure groups, in current Nss data to 
obtain the ‘poverty percentage’. Thus the current data was, and is be-
ing used selectively, with only the distribution of persons by expendi-
ture classes being used, and the associated energy intake part being 
ignored completely. The declining energy intake corresponding to offi-
cial poverty estimates are never mentioned, nor do academics follow-
ing the same method ever mention the lowered calorie intake corre-
sponding to their estimates (vide the papers in Economic and Political 
Weekly, 2003, special number tendentiously titled ‘Poverty reduction 
in the 1990s’ ). The credibility of official and similar academic poverty 
estimates would certainly come into question if the educated public at 
large was informed about how far below RDA (Required Daily Allow-
ance) the consumption standard has been continuously pushed down, 
by the official method. 
For example the official price-index adjusted poverty line for 
1999-2000 was Rs.328 only (about 6.7 times Rs. 49) and this has been 
applied to the first and last columns of Table 8 to read the population 
below this line which came to 27%. No attention was paid to the fact 
that at this expenditure a person could access at most only 1890 calo-
ries, over 500 calories per day below the RDA and nor is this fact ever 
mentioned to the public when poverty estimates are quoted by the 
Planning Commission. This amounts to suppression of information 
and is not an academically acceptable procedure. The same applies to 
the academics who follow the official method and who never allude to 
the lower and lower calorie intake inherent in their poverty lines.
Academics writing earlier (R. Nayyar 1991) however, had estimat-
ed poverty both by direct inspection of current data and by the official 
method, and had explicitly noted that the official poverty estimate di-
verged more and more over time from the much higher poverty percent-
ages yielded by current data. As the base year of the official method gets 
further back in time the divergence has assumed absurd proportions. in 
1993-4 the official price index adjustment method gave a rural poverty 
line of only Rs.205, and 37.3 % were below it in the 50th Round distribu-
tion of persons by expenditure groups, and so deemed to be ‘in poverty’, 
but the fact that at this poverty line only 1,970 calories per diem could 
be accessed (over 400 calories below the RDA) was never mentioned. 
inspecting the same current 50th Round data showed that 74.5% of 
persons had an intake below the RDA of 2400 calories, because their 
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monthly expenditure was below the Rs.325 at which the nutrition RDA 
could be accessed. Mehta and Venkataraman (2000) pointed out for the 
50th Round data, this large divergence between the results of applying 
the official definition, and following the official price-adjustment proce-
dure, in a short but significant paper. They do not refer to Nayyar (1991) 
who had already pointed out the divergence for earlier Rounds and had 
also analysed state-wise divergence, but unfortunately her book had not 
been accorded the importance it deserved. 
in 1999-2000 as we already noted the official estimate gives only 27.4 
percent in poverty because these are the persons spending below the 
price-index adjusted official poverty line of Rs.328, but again the fur-
ther lowering of the associated energy intake standard to 1890 calo-
ries, over 500 calories per day below RDA, is never mentioned. The 
same current 55th Round data shown in Table 8 continues to give 74.5 
percent of persons actually in poverty, namely with intake below 2400 
calories because their expenditure was below the Rs.570 required to 
access the RDA. (however, greater poverty depth is seen by 1999-00, 
with  more of the population moving below 2100 calories as compared 
to 1993-94, and 3 percent more being below 1800 calories). Thus in 
1993-4 the official method had left out 37.2 percent of the total rural 
population who were actually poor, while by 1999-2000 the official 
method was leaving out 47.4 of the total rural population or around 
350 million persons who were actually poor. Table 9 summarizes the 
official poverty lines, poverty percentages and the falling calorie in-
takes at poverty lines, and it gives the true poverty lines required to 
access the RDA, along with the poverty percentages. 
There is no theoretically acceptable basis to the official claims 
of poverty reduction in the 1990s. The basic point is that the method 
of comparison over time is not logically valid when the consumption 
standard is being altered, as is being done in the indirect estimates. 
The consumption standard in 1973-74 was 2400 calories at which 56% 
was in poverty, by 1993-94 the standard implicit in the official esti-
mate (37% in poverty) was down to 1970 calories, and in 1999-2000 
for the official estimate (27.4 %) it was even lower at 1890 calories. by 
the 60th Round, 2004-05 it is likely to be below 1800 calories and cor-
respond to less than one-fifth of rural population. We will once more 
hear spurious claims of further ‘poverty reduction’ without any men-
tion of the lowering of the energy intake.
how can anyone say how ‘poverty’ has changed over time using 
the above method? To give an analogy, when a set of runners are lined 
up in a row on a circular race track for a long-distance race, if the per-
son in the inner-most circle crosses the finishing rope first, it cannot 
be validly inferred that he has won the race: for the distance run by 
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Table 8
Percentage Distribution of Persons by Monthly Per Capita Expenditure (MPCE) Groups
and average Calorie Intake per diem, 1999-2000, All-India
RURAL
Monthly
per capita
Expenditure
Average
MPCE
Calorie Intake
per diem
Percent
of persons
Cumulative
percent of
Persons
Rupees Rupees Per capita. % Kg.
Below 225 191 1383 5.1 5.1
225- 255 242 1609 5.0 10.1
255- 300 279 1733 10.1 20.2
300- 340 321 1868 10.0 30.2
340- 380 361 1957 10.3 40.5
380- 420 400 2054 9.7 50.2
420- 470 445 2173 10.2 60.4
470- 525 497 2289 9.3 69.7
525- 615 567 2403 10.3 80.0
615- 775 686 2581 9.9 89.9
775- 900 851 2735 5.0 94.9
900 & more 1344 3178 5.0 99.9
ALL 486 2149 99.9
SUMMARY
470-525	 2289
and	less	 and	less	 69.7
525-615	 2403	 10.3
615-775	 2581	 19.9
and	more	 and	more
(continue)
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(continue)
URBAN
Monthly
per capita
Expenditure
Calorie Intake
per diem
Percent
of persons
Cumulative
percent of
Persons
Rupees Per capita % Kg.
Below 300 1398 5.0 5.0
300- 350 1654 5.1 10.1
350- 425 1729 9.6 19.7
425- 500 1912 10.1 29.8
500- 575 1968 9.9 39.7
575- 665 2091 10.0 49.7
665- 775 2187 10.1 59.8
775-915 2297 10.0 69.8
915-1120 2467 10.0 79.8
1120-1500 2536 10.1 89.9
1500- 1925 2736 5.0 94.9
1925 & more 2938 5.0 100
ALL 2156 99.9
SUMMARY
500-575	 1968
and	less	 and	less	 39.7
575-665	 2091	 10.0
665-775	 2187	 50.2
and	more	 and	more
Source: National Sample Survey Organization (55th Round, 1999-2000) Report No. 471, Nutritional Intake in India for calorie 
intake data by expenditure groups and Report No. 454, Household Consumer Expenditure in India - Key Results for the 
distribution of persons. The calorie intake data. refers to the 30 day recall so the distribution of persons by the same recall 
period is taken above. 
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him is much less than that run by others. For a valid comparison of 
the runners’ performance, the distance run has to be the same stand-
ardized distance for all the runners, and this is done by staggering 
the runners. similarly, in the official method the percent of persons 
below the same, standardized consumption level or levels, need to be 
compared but this is not the case in the indirect method. Rather, the 
method used implies that the percentages below un-standardized and 
changing consumption levels are sought to be compared over time 
(see Table 9). This is not legitimate, and any statement about decline 
(or change generally) is not valid. Present day heated debates between 
the estimators about whether poverty has ‘declined’ by ten points or 
seven points, when poverty has not declined at all, can be likened to 
debates over whether the inner-circle runner has ‘won’ by one metre 
or two metres, when the fact of the matter is that he has not ‘won’ at 
all, because the premise for valid comparison is violated. 
9 The analogy can be carried a little further. if the race is a short one over a straight 
segment of the course, lining the runners up in a straight line at the starting point is 
okay. similarly if the base year of the price index is very close, say two to three years, 
then comparison over time can be made using the official method –which ignores 
every non-base year actual calorie intake– without leading to too much inaccuracy. 
but for a long race (a base year further back in time) absence of standardization will 
arise and make comparison invalid. 
Table 9
The Rural Poor as Percent of Rural Population in India
1973
- 74
28th
1983
32th
1993
- 94
50th
1999
- 00
55th
2004
60th
MPCE (Poverty line) Rs
NSSRound
1973
- 74
28th
1983
32th
1993
- 94
50th
1999
- 00
55th
2004
60th
Using Official 
Definition
(<MPCE giving
2400 cals)
56.4 70.0 74.5 74.5 n.a 49 120 325 570 n.a
Official 
Estimates
56.4 45.7 37.3 27.4 20.3* 49 86 206 328 354
and Implied
Calorie ‘Norm’
2400 2060 1970 1890 n.a (1.0) (1.4) (1.6) (1.7) n.a
Source: First line calculated from NSS Reports on Consumer Expenditure, 50th Round 1993-4 and 55th Round 199-00.
MPCE is Monthly Per Capita Expenditure.
Note that base year 1973-74 is the only year the official definition was correctly applied.- in all later years the nutrition norm is 
continuously diluted. The same exercise can be carried out for urban India. (Figures in parentheses are the ratio of the expenditure 
actually required to access the calorie RDA, to the official poverty line).
* Provisional estimate, applying official poverty line of Rs.344 for 2004, to the ogive of persons by expenditure levels from NSS 60th 
Round, January – June 2004, Report No. 505 Household Consumer Expenditure in India, Statement 3.2 R.
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The official rural monthly poverty line expenditure for 2004 (obtained 
by updating the 1999-00 poverty line of Rs.328, using the CPiAL), is 
Rs.354 or Rs11.8 daily, equivalent to 26 Us cents at the prevailing ex-
change rate. This paltry amount will actually buy at most one bottle of 
water, but it is supposed to cover all expenditure on food, fuel, cloth-
ing, shelter, transport, health and education – in short all daily spend-
ing on goods and services for one person! Estimates of indian poverty 
for 1999-00, 55th Round, by some individual academics like A.Deaton 
(2003b, 367) and s.bhalla (2003) are even lower and imply a poverty-
line of 20 Us cents or less expenditure per day, one-fifth of the World 
bank’s dollar-a-day measure. There is no logic in arguing that purchas-
ing power parity should be considered and instead of one dollar there-
fore around one third of that should be taken as the local poverty line, 
for the comparison is not between advanced and developing countries 
at all but between developing and other developing countries. A quar-
ter U.s dollar in india purchases exactly as much as Rs.11 does, at the 
prevailing exchange rate, and a quarter Us dollar purchases exactly as 
much as 2 yuan does in China (whose current rural poverty line is also 
far too low at 2.2 yuan per day). Poverty level incomes in the UsA are 
not set three times higher than the Chinese or indian one, but are at 
least thirty times higher. 
obviously, it is not difficult for either the Planning Commission or 
the individual academics to ‘adjust’ indian poverty figures downwards 
when the consumption level embodied in the rural poverty line, is de-
pressed to such sub-human levels as Rs11 or less per day. Few people 
can actually survive long below these levels –those who are there today 
are on their way to early death. The poverty estimators should try a 
test on themselves. Let them be handed the weekly equivalent of their 
own estimated monthly poverty line –they need not even exert them-
selves to earn it as the poor are obliged to do– and let them spend only 
one week in a village living on that amount, which would range from 
Rs.60 to Rs, 80. since they will not be confident of drinking the local 
water all they would be able to buy would be a bottle of water a day 
and no food let alone other necessities. What they would undoubtedly 
gain from their one-week stay, would be weight loss. Urban poverty 
lines are almost equally unrealistic.
sometimes to justify the indirect method it is argued that the orig-
inal rural consumption norm of 2400 was ‘too high’. First, it is not ‘too 
high’ because the average intake of those below it works out to about 
1950 calories which is lower than in any other country in the world 
except the least developed countries. second, even if it is accepted for 
the sake of argument that it was ‘too high’ it does not justify compar-
ing 1999-2000 ‘poverty’ figures which are all those persons below 1890 
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calories intake, to those persons below 1970 calories intake in 1993-94 
and those persons below 2400 calories intake in 1973-74. 
by all means, let us consider lower norms, in fact take several al-
ternative norms including 2400, but when comparing over time, com-
pare the proportion of population under the same norm at the two 
points of time –for only then will the comparison be valid. The indi-
rect estimates fail on this simple but essential criterion of comparabil-
ity over time and those who nevertheless undertake such comparison 
are committing a logical fallacy –the fallacy of equivocation. This a 
well known type of verbal fallacy, in which the same term is used with 
two completely different meanings in the course of the argument, so 
the inference is not true. in this case, ‘poverty line’ was defined and 
initially calculated with respect to a nutrition norm, while ‘poverty 
line’ as actually calculated is de-linked from the norm, so the inference 
regarding change (whether rise, fall or constancy) is not true0.
Not only is the official comparison of poverty percentages, and 
claims of poverty reduction over time, quite spurious; the comparison 
of the poverty levels of states at a given point of time, is equally invalid. 
As Table 10 shows, we have a bizarre picture when we calculate the 
maximum calorie intake levels below which people are designated as 
‘poor’ by the official method in the different states of india. The calo-
rie intake corresponding to the official state-wise poverty lines, –from 
which the state poverty percentage have been officially derived– for the 
year 1999-2000, varies from 1440 only in kerala, nearly a thousand cal-
ories below RDA, to 2120 in orissa, less than 300 calories below RDA. 
The fact is that the official method in india today adheres to no 
nutrition norm at all. Nutrition has dropped out of the picture com-
pletely in the indirect method, nor is there any lower bound which 
is set, to the extent of decline in the calorie intake corresponding to 
whatever the price-adjusted poverty line happens to be. That is why 
we find states with 1500 calories or less intake corresponding to their 
official poverty lines in 1999-00. in as many as 9 states, the calorie 
intake associated with the official poverty lines was below 1800 calo-
ries in the 55th Round, while in four states it was 1600 calories or less 
(see Table 10). None of this is mentioned when poverty estimates are 
quoted by those making them. 
Not even the late P.V. sukhatme, who was a consistent critic of the 
2400 calorie RDA being too high, would have accepted 1800 calories 
as a reasonable norm for estimating who the poor are, –let alone 1600 
calories or less. he had used a norm of 2200 calories in one of his own 
10 i have discussed the fallacy of equivocation involved in the indirect estimates, in 
Patnaik 2005b. 
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estimates (sukhatme 1977). by 2004-05 the All-india official poverty 
line itself will correspond to an intake of 1800 calories or less, and at 
least eight states will have a 1600 or less calorie intake corresponding 
to the state-specific official poverty lines.
The fact that comparability conditions are blatantly violated, is 
obvious. officially it is inferred that poverty is much higher, for exam-
ple, in orissa at 48 percent, than in neighbouring Andhra Pradesh at 
only 11 percent. but how can we possibly infer that orissa is ‘poorer’ 
than Andhra, when the ‘officially poor’ are those persons with below 
2120 calories intake in orissa but the ‘officially poor’ are those persons 
with below 1600 calories intake in Andhra? (As a matter of fact the be-
low 2400 and below 2100 calories poverty percentages are both higher 
in Andhra than in orissa as the same Table shows in the last two col-
umns). similarly, how can it be inferred that rural Gujarat with only 
13 percent officially in poverty, is much better off than West bengal 
with 33 percent officially poor, when the associated calorie ‘norm’ in 
Gujarat has been pushed down to only 1680 compared to 1900 in West 
bengal? As a matter of fact the below 2400 calories poverty percentage 
is marginally lower for W.bengal compared to Gujarat and the below 
2100 calories percentage is substantially lower for W.bengal. And so 
the anomalies can be multiplied. Further, how can, for each state, the 
official estimate in 1999-00 be compared with that in 1993-94 and in-
ference about ‘decline’ be drawn, when the associated calorie intake 
has been lowered in each state? (Except only one, Gujarat). 
As a teacher if i were to follow the illogical procedure of saying 
that student A who has 53 percent marks is ‘better’ than student b 
who has 59 percent marks, because i apply a 50 out of 100 marks 
standard to student A and apply a different, 60 marks out of 100 stand-
ard to student b, i would rightly face a court case. Yet our Planning 
Commission and individual academics have been allowed to get away 
with making patently illogical and untrue statements on poverty. The 
Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission recently congratulated 
the Andhra Pradesh government on its success in reducing poverty. 
This ‘reduction’ was solely the effect of applying an extraordinarily 
low price-adjusted poverty line of Rs. 262 per month in 1999-00 at 
which less than 1600 calories could be accessed (see Table 10). Look-
ing directly at nutrition poverty, we find that the proportion of persons 
below 1800 calories intake in that state has doubled to 40% by 1999-00 
compared to 1983 (Table 11). To complete the story, the proportion 
below 2100 calories has risen to 62% at the later date, compared to 56 
% only five years earlier in 1993-4, and 44% in 1983. 
What is the reason, the reader might ask, for the official method pro-
ducing consistently lower estimates than the direct method, and why 
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has the divergence been growing until now, the indirect estimate gives 
only 27 percent compared to nearly 75 percent by the direct estimate. 
it is not primarily a matter of the price index used: different price indi-
ces do give different results but this accounts for difference of at most 
10 percent or so of population, not the difference of 48 percent of pop-
ulation which is actually observed. The basic reason is assuming an 
invariant consumption basket in the indirect method, held unchanged 
for three decades. over these three decades however there has been 
increasing monetization of the economy and disappearance of com-
mon property resources, along with higher cost of utilities and health 
care. With a given real income people have to spend relatively more 
on essential non-food requirements, overcoming illness and earning 
a living. The actual current rural consumption basket which satisfies 
the nutrition norm, and to which the total monthly expenditure on all 
goods and services corresponds, costs almost double the price-adjust-
ed poverty line (from Table 8 summarized in Table 9, at least Rs.570 
is required compare to the official Rs.328). The official poverty lines 
are simply far too low and are getting further lowered as the base year 
becomes more remote.
Rohini Nayyar (1991) in her careful doctoral study, estimated 
poverty using both methods and noted the widening divergence in 
the results between 1961-2 and 1977-8. she had taken some solace 
from the fact that though poverty levels estimated by the two different 
methods were moving apart quite fast, at least they did seem to move 
in the same direction over time. The ranking of the states of india ac-
cording to their poverty levels estimated using the two methods, was 
highly correlated: Nayyar found that spearman’s rank correlation co-
efficient worked out to 0.89 and 0.84 (using the official estimate on the 
one hand, and two different direct estimate norms of 2200 and 2000 
calories) and was significant at the 1% level. 
but in the 1990s this conclusion no longer holds. The poverty lev-
els calculated by the two methods are moving fast in opposite direc-
tions and the rank correlation may soon become negative. spearman’s 
rank correlation taking the poverty ranks of the states by the official 
indirect method, and by the direct method for 1999-2000, 55th Round 
data, works out to only 0.236 and 0.075 (using the same two direct 
estimate norms) and neither is statistically significant at the 1% level 
(Ram, 2004). inspection of Table 10 will tell the reader why this is the 
case: some of the states with the lowest official poverty, such as And-
hra Pradesh, a by-word for agrarian distress, have some of the high-
est actual poverty. in general the official method produces the largest 
divergence from the direct method, in the case of the southern and 
Eastern states.
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The rot in poverty studies discussions seems to have set in with 
neo-liberal reforms in india, particularly in the late 1990s. The indi-
an Government was eager to claim success for the economic reforms 
and the pro-reform economists were eager to see poverty reduction 
in the data. in such a milieu, the inconvenient direct estimates show-
ing high and in some states, increasing levels of poverty were swept 
under the carpet. Discussion of direct estimation of poverty virtually 
disappeared from the literature. The dominant trend of discussion 
focussed on the official indirect method, which, to the great satis-
faction of the pro-reform and the World bank estimators, not only 
showed very low ‘poverty’ levels but actual decline in these levels. 
Not one of the authors using the official indirect method, alluded 
to the nutritional implications of their own estimates. This meant 
that they were using and presenting the Nss data selectively, tak-
ing only the distribution of persons by expenditure classes to read 
off the poverty proportion corresponding to their indirect poverty 
line, while ignoring the associated energy intake figures completely. 
such lack of transparency and selective use of data, is not accept-
able academic procedure. owing to this lack of transparency, to this 
day most economists in india not directly working with the data, 
and including even those examining research theses on poverty, are 
not aware that drastically lowered consumption levels over time and 
arbitrary variation of consumption levels across states, are the nec-
essary implications of following the indirect method and arriving at 
low poverty estimates. They assume that the original norms are be-
ing followed when this is not true.
There is a debate among the academics following the official, indi-
rect method, that owing to change in the recall period during the 55th 
round, 1999-2000 compared to earlier Rounds, actual expenditure is 
slightly overstated in every expenditure class, and hence the distribu-
tion of persons by expenditure classes has been affected. Making the 
required adjustment for comparability alters the distribution slightly 
and raises the 27 percent below the Rs.328 official price –adjusted pov-
erty line, by another 2 to 3 percent (sundaram and Tendulkar, 2003, 
Deaton, 2003a, sen and himanshu 2005). if these adjustments are 
correct, quite obviously, the percentage of persons below the directly 
observed poverty line of Rs.570 would rise to an even greater extent 
than 2 to 3, since a higher proportion of people than before would 
also come into the expenditure interval Rs.328 to Rs 570, and thus 
the difference between official estimate and the direct estimate would 
increase further. Thus all those with less than 2400 calories intake per 
diem, in 1999-2000 would be more than 74.5 + 3 = 77.5 percent of 
rural population, which is a rise compared to 74.5 percent in the 50th 
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Round, 1993-94. similarly those below 2100 calories would rise from 
49.5 percent to more than 52.5 percent11.
however we have chosen to give the direct estimate for 1999-2000 
unadjusted for recall period in all our tables, since the main point be-
ing made in this section, is the type of mistake involved in the indirect 
method itself which is leaving out nearly half the rural poor, and this 
basic problem with all indirect estimates not only remains but gets 
further aggravated, whenever adjustments are made by the estimators 
on account of altered recall period. it may be noted that with the ad-
justment for recall period, they are leaving out more than 47 percent 
of the actually poor rural population from their set of ‘the poor’ while 
without the adjustment, they were leaving out exactly 47 percent of 
the population.
some economists who are critical of the official price-adjustment 
method, have put nutrition back at the centre of their analysis, but 
they have followed another direct poverty estimation route, as com-
pared to inspecting current Nss data –the method we have followed. 
They have estimated the minimum cost of accessing the calorie RDA 
on the basis of current nutrient prices, and thus have obtained a nor-
mative food expenditure. by comparing with the actual expenditure 
on food in the Nss, they arrive at the percentage of persons failing to 
reach the RDA and this is 66 percent at the All-india level for the 55th 
Round (see Coondoo, Majumdar, Lancaster and Ray 2004, Ray and 
Lancaster 2005). subramanian (2005) has used indirect method base 
years closer to the present, as well as the direct method we use, to see 
how the trends in poverty behave under alternative scenarios. 
Many critical voices (suryanarayana 1996, Mehta and Venkatara-
man 2000, swaminathan 1999, 2002) which had continued to draw at-
tention to the high prevalence of undernutrition and malnutrition, to 
the secular decline in average rural calorie intake, to high direct pov-
erty estimates using reasonable calorie norms and which criticized 
the indirect estimates, have been sought to be silenced by the pro-re-
form economists, by the simple expedient of ignoring them altogether. 
Not one critical author is referred to in the articles by those present-
ing their indirect estimates at a Conference and later collecting them 
in a special issue of The Economic and Political Weekly tendentiously 
titled ‘Poverty Reduction in the 1990s’ (Deaton 2003a, and 2003bTen-
dulkar and sundaram 2003 etc.). The only article on energy intake 
11 We could easily find out how much higher the direct estimate would be than 74.5 
percent if those making the adjustment to the distribution of persons by expenditure 
class, had bothered to present the associated average calorie intake by expenditure 
class. As usual however they ignore the nutrition part completely in their papers.
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Table 10
Official Poverty Percentage by States and Associated Calorie ‘Norm’
STATE
Indirect estimates, 1993-4 and 1999-00 
Direct Estimates,
1999-2000
1993-1994 1999-2000
< 2400 cal
Poverty 
Percentage
< 2100 cal
Poverty
Percentage
Official
Poverty
Percentage
Implied
Calorie
‘Norm’
Official
Poverty
Percentage
Implied
Calorie
‘Norm’
Andhra
Pradesh 15.92 1700 11.05 1590 84.0 62.0
Assam 45.01 1960 40.04 1790 91.0 71.0
Bihar 58.21 2275 44.30 2010 77.0 53.5
Gujarat 22.18 1650 13.17 1680 83.0 68.5
Haryana 28.02 1970 8.27 1720 47.5 30.5
Karnataka 29.88 1800 17.30 1600 82.0 50.0
Kerala 25.76 1630 9.38 1440 82.5 52.5
Madhya
Pradesh 40.64 1970 37.06 1850 78.5 55.0
Maharashtra 37.93 1780 23.72 1760 92.0 55.0
Orissa 49.72 2150 48.01 2120 79.0 45.5
Punjab 11.95 1810 6.35 1710 47.5 36.5
Rajasthan 26.46 2130 13.74 1925 53.5 27.5
Tamilnadu 32.48 1650 20.55 1510 94.5 76.0
Uttar
Pradesh 48.28 2220 31.22 2040 61.0 37.5
West	Bengal 40.80 2080 31.85 1900 81.0 55.0
ALL INDIA 37.27 1970 27.09 1890 74.5 49.5
Source: As Table 8. From the basic data by states, the ogive or cumulative frequency distribution of persons below specified per 
capita expenditure levels was plotted, and on the same graph the relation of per capita expenditure and per capita calorie intake was 
plotted. Calorie intake corresponding to the official estimates was then obtained from the graphs. Note that for 1993-94 the mid-point 
value of each expenditure class has been plotted against the per capita calorie intake as the arithmetic average was not available in 
the published tables. For 1999-2000 it was available and has been used in deriving the figures for 1999-00. We find that for several 
expenditure classes the mid-point value coincided with the arithmetic mean, and for the others the difference of mid-point value from 
mean was very small, suggesting that the same would be true for 1993-4.
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while juxtaposing the official and direct estimate does so somewhat 
uncritically12.
The critical writers on the other hand, have given cogent argu-
ments to suggest why per capita calorie intake should be involuntarily 
declining in the lower expenditure classes over time. (it is also declin-
ing in higher expenditure classes but the problems of the initially over-
fed who may be reducing intake, do not concern us at present). They 
have pointed out that there has been substantial monetization of the 
economy over the last three decades. Wages which used to be paid in 
12 Meenakshi and Viswanathan 2003 present ‘calorie deprivation’ as though it is 
an independent topic, not essentially related to official poverty estimates, and al-
though they usefully juxtapose their estimates of population below differing calorie 
norms, and the official estimates, they do not refer to the falling energy equivalent of 
the official or individual poverty lines over time which affects comparability. Their 
method of estimating the calorie distribution ogives using kernel density functions, 
gives higher estimates of population below various calorie norms, than our estimates 
using the grouped data and the simple method described in the note to Table 10. This 
is probably because their estimate includes all well-to-do persons who have lower 
calorie intake than RDA. There is no reason however to consider rich race jockeys, 
super models or anorexic people as part of the poor. 
Table 11
States which have seen rise in the percentage of persons with less than 1800
calories intake per day during period 1983 to 1999-2000, and states with over one-third
of population below 1800 calories intake at either date
Rural
38th Round, 1983
< 1800 calories
Percent of total Persons
55th Round, 1999-2000
< 1800 calories
Percent of total Persons
Andhra Pradesh 19.0 40.0
Assam 28.5 41.0
Haryana 8.5 10.5
Karnataka 24.5 35.5
Kerala 50.0 41.0
Madhya Pradesh 18.5 32.5
Maharashtra 20.5 28.0
Tamilnadu 54.0 50.0
West Bengal 38.0 22.5
Source: Abstracted from estimates for all states, using NSS Reports No.471 and 454 for 55th round, and Report Nos.387 and 353 for 
38th Round. Estimation method as in note to Table 10. Note that in 1983 only 3 states – Kerala, Tamilnadu and West Bengal had more 
than one-third of rural population below 1800 calories intake. By 1999-2000 all three states had improved, West Bengal substantially, 
while Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra saw worsening. Thus by 1999-00, five states had more 
than one third of population below 1800 calories intake (six if we include the borderline Madhya Pradesh).
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kind as grain or meals, valued at low farm-gate prices in earlier Nss 
Rounds, are now paid in cash which the labourer has to exchange for 
food at higher retail prices, and so can buy less of it for a given real 
income. Common property resources have disappeared over the last 
three decades : fuel wood and fodder, earlier gleaned and gathered 
(and not fully valued in the Nss data), now have to be purchased, 
restricting the ability of the poorer population, to satisfy basic food 
needs out of a given real income and leading to the observed energy 
intake decline. staple grains and fuelwood or other fuels are obviously, 
jointly demanded since no-one can eat raw grain, and with a given real 
income a part of expenditure on grain has to be enforcedly reduced to 
purchase fuel. To this we have to add higher medical, transport and 
education costs as state funding is reduced and some services are pri-
vatized. The correct thrust of these arguments is that under-nutrition 
and poverty is very high, affecting three-quarters of the rural popula-
tion by now, and observed calorie intake decline for the lower fractiles 
is non-voluntary. by 1999-2000 for the first time average calorie intake 
in rural india has fallen below average urban calorie intake.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has embarked on a brief but sharp critique of the preva-
lent analysis and prescriptions regarding food security and poverty, 
because of two reasons. First, the agrarian crisis is serious and wide-
spread, and has been created by public policies which have been de-
flationary, combined with trade liberalization when world primary 
prices have been declining. it is manifesting itself in slowing output 
growth, rising unemployment, unprecedented income deflation for 
the majority of cultivators and labourers, enmeshing of cultivators in 
unrepayable debt, and loss of assets including land, to creditors. kid-
ney sales and nine thousand recorded farmer suicides are only the tip 
of the iceberg of increasing deprivation, a crucial index of which is 
an unprecedented fall in foodgrains absorption to levels prevalent 50 
years ago, and decline in average calorie intake in rural india. 
second, the prevalent analysis by policy makers, the Planning 
Commission and the government, however, can be summed up as an 
obdurate refusal to face the facts, and an attempt to construct a coun-
ter-factual fairy story which is illogical and in patent contradiction 
with the trends in the economy. “We must learn truth from facts” (Mao 
ZeDong) “or the facts will punish us” (added by Deng hsiao Ping) is 
a dictum that our policy makers would do well to bear in mind. Their 
theorization interprets severe loss of purchasing power and enforced 
decline in effective demand for food grains, as its very opposite, as 
‘over-production’ in relation to an allegedly voluntary reduction of 
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foodgrains intake by all segments of the population, and reaches 
the dangerous inference that foodgrains output should be cut back. 
it refuses to recognize that, while in developed societies, consumers 
can be separated from a minority who are agricultural producers, in 
a poor country like india the majority of consumers are themselves 
rural and directly involved in production as cultivators and labourers, 
so deflationary policies hit them hard in both these roles of producers 
and consumers. Price deflation does not benefit even landless labour-
ers since it is part of a process of income deflation which raises unem-
ployment faster than prices fall. our economists estimating poverty 
by the indirect method are still caught in the old conceptual trap of 
equating relative food price decline with declining poverty, without 
understanding that the adverse unemployment effects of deflation can 
swamp out any benefit of food price fall: they should study the eco-
nomics of the Great Depression for some insights into how deflation-
ary processes actually operate. 
As Table 11 shows, by 1999-2000 as many as five states had more 
than one-third of rural population below 1800 calories intake, and in 
another three states the percentage of persons with below 1800 calories 
intake, had risen between 1983 and 1999-00, though not exceeding one-
third at the latter date. (Note that Meenakshi and Viswanathan, 2003, 
obtain a larger number than we do, eight states with more than one-
third of population below 1800 calories in the 55th Round –but their use 
of kernel density functions to obtain the calorie distribution ogive, is 
perhaps overestimating the nutrition poverty figures, since their meth-
od includes all high income but calorie deficient people as well).
Despite this worsening situation at the ground level being reflect-
ed in the nutrition data, it would be very sad indeed if the present 
Planning Commission is tempted to make further spurious claims of 
‘poverty reduction’ as the previous ones had done, the moment the 
next large-sample Nss data on consumption becomes available. Their 
indirect method –which selectively uses the data by ignoring the nutri-
tion part of it– is bound to show a further steep and spurious ‘decline’ 
in rural poverty by 2005-06, to around 18-19 percent of rural popula-
tion from 27.4 percent in 1999-2000. 
This is because, owing to the unprecedented income deflationary 
situation itself, the rise in prices has been at a historic low between 
2000 to date. The CPiAL actually declined in 2000-01 compared to 
the previous year, and rose only 1 percent the next year. With low in-
flation, the CPiAL adjusted official poverty lines for 2003 and 2004 
works out to only Rs. 342 and Rs. 354, a mere Rs. 14 and Rs.26 more 
than the Rs.328 of 1999-00. The already published 58th Round Nss 
data relating to 2002-03 had shown that only 22 percent of all –india 
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rural population was below Rs. 342, a share which is falling further 
every year, solely because few persons can survive at such low levels 
of spending– it is indeed amazing that there are people surviving at 
all on less than Rs.11.5 per day. one can imagine how adverse their 
height, weight, morbidity rates and life expectancy would be relative 
to the average. 
it is no surprise that in fact the latest 60th Round consumption 
data covering January-June 2004, which has been released as Report 
No.505 by the Nss in end November 2005, shows that now only 23 
percent of all persons in rural india are below Rs. 354 monthly per 
capita expenditure, the poverty line for 2004 if schedule 1 is used and 
only 17.5 percent is below the same poverty line if schedule 2 is used. 
While this is a thin sample, it is adequate for the all-india estimates 
of course, this will be necessarily associated with a further fall in the 
calorie intake level corresponding to the official poverty line, from 
1890 calories to somewhere around or below 1800 calories, in short at 
least 600 calories below RDA. This information of declining nutrition 
standard associated with the official estimate is likely to be quietly 
suppressed as it has been in the past. The Government should bear in 
mind however, that any claims of ‘poverty reduction’ it might be mis-
guided enough to make, will no longer carry credibility since the ar-
bitrary and illogical nature of its method of calculation is today much 
better understood, and the contrast of any such claims, with all other 
adverse trends in the rural economy is too glaring to be ignored. 
since such a large fraction of the population is already at very low 
energy intake levels, they have been trying to maintain consumption 
by liquidating assets against debt. Thus there are not only adverse 
flow adjustment (lowered nutrition levels) but also stock adjustments 
going on, reflected in the emerging recent data on rising landlessness. 
We may expect to see rise in the already high concentration of assets 
in rural areas. in such a scenario labour bondedness against debt is 
also likely to be increasing.
The Tenth Plan, 1992 to 1997 sets out that Rs, 300, 000 crores are 
to be spent by the Centre on Rural Development Expenditures (adding 
up as before three items)13. Three years of the Plan or two-thirds of 
the period is over: Rs.100,000 crores or only one-third of the planned 
outlays have been spent, of which Rs.85,000 crores spending was dur-
ing the last two years of NDA rule, mid- 2002 to mid-2004, while there 
was a sharp cut-back to Rs. 15,000 crores only in 2004-05. As in 1991 
the first years after a general election are being used by the neo-liberal 
13 Namely, agriculture and rural development, irrigation and flood control, 
village and small scale industry.
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lobby in the new government which controls finance, to apply mind-
less deflation although unlike 1991 there is deep agrarian crisis today. 
This cynical move to cut rural development expenditures in the face 
of rising unemployment and agrarian distress, can only be in order 
to please international financial institutions and meet the arbitrary 
provisions of the FRbM Act. 
To achieve the 10th Plan target now, at least Rs.100,000 crores 
must be spent both in 2005-06 and 2006-07, of which about 25 to 30 
thousand crores should be on universal employment guarantee and 70 
to 75 thousand crores on rural development expenditures. This level 
of planned spending would total only about 2.5 percent of NNP and 
it needs to be stepped up steadily in later years to reach the 4 percent 
of NNP which prevailed in the late 1980s during 7th Plan before eco-
nomic reforms began.
When actual rural poverty is so high as nearly four-fifths of the 
population, and poverty depth is increasing with a higher proportion 
of people being pushed down into lower nutritional levels, there is 
no economic rationale for continuing with a targeted public distribu-
tion system. indeed as i have long argued, apart from the deflationary 
policies and exposure to the falling global prices, another reason for 
the denial of affordable food grains to the poor has been targeting us-
ing the arbitrary official poverty estimates. The reversal to a demand 
driven universal PDs is essential for rectifying the initial mistake 
made in 1997.but a demand driven universal PDs will work well only 
if mass purchasing power which has been greatly eroded over the last 
fifteen years, is restored through the implementation of a properly 
funded National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. The Act has been 
passed and implementation has started from Feb1. 2006. Within a 
month, 4 million persons have already registered to offer themselves 
for work. but the scheme cannot be said to be properly funded at all. A 
number of economists had pointed out that between Rs. 25,000 crores 
to Rs.30,000 crores was the order of annual expenditure required to 
give a genuine boost to employment and incomes after taking all mul-
tiplier effects into account. This could have been easily undertaken 
since tax receipts even at unchanged tax rates, have been buoyant, 
owing mainly to the rich getting considerably richer in recent years. 
but those controlling the government’s finances have already dem-
onstrated their lack of concern for dealing actively with the agrar-
ian crisis. All pre-existing employment creating programmes such as 
sGRY, JRY14 and all food-for-work programmes which together had 
accounted for Rs 11.7 thousand crores of the central government’s 
14 sGRY is sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana, JRY is Jawahar Rozgar Yojana. 
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expenditure in 2005-06, have been subsumed under and merged with 
the National Rural Employment Guarantee programme in the Febru-
ary 2006 budget proposals for fiscal 2006-07, and the total allocation 
to this is a mere Rs12.9 thousand crores, exactly one-tenth higher than 
in the previous year. This is in accordance with the prevailing defla-
tionist sentiments of those controlling the government’s finances and 
seeking to implement the bWi directives to reduce the fiscal deficit, 
but this continuing deflationist stance is detrimental to the effective 
implementation of the Act. The prognosis therefore remains far from 
encouraging: the agrarian crisis is not being addressed actively and 
the trend of increasing poverty depth is unlikely to be reversed unless 
public pressure is mounted to increase the funding of the NREG sub-
stantially to implement the Act.
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Political Participation and
Challenges of New Democracies: 
Remarks on China and Taiwan
sEVERAL AUThoRs hAVE NoTiCED the relationship between the 
internationalization (or the globalization) of the economy of a country 
with its democratization as an inevitable process. Nonetheless we can 
find important variations in this relationship that show, as in China, 
that there is not an inevitable relationship between economic liberal-
ism and democracy. in the contemporary changing process in China 
towards an increased local electoral participation of citizens, not to be 
considered as democratization, the endogenous factors along with the 
prevailing of the authoritarian state weigh more. on the other hand, 
in Taiwan, the democratic process can be linked to the search for in-
ternational legitimacy. Additionally it is important to consider the 
presence of a political and intellectual elite, educated in Europe and 
the UsA that is strongly imbued in western democratic values, which 
has been in power since the early 90s. We are taken by these instances 
to the various forms that a political system can adopt with citizen par-
ticipation, as Levitsky and Way have studied through applying several 
adjectives to democracy, marked by authoritarian traces, or through 
* Professor in Contemporary history of China and researcher of the Asia and Africa 
studies Center at The Mexico school. he is on the Editorial Advisory board of Estu-
dios de Asia y Africa magazine. he published several articles and books about China 
and its relationship with Latin America.
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authoritarianism with some forms of political participation (Levitsky 
and Way, 2002, Pershing, 2004). The case of Taiwan leads us to the 
well known debate between procedural democracy and its efficiency 
in terms of its consequences as studied by Amartya sen (sen, 1995).
The role of local elections in China
The changes in the Chinese political system during the reforms can 
be summarized as the transition from a totalitarian regime to a single 
party authoritarianism. This last form has required to decentralize 
decisions and to introduce innovative ways of political participation.
in order to understand the political changes in China, it is neces-
sary to consider first that as a result of the reforms, the complexity of 
the society has grown at great speed in the last twenty five years, in such 
a way that, today, roughly speaking, we find a well educated intellectual 
elite raised in the most sophisticated worldly thought trends, trauma-
tized by the Tiananmen repression in 1989, alienated by its privileges, 
not willing to risk its status, co-existing with a rich middle-class which 
accepts that itself is a by product of the authoritarian and developmen-
tal regime and because of that is also unwilling to risks its favorable 
circumstances. They are in a melting pot along with a wide majority of 
farmers and urban population strongly oriented to the satisfaction of 
their own basic needs; with a group of internal migrant workers that is 
more than ten per cent of the population, excluded from development; 
with a middle stratus of cadres from the Communist Party that use 
their power to get material profit from the new conditions; and all of 
them led by a political elite that not only searches to preserve its power 
through the Party but that requires specific instruments of governabil-
ity and legitimacy to guarantee the feasibility of the political system.
in terms of space there is an important sector of the population 
living in the urban communities of the oriental coast with high income 
and a cosmopolitan and consumerist culture coexisting with the ma-
jority of the population living with little resources and difficult infor-
mation access in the broad central and western areas of the country. 
There is also a great diversity of ethnic groups in the scarcely popu-
lated extensive south-west, extreme west, and center north territories, 
which have different ways for relating to space, economy and politics.
The study of the actual Chinese political system reveals that while 
the political elite acknowledges that the country’s severe inequality and 
corruption problems can be a real threat to governability, that elite is 
also forewarned by its own origin and nature to respond to this chal-
lenges within an authoritarian and single party frame. in order to face 
this situation, the new leadership has resorted, at least in the discourse, 
to instruments such as surveying functionaries and transparency and 
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has been using terms such as democracy and rule of law. however, 
the political elite has been clear about this matter: it moves within 
the frame provided by preserving the hegemonic position of the Com-
munist Party, which is endorsed by the Constitution and other related 
Laws. in other words, the defense of the rule of law in China means the 
confirmation of the predominance of the Communist Party. 
Therefore, these changes in the political discourse cannot be ana-
lyzed under the same lens as the meaning of the rule of law in other 
countries; instead, it has to be examined as an instrumental use of 
mechanisms that have been traditionally linked to democratic systems 
to help the survival of an authoritarian regime. in bringing together 
all these paradoxical elements we can search for the goal of citizen 
participation through voting in the local congress elections.
The first element that catches our attention from the new leader-
ship discourse is their stress on the great problems of the country that 
are no longer submitted as contradictions but as imbalances. Those 
submitted more frequently are: the inequalities in income and pover-
ty, the regional inequity in development, corruption and the excessive 
resource waste which is associated with environmental damage. 
one of the more interesting issues of the political change in China 
is the direct elections in the lower levels of the government structure. 
Though those changes were already in 1982’s Constitution they be-
came relevant from the mid 90’s onward. besides their inclusion in the 
Constitution, the direct elections in China are supported by two im-
portant legal instruments. The elections for the National People’s Con-
gress and the People’s Congresses of the lower levels are regulated by 
the Election Law of 1979. The direct elected village committees were 
regulated first by the organic Law on Village Committees approved 
provisionally by the standing Committee of the six National People’s 
Congress on November 24th, 1987. This Law was amended later and 
approved in its definitive form on November 4th, 1998 in the Fifth ses-
sion of the standing Committee of the Xi National People Congress.
As a result there are several kinds of direct elections: the village 
committees, the people’s congresses of townships and counties, the 
neighborhood committees and the popular assembly of districts and 
urban districts. These processes are also ruled by local regulations 
where the provinces have worked on them. in general terms these 
elections must follow the popularity principles, i.e. that all the legal 
age people can vote; equality, direct elections, secret ballots, multiple 
candidates, guarantee the right to vote and the supervision and recall 
of the chosen ones.
The urban equivalent of the village committees are the residents 
or neighborhood committees (chengshi jumin weiyuanhui) which go 
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back to 1954 when they were established to organize the urban resi-
dents that were not affiliated to a working unit. The law for urban 
elections was approved in1989 and it was based on the experimental 
law of the village committees. since 1999, the direct elections of these 
city-dweller committees have been in effect, when the Ministry of Civil 
Affaires selected and then the Party approved the experiment with a 
group of cities among which were beijing, Nanjing and Chongqing. 
in cities with high unemployment and where urban transformations 
have changed –in some cases violently– the way of living of its inhabit-
ants, these elections channeled the dissatisfaction.
since the village elections were implemented, two positions 
arose in the party, on one side, the middle and lower cadres were 
against the law because it undermined the roots of their power; on 
the other side the leaders at of the central power of the party de-
fended the law as an instrument for recovering of legitimacy among 
the people, which could be read as the ideological commandment of 
“masses line”.
however, in practice, it was more relevant to maintain political 
control, avoid the popular unrest caused by the local authorities’ abus-
es, and to guarantee the country governability. That is why, during 
the first period, the lower cadres of the party tried to grasp most of 
the village election positions, frequently using unlawful practices and 
causing local political tensions expressed in countless peasant protest 
movements.
The legitimacy crisis that followed the 1989 repression made the 
party leadership devoted to a big campaign to promote the rule of law 
which was systematized in the mid 90s. During this process the lead-
ership reached an important consensus on governability, stability and 
unity of the country. 
Given the aforementioned circumstances as well as its need for re-
newal and legitimacy, the Communist Party, after a thorough analysis 
of the situation, took a new position, which was posted in a document 
in July 2002. This document clarifies to the members of the party that 
they must respect the electoral laws and avoid imposing their own 
candidates. The document says; 
it is advocated that candidates for secretaries of party branches shall 
run for village committee election first; after they obtain the approval 
from the people, they can be nominated as candidates for secretar-
ies of party branches; should they fail to be elected head of village 
committees, they shall not be nominated as candidates for secretaries 
of party branches. Members of village committee can hold a concur-
rent post in party branches after s/he is approved by the inner-Party 
election. Members of village committees and village group leaders and 
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representatives of villagers can be admitted into the Party in order to 
infuse rural basic-level party organizations with new blood (Circular 
concerning improving villager committee election, 2002).
Direct elections in Chinese countryside have been observed by local 
and foreign Non Government organizations and have been managed 
by the Ministry of Civil Affairs whose educational work is highly and 
widely recognized. however, the majority of these elections don’t fol-
low the law closely, but surveillance along with education has slowly 
shown their effect. 
Meanwhile, in big cities like beijing, these local elections have 
taken independent defenders of popular causes to local congress, and 
in some places local entrepreneurs have won elections to local rep-
resentation. A noteworthy case was when Wang Youhua, brother of 
the former Tiananmen democracy activist and founder of the Chinese 
Democratic Party, Wang Youcai, was pressured by local government 
officials to withdraw his candidacy for the village chief elections in 
Liwu village committee in the east coast province of Zhejiang. (Asia 
Times, May 25, 2005) Through these examples we can state that the 
emphasis on the law and on the institutional reforms, such as local 
elections, can be mechanisms for a small change within the political 
practices and culture of the country. 
During 2005 there were more than 300,000 local direct elections 
for village committees in 15 provinces, municipalities and autono-
mous regions. since 1988 when the provisional organic Law for Vil-
lage Committee was approved there have been elections in the majori-
ty of the provinces and autonomous regions of the country. Up to 2005 
more than 700,000 elected village committees had been established. 
Even though the law has been interpreted locally in many ways, these 
elections involve open nominations, secret ballots and more candi-
dates than positions. According to the international observing agen-
cies the first urban elections have been mainly free and transparent.
since 1999 more than a dozen main cities have been selected to 
carry out direct elections of the neighborhood committees, the lowest 
level of municipal government. in 2005, after several experiments, the 
government decided to increase the number of cities that hold elections 
to choose their representatives in the local congresses. Among others 
these elections have taken place in beijing, shangyang, Nanning, Tian-
jin, Nanjing, Wuhan, harbin, Jinan, Changsha, Yinchuan y Ningbo.
it is remarkable that in some cities even foreigners have been can-
didates as was the case in Pudong or the Taiwanese entrepreneur who 
contested representation in the local congress of Tianjin (People’s Daily, 
october 23, 2005) in the same way experiments in consulting and trans-
parency were registered in some Guandong districts, where officials 
Globalization and the Washington Consensus
206
have began publishing their budgets and employment policies. in 2003, 
in a district of Jiangsu, the local authorities held a public referendum 
so the residents could choose the worst official in each administrative 
department. As a result nine officials were suspended for six months.
it could not be said that the electoral laws are accurately enforced, 
in theory the elections are open and their limit is the formation of po-
litical organizations, the candidates must only represent the interests 
of their communities. one of the main problems of these elections is 
illegal vote induction. in this regard, Zhan Chengfu, director of the 
department in charge of the administration of the basic level of the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs said: 
There is only one article dealing with the problem in the existing “or-
ganizational Law for Villager’s Committee” and moreover it is in prin-
ciple singular and vague in sense. There’s no definition on what is a 
bribed vote, nor is there any definite rule as regards how to deal with 
the problem and so it is somewhat difficult to handle the problem. 
Now what we can do is only to work out some rules and regulations on 
the basis as a related department, which can be used by local admin-
istration for reference. When these rules or regulations are testified to 
be correct and suitable in practice they can be taken as amendments 
for legislation. This is an accumulative process in the construction of a 
system (People’s Daily, 2005)1.
Many scholars have interpreted the opening of the political system in 
China as an after effect of globalization. From my personal point of 
view, the local elections are an instrument that the authoritarian elite 
utilizes to face the generalized discontent of the population –resulting 
from the corruption of local officials– which threatens governability. 
in 2005 there were 87,000 officially reported “mass incidents”, which 
are in fact social protest movements. The factors that caused these 
changes appear to be completely endogenous and the Chinese elite 
confirms it. During an important political meeting to commemorate 
the 50th anniversary of the National People’s Congress, the President 
and General secretary of the Communist Party, hu Jintao stated “…
history proves that blindly following western political systems would 
lead China to a dead end, and China’s current people’s congress system 
has strong vitality and great superiority”. The President also said:
We must be active in learning from all human civilizations, includ-
ing the positive results of political civilization. but we will never 
1 About the legal problems of elections see also <http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/
zm/20050202/xw/tb/200502030042.asp>.
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blindly copy the mode of other countries’ political systems (People’s 
Daily, 2004). 
Nature and challenges of the new
democracy in Taiwan
Taiwan requires a closer analysis because, from an institutional point 
of view, its democratic liberal system has been recognised worldwide as 
one of the most democratic countries. This process began with the end 
of Martial Law in 1987; however, the political opening can be traced 
back to 1972. in that year, the only party dictatorship of the kuomintang, 
presented signs of opening alternated with ferocious acts of repression. 
These first political changes occurred as an answer to Taiwan’s diplo-
matic isolation after being expelled from the United Nations in 1971. 
This international event undermined the position of the authoritarian 
government; from that moment on, and with growing intensity, some 
of the social forces began to express themselves such as: human and 
women rights or even early worker and student movements.
The death of Chiang kai-shek in 1975 and, three years later, the 
rise to the presidency of his son Chiang Ching-kuo who was more lib-
eral took place precisely when the pressure of the opposition groups 
was growing. on January first of 1979 another international event in-
tensified the problems: the UsA diplomatic recognition shifted from 
Taiwan to the People Republic of China, which meant another hard 
blow to the stability of the Taiwanese state. in December, some civilian 
groups led wide mass meetings in kaohsiung, the second city on the 
island, that were followed by a brutal police repression. by the early 
eighties the existence of the group called tangwai was already evident; 
these were organisations outside of the ruling party that fought for the 
regime’s liberalisation by imposing strong political pressure.
in March 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo announced to the kMT’s central 
committee that the moment of leading the country to constitutional 
democracy had arrived. Consequently, he named a group of twelve cen-
tral committee permanent members, including liberals and conserva-
tives, to assess the situation and propose a strategy. in June, the group 
presented a six point program: carry out extensive elections to choose 
the central organs representatives, reform local governments, directly 
elect the governors and mayors of Taipei and kaohsiung, simplify na-
tional security laws, legalise the new civilian associations and political 
parties, strengthen public order and fortify the work of the party.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) –which was tolerated 
for some time– made its foundation public in september 28th, 1986. 
Even though, the ministry of justice pressed charges against it for 
violating Martial Law, the president mediated and lifted the Mar-
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tial Law. in addition, he allowed the political parties that abandoned 
the communism and Taiwan’s independency causes. The DPP car-
ried out its first congress in November and adopted a Party constitu-
tion which supported in its documents –in ambiguous language that 
would not upset the government even more– Taiwan’s self-determina-
tion and its return to the United Nations.(Clark, 2000). The DPP, still 
without legal recognition, participated in the legislative elections of 
December 6th, 1986, where 84 members of the Legislative Yuan and 
73 members of the National Assembly were elected. The DPP won 
21% of the votes. on July 15th, 1987, Martial Law was suspended and 
on october 14th Taipei allowed family visits to the mainland for the 
first time. 
After Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, on January 13th, 1988, the vice-
president, Lee Teng-hui2, rose to the presidency. Lee, as the first presi-
dent born in Taiwan, started a ‘taiwanisation’ process within the gov-
ernment and proceeded to immediately dismantle the old structure of 
the state, brought by Chiang kai-shek directly from China. Therefore, 
on March 2nd, 1988, the National security Council requested the vol-
untary retirement of the members of the parliament elected on the 
continent during the 40’s.
Along with this taiwanisation process of the government, Lee Teng-
hui started extending democratic liberties. Thus on January 20th, 1989, 
more political parties were allowed, and on December 2nd –that same 
year– they were able to stand in the elections for the Legislative Yuan, 
the Provincial Assembly of Taiwan, Taipei’s and kaohsiung’s Munici-
pal Councils, and County Magistrates and Town Majors. The DPP won 
35% of the votes and the kMT 60%. The National Assembly elected Lee 
Teng-hui president for a six-year term on March 21st, 1990.
The pressure for more reforms was expressed in mass meetings 
and President Lee decided to search for consensus among the is-
land’s different groups; so, in the summer of 1990 he called a confer-
ence on national issues, where the leadership of the kMT and the 
opposition achieved an agreement. During the conference the most 
important aspects on democratization were discussed, and the par-
ticipants reached a consensus on the necessity of a political reform. 
Consequently, in April 1991, a constitutional reform cancelling some 
National Assembly prerogatives was carried out. An organisation 
devoted specifically to deal with Mainland related issues was also 
constituted. The same year, on December 21st, the elections for the 
National Assembly took place; the DPP obtained 24% of the votes 
2 Mayor of Taipei 1978-1981, Governor of Taiwan Province 1981-1984, and Vice 
President since 1984.
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and the kMT 71%. on December 31st, 1991, every Mainland-elected 
member of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Yuan 
of Control finally retired.
since 1991, the Constitution has been amended several times with 
the purpose of changing some foundations of the government struc-
ture and the electoral mechanisms. The acting periods of both the 
president and the members of the National Assembly were reduced 
from six to four years; the proportional representation was introduced 
in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly also. The president 
and the vice-president could be elected by direct popular vote instead 
of being elected indirectly. The president with the approval of the Leg-
islative Yuan instead named the members of the Yuan of Control, that 
used to be elected by the Provincial Assemblies and the Municipal 
Councils, so this organism was transformed into a semi-judicial insti-
tution. Moreover, on June 7, 2005, the National Assembly was finally 
abolished by a constitutional amendment. 
All these reforms implied a redefinition of relations with China. 
The new ascending Taiwanese elite wanted to abandon the reunifica-
tion project and began constructing an all-Taiwanese political struc-
ture and a new form of nationalism. At the same time, informal chan-
nels of communication with the continent were open; travel, telephony 
communication, and triangular commerce increased. At the moment, 
the intensification of the economic relationship has made the island 
highly dependent on its commerce with the continent. 
it is important to emphasise that the opening process was not 
only a product of the island’s domestic social forces but, also, of the 
relationship with China and the international context. China’s eco-
nomic reforms, initiated in the late 70’s, were already consolidated 
with a clear capitalist bias which, together with the dismantlement of 
the soviet Union in the early 90s, made the phantom of communism 
vanish. For the kMT the only recognised enemy had been the Com-
munist Party, hence the island’s economic prosperity, the success of 
anticommunist education and the rise of a particular society, were the 
reason why the kMT did not see a threat in the domestic opposition 
forces. besides, the extreme isolation of the island after the shift of the 
American diplomatic recognition, convinced the kMT leadership to 
undertake the political opening to assure some international legitima-
cy, especially because in the 80’s it was already clear that the Chinese 
Communist Party wouldn’t choose the political opening.
simultaneously with the creation of political parties, the con-
tained elements of a highly educated civil society began to be ex-
pressed in publications and in the formation of new social organisa-
tions out of the kMT’s control. (hu, 1994:479, 481, 485-6) Likewise, in 
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January 1994, the Law of Universities granted to those communities 
a bigger participation in the management of their own issues.
Another remarkable element of Taiwanese society is the civil or-
ganisations or foundations devoted to the achievement of community 
goals. Many of them played an important role during the Martial Law 
period; however, their independence was questionable. over time, 
those foundations acquired a bigger role and began following their 
own objectives, aside from the state. (hsiao, 1994, pp. 393-399) Most 
of those foundations are oriented to philanthropy, education or cul-
ture and only 3.6% of them are devoted to social activism; most of 
them are privately financed and depend neither on government nor 
on big corporations.
The foreign educated Taiwanese play an important role in the 
political transformation. in Taiwan, until the 80’s, the tendency was 
to send students abroad, mostly to the United states, to specialise in 
post-graduate studies. At the beginning the return rate of those stu-
dents wasn’t very high, due to the economy’s incapacity to incorporate 
them. (Liu, 1981) since the 90’s, however, the return of highly quali-
fied personnel grew dramatically because of the country’s improved 
conditions, such as better salaries, political liberties and a special in-
centive system created by the Commission for the Youth. 
Elections and political parties
The transition from an only party dictatorship to an electoral democ-
racy in Taiwan initiated when the DPP managed to participate in the 
1986’s legislative elections. Therefore the consolidation of this process 
has been parallel with free trustworthy elections and the strengthen-
ing of the parties. it was Lee Teng-hui who organised the first direct 
presidential elections in 1996, where Lee Teng-hui himself won with 
54% of the votes. The most important highlight of this transition, 
though, is the second direct presidential election, on March 18th, 2000. 
For the first time, the elections were very hard-fought and also they 
were characterised by splits in the two most important parties. Five 
candidates contended for the presidency.
Lee Teng-hui imposed Lien Chan, the regime’s vice-president, who 
represented the continuity option, as the kuomintang candidate; nev-
ertheless Lien tried to put some distance from Lee’s radical positions 
on the state/state relation formula with China, that irritated beijing 
in July, 1999. The candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party was 
Chen shuibian, who was born in Taiwan from a poor peasant’s fam-
ily and was known for his inflexible position against corruption. he 
dragged along throughout his whole campaign the burden of his par-
ty’s radical posture on Taiwan’s independence, this implied the support 
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of the Taiwanese population which preferred independence, but also 
brought to him beijing’s menaces. James soong, a former prominent 
member of the kuomingtang, decided to run as an independent candi-
date in November 1999, as a response to the authoritarian imposition 
of the president’s candidate in his party. Regarding the China issue, 
he represented the position of the so-called Mainlanders, that is to 
say the most favourable for beijing. These three were the most voted 
candidates, but also running was Li Ao, a leading intellectual from the 
New Party –an earlier kuomingtang split–, who surprisingly called on 
his followers to vote for Lien Chan; and hsu hsin-liang, who ran for a 
little group that had broken away from the DPP.
During the electoral process, it was difficult to predict who of the 
three strongest candidates would win the elections; the polls gave very 
similar figures. in general, the three government options didn’t differ 
substantially from an ideological point of view or on their propos-
als on Taiwan’s economic and social development. Two elements ap-
peared as the most important issues during the campaigns, the rela-
tions with the People’s Republic of China and the criticism against 
corruption; it seems however, that among the citizens the candidates’ 
background and personality were more relevant. This element, which 
can lead to the citizen’s preference for charismatic leaderships, may 
be very important in the dawn of a democratic system.
surprisingly for the ruling party, the election results were very un-
favourable. Chen shui-bian, for the DPP, obtained 39.3% of the votes, 
James soong 36.84% and Lien Chan from the kMT 23.1%. This meant 
a crushing defeat for the koumingtang, not only in quantitative terms 
but also for the certainty that they had put on winning the elections no 
matter what. still, when we consider the ideological affinities and the 
common origins of the losing candidates and add up their votes, we 
can observe a clear social tendency akin to kMT propositions.
Many elements explain the success of the Democratic Progressive 
Party’s formula, Chen shui-bian to the presidency and Anette Lu to 
vice-presidency. First, we have to consider that they were helped by the 
kMT’s break up and the attacks between the two candidates, Lien and 
soong, who each considered themselves as the great and only contend-
er. That dispute only served to expose the past government corruption, 
because Lien Chan was the vice-president and soong had been the first 
and last directly elected governor of the Taiwan province (1994-1998), 
making their mutual attacks based upon their respective administra-
tion’s flaws. As for Chen and Lu, they were leaders emerging from the 
civilian struggle for political rights in their own party. The fact that 48 
year old Chen came from a poor peasant family already marked a dis-
tance from the old political elite. besides what was important for voters 
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was his well-known inflexibility –as Taipei mayor– in the fight against 
corruption, the system of privileges and the administrative inefficiency. 
All of this was very appealing for a highly educated Taiwanese society, 
which no longer believed in promises and coercion –old kuomintang 
techniques. 55-year-old Anette Lu, was formed in the feminist struggles 
of the 70’s, she was imprisoned for fighting for human rights and is 
very popular among the female population.
it is difficult to judge the relevance for the elections of the tradition-
al Democratic Progressive Party posture on Taiwanese independence. 
China tried to influence the elections by different means; on February 
21st, the beijing government published the White Paper on the Taiwan 
issue, in a very threatening tenor, where a new condition justifying the 
use of force against Taiwan was added: the “indefinite delay on the con-
versations about reunification”. besides, the Chinese leaders’ harsh dec-
larations on the possibility of the use of force were given great publicity. 
obviously, this affected the Taiwanese society since, despite government 
intervention; Taipei stock Exchange’s Taiex index lost 7.1% in the week 
prior to the elections. This could have also influenced the surprisingly 
high number of votes for James soong, who represented the most mod-
erate position about China. After the publishing of the aforementioned 
White Paper, the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan conducted a poll 
demonstrating that the publication had had the opposite desired effect.
it seems that this crucial issue wasn’t determining as the con-
tenders didn’t show radically different positions regarding China. The 
following factors were the ones deciding the election in Chen’s favour: 
first, the kMT’s division and the focusing of the old party’s campaign 
against its former affiliated, James soong; second –but not necessarily 
less relevant–, the vote for change. Also important were Chen’s and his 
partner Anette Lu’s personal characteristics, the Democratic Progres-
sive Party’s promises of fighting corruption and the public support to 
Chen by some businessmen.
Decisively, those elections were crucial for Taiwan. on the one 
hand, they offered the chance to test relations with China of the new 
Taiwanese nationalist elite that has proved to be less radical than Lee 
Teng-hui, and on the other hand it has led to a readjustment of the 
political forces. This last process began with James soong’s departure 
from the kuomintang and his unexpectedly high number of votes. be-
sides, when the electoral results were known the kMT militants organ-
ised protests, some of them violent, to demand Lee Teng-hui’s resigna-
tion from the party’s presidency and his recognition of responsibility 
for defeat. Lien Chan resigned from the kuomintang vice-presidency 
and later on Lee Teng-hui resigned from the party presidency, which 
didn’t satisfy his angry party fellows.
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The kuomintang immediately undertook a self-criticism process 
and a structural reform. in the provisional meeting of the 15th Con-
gress of the Party, three months after the elections, Lien Chan was 
elected president and he nominated five new party’s vice-presidents, 
including a woman. subsequently, in the fourth plenary session of the 
15th Central Committee, 31 new members of the standing committee 
were elected; none of them was imposed from above. Moreover, the 
party’s constitution was reviewed and the direct election of the future 
president by all party members was introduced.
immediately after the elections, soong’s followers insisted him to 
create a new party. This is the reason why he founded the People First 
Party (PFP), which won over many kMT and New Party legislatives, 
becoming the Legislative Yuan’s third force.
Despite its reforming attempts, the kMT drowned in a new crisis 
after loosing the 2000 presidential elections. it was not only affected 
by the strong division of James soong’s departure and the foundation 
of a new party, but also by the new government’s fight against cor-
ruption that has revealed many details on the kMT members corrup-
tion, which was no surprise to anybody, but hadn’t been cleared up. 
besides, in the December 1st, 2001 legislative elections it was defeated 
again by the DPP, which led kMT to establish alliances with James 
soong’s party. 
in the 2004 presidential elections, the kMT lost again. however, 
the narrow margin giving triumph to the DPP –0.22 percent– and the 
severe accusations against the winning party and its candidate for the 
suspicious financing of their campaign which caused a serious dis-
credit to the DPP in its second period, have created an advantageous 
situation for the kMT which recovered its large share of votes in De-
cember 2005 local elections. This party’s recovery is due considerably 
to the continuous corruption scandals surrounding the DPP, which in 
its second period in government has succumbed to some corruption 
practices that were the kMT’s prerogative in the past. Also important 
in this recovery has been the charismatic leadership of Ma Ying-jeou, 
the Taipei mayor. At the end of June 2006, the kMT and the PFP tried 
to pass a motion in congress to organise a referendum to recall Presi-
dent Chen shui-bian amid a swirl of corruption scandals embroiling 
his wife and son-in-law. 119 of the legislature’s 221 members, well be-
low the two-thirds majority needed to force a referendum, backed the 
motion. The strong opposition in the congress has practically para-
lysed many actions in Chen’s government. besides, the kMT leaders 
have reached an important approach with China, at a time when this 
country was approving laws that set up its intention of making a mili-
tary intervention on the island if it declares independence. 
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on November 3, 2006, Wu shu-chen, President Chen shui-bi-
an’s wife, and threee other high-ranking officials of the Presidential 
office were indicted of corruption. Consequently, even prominent 
members of DPP have criticized the President. since the beginning 
of that year a prominent leader of DPP, shih Ming-de, has been in 
open opposition to the President Chen. in september he launched a 
campaign called “Million voices against corruption. President Chen 
must go”. Tens of thousands of people demonstrated in the streets 
wearing a red shirt asking for the resignation of the President. This 
movement, supported by the kMT, maintain a sitting on the Main 
Train station of Taipei, every day from 6 to 10 pm, asking for the 
resignation of the president. 
Taiwanese Society and Its Political Process
one element characterising Taiwanese society is its dynamic class 
mobility, as a product of development and economic opportunities. 
The general conditions encouraged by the state that have helped this 
social dynamism consist of efficient land reform, strong investment 
in education, industrial development and infrastructure construction. 
An interesting factor bearing upon social mobility is occupational 
crossing; many corporate employees have also small family assem-
blage companies that subcontract with big corporations. in the same 
way, because of its high level of information, people take advantage of 
the financial offerings so their savings grow fast with highly profitable 
investments.
All these elements have contributed to achieve a relatively fair 
income distribution that gives a sense of being constantly improved. 
however, due to the companies’ internationalisation and the invest-
ments placed abroad, when it is expressed in technical figures, this 
fair distribution reflects a different situation. During the initial period 
of social transformation and accelerated economic development, the 
income disproportion dramatically decreased because of the land re-
form in the 50’s. Nonetheless, the economic transformation toward 
bigger capital investment and technology exports, initiated in the 80’s, 
has –marginally– increased inequalities. in 1953, the Gini Coefficient 
was 0.56, by 1964 it decreased to 0.33 and by 1970 to 0.30. Later on, 
the Gini Coefficient increased, from 0.277 in 1980 to 0.316 in 1993, 
which is not directly perceived by the population for it is a reflect of 
economic internationalisation.
This situation, combined with other social traits, has prevented 
severe class conflicts on the island. The economy’s ‘family factor’, is 
another social element –hard to measure– that has also avoided em-
ployer-worker conflicts. A great portion of small and medium size 
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companies sustaining the island’s economy were family businesses 
employing preferably relatives and other people close to the family. 
Likewise, from the mid 60’s to the mid 80’s, the demand of work ex-
ceeded the supply, which forced businessmen to improve the working 
conditions to attract possible employees.
Until the end of the Martial Law in 1987, kuomintang exerted 
a corporative control over labour and it repressed every class con-
flict led by workers. Unions were utilised as a means of control rather 
than serving to protect the workers’ interests. This has changed and 
several independent unions, along with public manifestations and la-
bour disputes have emerged since 1987. Nevertheless, the workers’ 
movement is not an important political player because of the lack of 
severe economic contradictions, the existence of real options for in-
creasing income and the people’s tendency to combine different eco-
nomic activities. it is also essential to consider that the kuomintang 
–which held the government until May 2000– took political measures 
to provide social welfare, as well as redistribution policies wich took 
over some goals of the unionists. The party’s corporative tendency also 
reached out to the business sectors; by means of state/private com-
pany joint investments, and by using regulations and its fiscal power, 
the kuomintang with its political power controlled the most impor-
tant businessmen. This tendency changed with Lee Teng-hui’s regime, 
which allowed important businessmen, many of them of Taiwanese 
origin, to reach political power; and through different ways they have 
occupied legislative positions, a phenomenon that is not without its 
corruption accusations.
in general, we could distinguish Taiwanese society for its middle 
class predominance. it is composed of small and medium size busi-
nessmen, intellectuals, technicians, administrative workers of every 
level, et cetera. Due to the dramatic economical and political changes 
on the island, we can consider it mostly a second-generation middle 
class, characterised by a liberal political positioning, the supporting 
of democratisation and an open attitude toward the mixing of their 
different groups of origin.
From the social structure perspective, the most important cleav-
age that we can find on the island –for its complexity– is probably the 
one dividing the “Taiwanese” from the “Mainlanders”. it is an inherited 
identity, and it tends to dissolve. This division refers to people that ar-
rived to the island before 1945, and to their descendents; but most of 
them share a common origin and the same culture. Their difference 
lies in the fact that Taiwanese lived under Japanese rule for about 50 
years, while mainlanders arrived later to the island and settled in as a 
political class, monopolising key positions in the state structure, in the 
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ruling party and in educational and cultural institutions. They imposed 
things such as the Mandarin Chinese as the spoken language, or even 
a national concept based on a government that, in theory, controlled 
the whole of the Chinese territory. Another important event that con-
tributed to widen this division was the repression against the people 
opposing the occupation troops, which led to the massacre of about 
20,000 people on February 18th, 1947. This event is still remembered on 
the island and is the symbolic axe of a Taiwanese identity “oppressed” 
by the mainlanders. it is estimated that by the time of their arrival, 
the mainlanders –including administrative workers, military person-
nel and political refugees– were about one and a half million people; 
almost 20 % of the island’s population in 1949. by the mid 60’s they 
represented 15% of the island’s total population –probably 30% of the 
people living in urban areas. Nowadays, the estimation is that they 
amount to slightly over 10% of the population.
Regarding the work division, the separation can be expressed in 
the following way: relying on family labour and land possession, Tai-
wanese focused on productive activities, while –as we said before– 
Mainlanders, in general, occupied the state’s and the Party’s adminis-
trative positions as well as the management of new companies, settled 
on the island thanks to the state support and foreign investment3.
historically, these social boundaries have been expressed in the 
principal political parties, and they are still a fundamental issue in 
new political associations. Mainlanders kept their prominence in the 
kuomintang as the DPP have assumed the cause of Taiwanese vindica-
tion; so Taiwanese represent the majority of its leaders and its follow-
ers. it explains why a Taiwanese president of the kuomintang was such 
an important element on the structural change of these groups’ rela-
tions. The Mainland sectors inside the kMT that think that they have 
been left out by their leaders, founded another party in 1993, the New 
Party, which keeps a detailed proposal for trans-strait relations on its 
program platform and, moreover, its members pursue associations with 
the continent. The identity issue was also behind the foundation of the 
Taiwan solidarity Union Party, in August 2000, which states in its plat-
form the trans-strait relations as one of its main political concerns. This 
party grouped the kMT dissidents –who observed, after the electoral 
defeat, a change of direction on the taiwanisation tendencies imposed 
3 besides this division, it could be added that Taiwanese establish some group dis-
tinctions between the hokkien –representing the majority– and the hakka; though 
they both come from regions of the same province of Fujian. Likewise, they make 
a difference between the people coming from Guangdong province. These groups 
present notorious linguistic differences.
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by Lee Teng-hui–, and also some of the DPP dissidents –disappointed by 
president Chen shui-bian’s moderate policy towards China.
From my observation, in spite of the basis of this social division 
being rather weak, it is present in almost every group. it is a division 
encouraged by DPP as a way to present it self as a real alternative to 
kMT. Moreover, for many people it is a way to express their remorse 
for decades of repressive government of kMT. in other words, the so-
cial trauma of the repressive kMT government has been channelled to 
this “social division”. Contrary to other cases, the repressors have not 
rendered judgment. 
Taiwan Democracy’s Lessons
The DPP’s victory over the kuomintang, in the presidential elections 
of 2000, brought a regime shift that was confirmed the following year, 
when the kMT lost its majority in the congress. Although this has ful-
filled the expectations on the democratic transition of those prioritis-
ing the change of party in government, there are still some elements 
of the political system that can be considered problematic for the con-
solidation of democracy in Taiwan.
The state structure inherited a very close bond between the 
executive and the legislative powers as a by-product of a long peri-
od of a single-party administration. The DPP’s government agenda 
has suffered some paralysis due to the opposition alliances in the 
Legislative Yuan that often frustrate their actions. This has shown 
the necessity for some political reforms and constitutional amend-
ments allowing a definition of the political system towards a new 
one –perhaps one that, structurally, gives more prominence to the 
president; the kMT has systematically opposed this. on the other 
hand, inside the DPP, some disagree with the fact of having the 
president as the head of his own party, while others praise the sys-
tem’s advantages for building more cohesive action in the congress. 
The conflict between executive and legislative powers not only cre-
ates economic and administrative paralyses, but it also affects the 
prestige and significance of democracy as an efficient political sys-
tem among social sectors such as entrepreneurs and the like. The 
political elites from all parties do not consider the consequences of 
this issue on their agendas.
While in the past the core problems of the local elections were 
traditional local loyalties and vote buying, Taiwan has now entered 
a corruption wipeout process. The problem today is the way political 
parties are considering local election processes. For many of them 
these elections are only important in terms of people’s preferences to-
ward the next national elections, especially the presidential election, 
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without considering that local elections may play an important role in 
the political education of citizens in new democratic systems.
There is a growing lack of trust in political parties, which is ex-
pressed in a growing number of candidates independently running for 
elections. Frequently, political party campaigns are based on a series 
of corruption scandals or on the personal features of the candidates. 
Quite often ideological considerations are neglected in order to facili-
tate inter-party alliances otherwise impossible. small political parties 
usually “sell” or exchange voters’ preferences to negotiate and ensure 
political positions with big parties. All these abnormalities along with 
the frequency of election processes have brought a sort of “political fa-
tigue syndrome” among voters, which could in the future be expressed 
by staying away from ballot boxes. it can also be expressed by looking 
for charismatic leadership outside political parties, a person who may 
not always have a strong commitment to democracy. 
it is relevant also to consider the importance of the role played by 
the media along with the influences of local factions and interpersonal 
relationship networks and their effects in new democracies’ political cul-
ture. in a situation where candidates and parties are only looking for 
votes, they tend to sell themselves as any other commodity. Consequently, 
a kind of show business has become part of this new “pop electoral cul-
ture”. Therefore, expensive and efficient campaigns can result into cata-
pulting not precisely the best candidates to power, while the scandal-hun-
gry media avoids debating the important issues for communities.
There is a strong tendency to “personalize” leadership. influential 
leaders usually abandon parties when they do not obtain the nomination 
they seek. Then they run as independent contenders or establish a new 
small party to be able to negotiate with bigger organizations. As a result, 
voters have to choose from a number of parties or candidates offering 
similar ideologies and platforms. They usually end up voting for the most 
charismatic candidate or supporting whichever party seems stronger. 
Considering the case of Taiwan, i can conclude, that democracy is 
more than copying procedures and institutions. The political culture is 
particularly important, new democracies still need to go through po-
litical education in order to create real citizenship. The role of political 
parties in this process is crucial. however, political parties focused only 
on votes seem to neglect their role in political education. This situation 
tends to undermine the prestige and significance of democracy in socie-
ties where authoritarianism is not so far away historically speaking. 
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